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Abstract 
In this thesis, I explore the topic of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in UK 
publicly traded firms. My objective is threefold. First of all, I investigate debt-holders‟ 
reaction to CEO compensation in terms of the cost of debt financing. Secondly, I 
examine the possible link between CEO compensation and expectation management. 
Thirdly, I examine whether and how the interactive relation between CEO career 
horizon and compensation package affects a firm‟s research and development spending.  
 
Multiple regression is employed in this thesis to investigate the causal relationship 
between these above mentioned aspects I‟m interested (the cost of debt, expectation 
management and research and development spending) and CEO compensation. I 
consider all major compensation components for a typical CEO in UK publicly traded 
firms: defined benefit pension, bonus, restricted shares, traditional stock options and 
performance-vested stock options. The accumulated equity incentives, such as 
ownership, are also examined.  
 
My major findings are as follows. First of all, I find that an increase in defined benefit 
pension and bonus in CEO compensation are associated with a lower bond yield spread, 
while an increase in stock options and ownership intensifies it. Secondly, I document 
that CEO equity incentives that will be vested in the following year are positively 
associated with the probability of employing expectation management to meet or beat 
financial analysts‟ forecasts about a firm‟s reporting earnings. Thirdly, I demonstrate 
that older CEOs will not spend less in research and development expenditures in 
general. However, older CEOs with more defined benefit pensions and ownership are 
reluctant to engage in such an investment.  
iii 
 
My results generate several implications for CEO compensation research. First of all, I 
show that debt-holders rationally incorporate the information of CEO compensation 
about risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives when pricing a firm‟s publicly traded 
debts. Secondly, I provide the evidence that CEO compensation motivates top managers 
to manipulate information disclosure by employing expectation management for 
personal gains. Thirdly, the joint influence of CEO career horizon and compensation 
package on a firm‟s research and development spending is highlighted. CEO 
compensation motivates a short-sighed and risk-averse investment policy when top 
managers have a short career horizon.  
 
The first novel contribution in this thesis is the coverage of CEO pension, which is 
overlooked by the most of previous literature on compensation studies. Secondly, I 
provide the evidence that the popularity of expectation management in the UK, which is 
well documented in the literature, can be partly explained by CEO compensation. 
Finally, the interactive relation between CEO compensation and career horizon on a 
firm‟s investment policy is re-examined. It provides further material in the debate of 
career horizon problem, which has no consensus in the previous literature. Overall, this 
thesis generates some empirical evidence about the influence of CEO compensation on 
managerial behaviour. Some adverse effects of CEO compensation highlighted in this 
thesis may help remuneration committee to design a better pay package for top 
managers in the future. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
1.1. Motivations  
 
Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation studies have drawn attention from 
academics for several decades. As reviewed by Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder 
(2007), research on the topic of CEO compensation can be classified into two main 
categories. The first group of studies looks at the pay-performance relationship (e.g. 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; 
Conyon, Peck and Sadler, 2001; Leone, Wu and Zimmerman, 2006; Duffhues and 
Kabir, 2008; Ozkan, 2011). These studies mainly investigate the sensitivity between 
firm performance and CEO compensation. The basic idea behind them is that CEO 
compensation is expected to align interests of shareholders and managers, thus 
mitigating agency problems (see the review by Murphy, 1999). The second type of 
research on CEO compensation focuses on the issue of how compensation will affect 
managerial behaviour. These studies examine how pay will affect top managers‟ 
information disclosure strategies (e.g. Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003), risk 
preference (e.g. Low, 2009), earnings manipulation (e.g. Bergstresse and Philippon, 
2006), information manipulation (e.g. Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) and shares 
repurchasing (e.g. Sanders and Carpenter, 2003). These studies often suggest that the 
effect of CEO compensation in managerial behaviour is not always in line with what 
shareholders expect. CEO compensation may provide incentives for goal misalignment 
between the agent and the principal.  
 
The development of corporate governance mechanisms in the UK has had a great 
impact on CEO compensation. The publication of the Greenbury Report and the 
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Combined Codes (1998, 2003, 2006, and 2010) provide extensive guidance for good 
practices in remuneration design and disclosure. Furthermore, the introduction of the 
Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulation (2002) requires more transparent 
information disclosure and a greater auditors‟ responsibility for directors‟ remuneration 
report. The Companies Act 2006 (section 439) mandates shareholders a power of vote 
for directors‟ remuneration in the annual general meeting (AGM). Hence shareholders 
are entitled to have a critical say on CEO compensation. In short, all these settings 
mentioned above intend to strengthen the relationship between firm performance and 
CEO compensation, thus limiting windfall pay for top managers.  
 
The improved information disclosures for CEO compensation and different corporate 
governance settings (e.g. more detailed information disclosure for executive stock 
options exercise is required in the UK than the US) have inspired more and more 
researchers to examine CEO compensation in Britain. These studies focus on issues 
including the comparison between UK CEO pay and overseas CEO pay (e.g. Conyon 
and Schwalback, 2000; Conyon, Core and Guay, 2011), managerial opportunistic 
behaviour (Kuang, 2008) and pay-performance relation (e.g. Ozkan, 2011). Their work 
contributes to the existing literature by successfully exploring distinctive features of UK 
CEO compensation.  
 
In this thesis, I intend to fill three gaps in the literature by analysing UK CEO 
compensation data. First of all, I would like to examine the relationship between CEO 
compensation and the cost of debt. Early literature mainly investigates CEO 
compensation from the point of view of shareholders (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
focusing on principal-agent conflicts. Recent studies begin to shed light in the conflict 
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between shareholders and debt-holders. One of interesting questions is whether and 
how shareholders and debt-holders react differently to CEO compensation (e.g. Billett, 
Mauer, and Zhang, 2010). A few studies have also examined the costs of debt on a 
single pay component (e.g. Duru, Mansi and Reeb, 2005).To the best of my knowledge, 
there is no study in the existing literature explores the cost of debt financing by 
considering all major CEO pay components and overall pay structure. In Chapter 2, I 
seek to provide empirical evidence to fill this gap by examining comprehensive pay 
components received by UK CEOs.   
 
Secondly, I explore the possible link between CEO compensation and expectations 
management. Expectations management refers to information manipulation in order to 
lower market expectations about a firm‟s profitability. The literature suggests that 
meeting or beating financial analysts‟ earnings forecasts is a major concern for top 
managers (e.g. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005). Earnings management by 
inflating accounting numbers (e.g. Cheng and Warfield, 2005) and expectations 
management by dampening market expectations (e.g. Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002) 
are two tools to help CEOs to achieve market expectations. Compared with earnings 
management, few studies focus on expectations management. Athanasakou, Strong and 
Walker (2009) document that expectations management is wide spread in the UK.  In 
Chapter 3, I seek to link expectations management with CEO compensation. I argue 
that CEO compensation may provide top managers with incentives to manipulate 
information disclosure for personal gains.  
 
Thirdly, I re-examine the so-called career horizon problem by considering the influence 
of CEO compensation on research and development spending. There is a debate about 
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whether career horizon affects managers‟ investment decisions. The career horizon 
problem hypothesizes that older CEOs are likely to cut long-term investment because 
their short career horizon limits the benefits from that spending. The empirical results 
are mixed. Some studies find that older CEOs are less likely to spend in risky and long-
term investments (e.g. Barker and Mueller, 2002), while other research documents no 
evidence to support investment cuts by retiring CEOs (e.g. Conyon and Florou, 2006). 
My re-examination adds additional material in this debate by analysing more recent UK 
data. In addition, few studies investigate the career horizon problem by considering all 
major CEO compensation components. In Chapter 4, I investigate whether and how 
different CEO compensation components affect top managers‟ investment decisions 
across various career horizon lengths.  
 
1.2. Major findings and contributions  
 
As mentioned in Section 1.1, studies on CEO compensation can be classified into two 
general categories (Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder, 2007): (1) pay and performance 
relationship; and (2) pay and managerial behaviour. In this thesis, the first issue I 
investigate, the cost of debt, can be viewed as a special pay-performance relationship. 
That is how debt-holders will react to CEO compensation in terms of bond yield spread. 
The rest of the two issues, including expectations management and the investment 
decision, can be classified in the second type of studies on CEO compensation. That is 
how top manager pay will affect managerial behaviour. My empirical study provides 
some interesting results on the role of CEO compensation in the UK.  
 
First of all, I highlight a significant CEO compensation component which has been 
overlooked by the most of previous studies: pensions. The role of pensions on 
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managerial behaviour still remains largely unknown, partly due to the poor data 
availability in the early period (before 2003 in the case of UK). The recent improved 
disclosure of CEO compensation (e.g. Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulation, 
2002) makes it possible to test the relationship between CEO pension and observable 
managerial behaviour directly. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that CEO pension 
can be considered as inside debt, because firms are liable to pay any deficit in their 
pension funds, and CEOs with pensions are potential debt-holders. Therefore, pension 
may generate unique risk-aversion incentives for CEOs. Such a view gets supports from 
some recent US studies (e.g. Edmans and Liu, 2011). In a UK study, Minhat (2009) also 
provides some evidence that a high level of CEO pension will lead to lower firm risks, 
which is measured as stock return volatility. In this thesis, I generate further evidence to 
echo the role of CEO pension in providing risk-aversion incentives. In Chapter 2, I find 
that the cost of debt, which is measured as the bond yield spread, is negatively related 
with CEO pension compensation. This suggests that pensions‟ unique risk-aversion 
incentives may align interests of CEOs and debt-holders. Hence debt-holders will 
charge less for borrowing to a firm which provides more pensions to its CEOs.  In 
Chapter 4, I document that older CEOs with more pensions are less likely to spend in 
research and development expenditures. This indicates that as pension vesting date 
approaches, CEOs with more pensions are concerned about the safety of their post-
retirement funds. Consequently, they are less likely to engage in risky investments in 
such circumstance. Overall, my study highlights the unique incentives for risk-aversion 
provided by CEO pension. This indicates the potential benefits in terms of debt 
financing and the potential cost in the issue of investment decision if a CEO receives 
more pensions.  
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Secondly, I examine the impact on the cost of debt from CEO compensation by 
considering all major pay components in Chapter 2. I predict that the cost of debt will 
increase if pay components are able to generate risk-seeking incentives, while the cost 
of borrowing will decline if pay components can provide risk-aversion incentives. 
Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that a CEO with more stock options and 
ownership will face a higher cost of debt. On the other hand, firms which provide more 
pensions and bonuses to their CEOs will be better off in terms of their costs of 
borrowing. In addition, I find that debt-holders dislike stock options more than 
ownership. Among stock options, performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) outweigh 
traditional stock options (TSOs) as far as increasing the cost of debt is concerned. The 
distinctive features of those equity incentives are able to explain these different 
reactions from debt-holders. Overall, my study shows that debt-holders can rationally 
consider the impacts of various CEO pay components on managerial risk-taking 
incentives and price bonds accordingly. Compared with previous studies (e.g. Ertugrul 
and Hegde, 2008; Brockman, Martin and Unlu, 2010), my study considers a more 
comprehensive range of CEO pay components. By splitting stock options into PVSOs 
and TSOs, I provide a further insight into the distinctive features of different types of 
stock options.  
 
Thirdly, I investigate the possible link between CEO compensation and expectations 
management in Chapter 3. Expectations management refers to an idea that managers 
purposefully dampen market expectations, so that final reported earnings are more 
likely to achieve market expectations. The literature documents that the stock market 
tends to reward firms which achieve market expectations (e.g. Bartov, Givoly and 
Hayn, 2002), and this achievement will benefit CEO bonuses and following insider 
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trading (e.g. Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004). Hence 
I expect that bonuses and equity incentives (stock options and restricted shares) which 
will be vested in the following year (after current year‟s earnings announcement) are 
likely to provide incentives for expectations management. I find that both bonuses and 
equity incentives which will be vested in the following year are positively related to the 
probability of achieving market expectations, as predicted. However, only equity 
incentives may lead to a higher probability of expectations management, while bonuses 
do not. My results demonstrate that although bonuses and equity incentives motivate 
CEOs to care about market expectations, top managers may choose different tools to 
achieve such a goal. Equity incentives are more likely to motivate expectations 
management, while bonuses may provide incentives for employing other tools (e.g. 
earnings manipulation) to achieve market expectations. My study echoes Athanasakou, 
Strong and Walker (2009; 2011) that expectations management is wide spread in the 
UK. My results show that the prevalence of expectations management in Britain can be 
partly explained by CEO compensation. This highlights the incentives for information 
manipulation which are provided by CEO compensation.  
 
Fourthly, I show how CEO compensation is related to investment decisions in different 
lengths of CEO career horizon. I document that there is no evidence to indicate that 
CEOs will curtail research and development spending when their career horizons 
become short, which is inconsistent with early literature (e.g. Barker and Mueller, 
2002), while consistent with more recent studies (e.g. Conyon and Florou, 2006). In 
addition, I find that pensions discourage research and development spending among 
older CEOs. As far as ownership is concerned, research and development spending 
generally increases with the level of ownership. However, older CEOs with more 
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ownership seem to spend less on research and development expenditure, compared with 
counterparts with less ownership. Overall, my results show some significant impacts on 
investment decisions from the interactive relationship between CEO career horizon and 
compensation. The role of CEO compensation in investment decisions may vary 
according to different lengths of career horizon. In short, this study provides further 
material for the debate on the career horizon problem. It is consistent with the view that 
CEOs‟ career horizon lengths should be considered vital when designing CEO 
remuneration packages (e.g. Cheng, 2004; Cazier, 2011).  
 
In summary, these results in this thesis provide some evidence to explain managerial 
behaviour and debt-holders‟ reactions from the aspect of CEO compensation. The role 
of CEO compensation in the costs of debt, expectations management and investment 
decisions are significant, but not always in line with shareholders‟ interests. The 
remuneration committee should consider these “side-effects” of various pay 
components when structuring compensation packages for CEOs.  
 
1.3. Thesis organization  
 
I investigate three issues in this thesis and organize them into separate chapters. Chapter 
2 examines the relationship between CEO compensation and the cost of debt. Chapter 3 
presents the link between CEO compensation and expectations management. The roles 
of the interactive relationship between CEO pay and career horizon on investment 
decisions are demonstrated in Chapter 4. The conclusions, limitations and suggestions 
for future research are presented in the final chapter.  
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Chapter 2   CEO Compensation and the Cost of Debt 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
Are creditors concerned with CEO compensation? In their seminal paper, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that if CEO compensation only aligns interests of shareholders 
and managers, there is a strong incentive for top managers to expropriate creditors‟ 
wealth by undertaking risky investments. Shareholders can award some specific forms 
of compensation to motivate CEOs towards accepting high risk investment projects. 
This happens primarily due to the convex payoff structure of equity incentives (e.g. 
stock options). Creditors can benefit from higher CEO compensation as long as 
increased managerial effort reduces the probability of firm default. But they are also 
more likely to suffer when additional risky investments amplify the firm‟s default 
probability. 
 
John and John (1993) argue that creditors rationally anticipate the risk-shifting 
incentive coming from CEO compensation and therefore require a corresponding 
increase in risk premium. Hence, firms that use CEO compensation to closely align 
interests of top managers and shareholders are more likely to face a higher borrowing 
cost. Since a higher cost of borrowing is damaging for firms, especially those requiring 
additional debt financing, there is a pressure for a reduction in CEO compensation. This 
means that CEO compensation should be designed to optimize the trade-off between 
these benefits from risk-shifting and these losses from increased borrowing cost. Ortiz-
Molina (2007) argues that less incentive compensation (e.g. stock options) for top 
managers is deliberately introduced in order to lower the borrowing cost when the 
conflict between shareholders and debt-holders is more severe (e.g. highly levered 
firms). 
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In this chapter, I investigate the impact of CEO compensation on a firm‟s borrowing 
cost. A few studies have previously examined various aspects of the relationship 
between CEO pay and the cost of debt. Duru, Mansi and Reeb (2005) analyse the 
impact of cash bonuses, while Shaw (2007), Ertugrul and Hegde (2008), Devos, Prevost 
and Rao (2008) and Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) examine equity compensation. 
These studies focus on a single pay component and relate it to a firm‟s cost of debt. 
However, if lenders rationally use CEO compensation to assess the impact of agency 
problems on a firm‟s credit risk, they should consider not only the size of each pay 
component separately, but also the overall structure of a CEO‟s compensation package. 
The relative proportions of various compensation elements may convey additional 
information about the direction and magnitude of risk-taking incentives. Therefore, I 
examine the effect of all main components of CEO pay on the cost of debt.  
 
I make three key contributions to the existing literature. First of all, I investigate 
whether a firm‟s cost of debt is affected by not only cash-based performance-related 
pay (bonus) and equity-based incentives (share and option grants), but also by debt-like 
pay (defined benefit pensions). Although the latter form of CEO compensation is 
ubiquitous and has the potential to align interests of CEOs and debt-holders, empirical 
studies rarely consider it. Because the detailed CEO pension data is only required to be 
disclosed from 2003 in the UK. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first 
empirical test to investigate the impact of CEO pensions on the cost of debt
1
. 
 
                                                 
1
 Wei and Yermack (2011) study the reaction of bondholders and shareholders to the disclosure of CEOs‟ 
pensions and deferred compensation in the US. While they provide interesting evidence using the event 
study methodology for a limited sample of firms that disclosed their detailed compensation data, I focus 
on the market-wide cross-sectional effects of pension compensation on the cost of debt in the UK. 
Therefore, my methodology does not depend on the assumption that the capital market is unaware of the 
existence and extent of inside debt prior to the disclosure. 
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Secondly, by splitting CEO stock options into two categories (traditional and 
performance-vested stock options), I for the first time empirically examine whether the 
credit market takes into account the distinct contractual features and incentives 
provided by these two types of stock options. Although most of the literature treats 
CEO stock options as a homogeneous variable, there are two distinct categories of stock 
options: traditional stock options and performance-vested stock options (e.g. Johnson 
and Tian, 2000).The former has no specific performance target attached, while the latter 
requires managers to achieve a performance target prior to vesting. Johnson and Tian 
(2000) find that performance-vested stock options (hereafter called PVSOs) provide 
stronger incentives to increase risk as well as stock price than traditional stock options 
(hereafter called TSOs). I study whether creditors consider the award of TSOs and 
PVSOs compensation differently and charge a differential risk premium accordingly. 
 
Finally, my analysis is the first study that examines the link between CEO pay and the 
cost of debt financing for UK firms. This provides out-of-sample evidence in addition 
to the very few existing studies that focus only on the US, and enables us to test 
whether the existing evidence holds for a market with a historically different managerial 
pay levels and structure. Conyon, Core and Guay (2011) document that US CEOs 
receive much higher pay as well as equity incentives compared with their counterparts 
in Britain. And such pay differences across the Atlantic can be partly explained as the 
risk premium: US CEOs bear higher risks.  
 
My results show that firms awarding their CEOs with higher proportions of defined 
benefit pensions, a potential liability of a firm that can be viewed as debt-like 
compensation, experience a significant reduction in the cost of debt. On the other hand, 
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I observe that equity-based compensations, such as stock options, are positively related 
to the corporate bond yield spread. Further analysis shows that holdings of 
performance-vested stock options outweigh traditional stock options in terms of 
increasing the cost of debt. Such finding indicates that bondholders see performance-
vested stock options awarded to CEOs as a stronger incentive to expropriate their 
wealth by means of risk-shifting. I also find that cash bonus payments to CEOs are  
associated with lower borrowing costs. However, I find no relationship between 
restricted shares grants and the cost of debt. Overall, my results show that bondholders 
rationally anticipate risk-taking or risk-avoiding incentives of CEOs by observing 
different types of compensation awards. Hence, a proper adjustment in the structure of 
CEO compensation is an effective way to reduce a firm‟s cost of borrowing, especially 
when it relies heavily on external debt financing. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the 
relevant literature. The hypotheses of this chapter are developed in Section 2.3. The 
methodology and data are described in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. The empirical 
results are presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 provides a summary and the 
conclusions of this chapter. 
 
2.2. Literature review 
 
CEO compensation has mostly been investigated from the point of view of a firm‟s 
shareholders. The idea originates from the agency theory whereby managers are 
provided with incentives to work for the creation of more shareholder wealth. As 
suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership and controlling 
power of a firm may cause conflicts interests between shareholders (principal) and 
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managers (agent). In this regard, risk-averse managers, who are also interested in job 
security and their own reputations, will be reluctant to take on value-increasing but 
risky investment projects. By providing appropriate equity incentives to managers, 
executives also become shareholders of their firms. Therefore, managers are motivated 
to undertake risky but value-added investment projects. The interests of shareholders 
and managers on investment decisions are expected to be aligned. 
 
Several studies provide empirical supports for this theory. Coles, Daniel and Naveen 
(2006) find that CEO equity-based pay is linked with several observable risk-taking 
activities, such as a higher leverage and less corporate diversification. Chen, Steiner and 
Whyte (2006) show that the increased use of option-based compensation in the banking 
industry induces managerial risk-taking. Wu and Tu (2007) provide evidence that stock 
option compensation encourages a higher level of research and development 
investments by firms. Similarly, Sanders and Hambrick (2007) find that the more option 
compensation CEOs receive the more aggressive investments they undertake. In a 
recent paper, Low (2009) further confirms that a higher sensitivity of CEO portfolio 
value to stock return volatility, which is associated with equity-based compensation, 
directly contributes to managerial risk-taking behavior. 
 
While shareholders‟ interests are being served and agency costs of equity decline 
because of incentive compensation, there can be a corresponding increase in the agency 
costs of debt (John and John, 1993). The reason is that managers might be inclined to 
choose risky investments that will be beneficial to shareholders at the expense of 
creditors. This phenomenon is widely known as the shareholder–debt-holder conflict. 
As explained by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conflict between shareholders and 
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debt-holders exists because of the convex payoff structure of equity when risky debt is 
outstanding. The limited liability of shareholders will benefit shareholders in shifting in 
risky investment, while debt-holders may suffer severely. Obviously, rational debt-
holders will anticipate this increased risk-taking tendency of CEOs arising out of 
incentive pay, and therefore charge a higher borrowing rate to compensate for any 
possible future loss. 
 
While incentive compensation can hurt debt-holders, there exist other types of CEO 
compensation that can bring managerial interests in line with those of a firm‟s creditors. 
A common but less investigated form of such compensation is pension. Edmans and Liu 
(2011) argue that pension payments to CEOs can discourage risk-taking activities. By 
aligning managerial interests with those of debt-holders, pensions can mitigate 
shareholder–bondholder conflict. 
 
The empirical examination covering the effect of CEO compensation on the cost of debt 
is limited. Daniel, Martin and Naveen (2004) observe that the credit spreads of 
corporate bonds increase with both the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility and 
the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices. This suggests a negative reaction to 
equity incentives from debt-holders. However, Ertugrul and Hegde (2008) analyse the 
effect of stock options granted to directors of US firms and find that an increase in 
option compensation decreases yield spreads. Duru, Mansi and Reeb (2005) argue that 
earnings-based bonuses can reduce the cost of debt because they motivate top managers 
to seek stable cash flows to achieve the earnings target and thereby lower the risk of 
default. Their results show that the level of CEO cash bonuses is indeed negatively 
related with the bond yield spread. In addition, Gerakos (2007) documents a positive 
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relationship between bond ratings and CEO pensions. This suggests the positive effect 
of pension on firm‟s default risks.  
 
A few studies provide indirect evidence. Ortiz-Molina (2007) finds that the pay– 
performance sensitivity, defined as the relationship between changes in a CEO‟s firm-
specific wealth and the shareholder return, is lower for firms that issue straight debt and 
higher for those issuing convertible debts. Such a finding indicates that firms adopt 
incentive compensation toward mitigating shareholder–bondholder conflict. He also 
finds that option-based compensation is less attractive for firms suffering from severe 
shareholder–bondholder conflict. Similarly, Bryan, Nash and Patel (2006) show that 
firms with higher amounts of convertible debt offer more options-based compensation 
to their CEOs. 
 
If a higher incentive compensation aligning shareholders‟ interests with those of top 
managers can be detrimental to debt-holders, this should also be reflected in lower bond 
prices. Therefore, instead of directly examining the effect on the cost of debt, several 
studies investigate how bond values are affected by equity-based compensation. 
Empirical evidence is first provided by DeFusco, Johnston and Zorn (1990) who 
analyse the effect on bond returns when firms announce CEO stock option plans. They 
find that stock returns increase while bond returns decline after these announcements. 
Billett, Mauer and Zhang (2010) also document an adverse bond price reaction when 
CEOs receive new equity-based compensation. Wei and Yermack (2011) examine how 
bondholders and shareholders react to the disclosure of CEO pension and deferred 
compensation. They find that bond prices rise, while equity prices decline for firms 
whose CEOs have relatively more pensions. All these studies analyse US data and 
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indicate that the announcement or disclosure of equity-based pay and pension to CEOs 
is associated with a wealth transfer between shareholders and bondholders. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses development 
 
The literature review in the previous section illustrates that CEO compensation can 
affect the risk-taking behavior of managers and subsequently a firm‟s cost of debt 
financing. Since each compensation component has its own distinctive features, their 
effects on the cost of debt can be unique. Therefore, I develop hypotheses on the impact 
of each pay component separately. 
 
2.3.1. Cash bonus 
 
Cash bonus is the first compensation element I consider. It is usually related to an 
accounting performance target.  As reviewed by Murphy (1999), CEO cash bonus may 
generate tow fundamental problems with risk implications. First of all, accounting 
performance upon cash bonus is backward-looking and short-sighted. An outcome of 
such a target is that managers are inclined to decrease certain long-term and risky 
investments (e.g. research and development spending) in order to lower short-term 
expenditures and thereby increase the reported profit (e.g. Dechow and Sloan, 1991). 
Therefore, it is argued that a relatively higher proportion of cash bonuses compensation 
would provide more risk-avoiding incentives to CEOs. The second problem of cash 
bonus is that it may provide incentives to manipulate reporting earnings (e.g. accrual 
management) since the performance targets on cash bonus are often explicit (e.g. 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995). Therefore, cash bonus may also possibly 
increase certain risks, such as financial restatement and misreporting. Duru, Mansi and 
Reeb (2005) empirically examine debt-holders‟ reaction on CEO cash bonus. They find 
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that CEOs with high bonuses face a lower cost of borrowing.  They argue that debt-
holders do reward the risk-avoiding incentives of cash bonus when pricing a firm‟s 
debt. Following Durn, Mansi and Reeb (2005), I also expect a negative relation between 
cash bonus and the cost of debt. My first hypothesis is: 
 
 H1: Firms providing more cash bonus to their CEOs face a lower cost of debt. 
 
2.3.2. Pension 
 
Pension is a special form of compensation because it is deferred and can only be 
accessed upon retirement. In the UK, there are three basic types of pension 
arrangements: the public social security system, occupational pension and private 
pension plans. Defined benefit pension scheme and defined contribution pension 
scheme are the two basic forms of the occupational pension plan.  
 
The defined contribution (DC) pension is also known as money purchase scheme. The 
firm is required to pay a prescribed fee (contributions) into the pension fund regularly. 
However, the firm is only liable to pay the annual contribution, but will not be 
responsible for the final income of the employee when he or she retires. In another 
word, the final income of a retired staff with DC pension scheme is not guaranteed. In 
the defined benefit (DB) pension scheme, the amount of money an employee is 
expected to receive upon retirement is often defined in advance. The firm is not only 
liable to pay the annual contribution, but also be responsible for the final income of its 
retired staff. Any deficit in DB pension fund is the liability of the firm. In this thesis, 
my focus is on the defined benefit pension scheme for CEOs only. Because this is the 
only form of pension that represents  potential debts of a firm to its CEO. 
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The asset in defined benefit (DB) pension scheme is well protected in the UK. The 
pension trust is separate from the firm‟s (sponsor‟s) assets. Hence the assets already in 
the pension trust are independent and will not be affected in the event of the sponsor‟s 
bankruptcy. The Pensions Act of 2004 introduced further protection for the UK pension 
scheme. Under this Act, a statutory fund, the Pension Protection Fund (PPF), was 
established by the UK government. The PPF is set to pay compensation to employees if 
the employer (scheme sponsor) becomes insolvent and the pension trust is unfunded 
(has a deficit). In such a case, 100% (90%) of pension compensation, up to a certain 
limit, is guaranteed for members who are above (under) the normal retirement age.
2
 
 
However, the defined benefit pension plan still presents considerable risk-avoiding 
incentives for CEOs. As a consequence of the falling equity market, lower interest rates 
and improvements in life expectancy, the defined benefit pension deficit has become 
increasingly severe among UK blue chip companies. According to the Watson Wyatt 
pension risk indicators database, the average UK FTSE 350 firm had a defined benefit 
pension deficit of £254 million and a funding ratio of only 79% in 2004 (Gupta, 2006). 
In a recent report by Pension Capital Strategies in association with JP Morgan, only five 
FTSE 100 firms had a defined benefit pension surplus during the period of 2007-2009 
(The Guardian, 19 May 2010). In short, demands from the pension regulator, along with 
pressure from the huge defined benefit pension deficits, may discourage firms from 
pumping “excess” cash flows into risky investments. 
 
Secondly, CEOs with a defined benefit pension scheme are still the victims in the event 
of bankruptcy. As mentioned earlier, the Pension Protection Fund guarantees 100% 
                                                 
2
  
  
Source:  www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk 
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(90%) of pension for a member who is above (under) the normal retirement age in the 
event of insolvency. CEOs with a defined benefit pension plan are not the exception. 
However, there is a cap for such compensation. Based on the latest figures from the 
Pension Protection Fund, the maximum compensation is £29,748.68 per year in 2010,
3
 
which is negligible compared to the average defined benefit pension plan for top 
managers in UK publicly traded firms. In other words, only a tiny fraction of a CEO‟s 
defined benefit pension loss can be sheltered by the Pension Protection Fund in the 
event of insolvency. Compared with normal employees, top managers will suffer much 
more from defined benefit pension loss in the event of bankruptcy. Therefore, CEOs 
with a large amount of defined benefit pension have strong incentives to avoid 
bankruptcy, even in the presence of a pension protection scheme. 
 
As a result, a CEO with a defined benefit pension scheme effectively becomes a firm‟s 
potential debt-holder. Sundaram and Yermack (2007), along with Edmans and Liu 
(2011), argue that by aligning interests of top managers with other debt-holders, 
pensions can reduce CEOs‟ incentives for risk-shifting and lead to a reduction of 
overall riskiness of a firm and subsequently its cost of debt. Therefore, CEOs will be 
discouraged from taking risky actions that may increase the probability of bankruptcy 
and lower the recovery value. Consequently, I formulate the next hypothesis as follows: 
 
 H2: Firms providing more pensions to their CEOs face a lower cost of debt. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Source:  www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk 
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2.3.3. Stock options  
 
A well-established view is that compensation by means of stock options will generate 
strong incentives for risk-increasing investments (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Guay, 1999). This view relies on the fact that stock options have a convex payoff 
structure: the expected payoff will be zero as long as the share price is below the 
exercise price, but it can be quite high if the options are in-the-money. In addition, the 
value of stock options increases when stock return volatility goes up. By undertaking 
risky investment projects, the expected payoff from option holdings increases. At the 
same time, increase in the firm‟s risk level will lead to a higher probability of 
bankruptcy, and therefore a lower value of the firm‟s debt. Ertugrul and Hedge (2008) 
provide evidence that the level of directors‟ stock option holdings is positively related 
with a firms‟ bond yield spread. Therefore, my hypothesis is that by providing a 
stronger incentive for managers to take more risks, stock option awards will lead to a 
higher cost of borrowing. 
 
 H3: Firms providing more stock options to their CEOs face a higher cost of 
                  debt. 
 
2.3.4. Comparison between PVSOs and TSOs  
 
Two types of CEO stock options are frequently used as compensation for top managers: 
performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) and traditional stock options (TSOs) (e.g. 
Johnson and Tian, 2000). These two categories have distinctive features: PVSOs have 
performance targets as vesting conditions, while TSOs have no such targets. This 
difference in vesting conditions may provide different incentives for CEOs. 
 
21 
 
First of all, PVSOs may generate stronger incentives for interest alignment of CEOs and 
shareholders than TSOs.  Because of the performance target attached on PVSOs, CEOs 
are expected to engage in value-added investments to maximize shareholders‟ value. 
Kuang and Qin (2009) document that PVSOs outperform TSOs to increase the pay for 
performance sensitivity. If PVSOs are more likely to align interests of shareholders and 
top managers, CEOs with more PVSOs are more likely to choose an investment 
strategy which will benefit shareholders as the priority. Anticipating such an investment 
tendency, bondholders will require a higher risk premium. 
 
Secondly, PVSOs may generate incentives for managerial opportunistic behaviors 
which damage debt-holders‟ interests. For example, earnings are usually used as the 
main performance benchmarks for PVSOs. Kuang (2008) documents that firms 
providing more PVSOs to CEOs exhibit a stronger incentive for earnings management 
compared with TSOs. Prevost, Rao and Skousen (2008) link earnings management to 
the cost of debt and find that earnings management distorts the quality of earnings, 
which is vital for creditors to assess a firm‟s default risk. Therefore, by observing a 
higher level of PVSOs awards to top managers, creditors already anticipate a stronger 
incentive for earnings management and will therefore charge a higher borrowing rate. I 
therefore formulate my next hypothesis as follows: 
 
 H4: Firms providing their CEOs more PVSOs relative to TSOs face a higher 
                  cost of  debt. 
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2.3.5. Comparison between stock options and ownership  
 
Ownership directly links CEO‟s personal wealth to stock price. Compared to stock 
options, the relationship between CEO‟s wealth invested in shares is a linear function of 
stock price rather than a convex one. Hence, the wealth of a CEO with more ownership 
might be more sensitive to a decrease in share price compared to the wealth of a CEO 
with large stock options holdings. As high risk investment may lead to higher return 
volatility, a CEO with a high level of ownership may reduce risk-taking behavior as his 
or her wealth exposure increases. Analysing US data, Ortiz-Molina (2006) provides 
empirical evidence that the cost of debt soars when ownership increases, while such a 
relationship disappears when ownership reaches a very high level. Because of the 
differences in payoff structures between stock options and ownership, I expect that 
stock options will create stronger incentives for risk-taking compared to ownership. If 
rational debt-holders perceive the difference between ownership and stock options in 
terms of risk-taking, they will require a higher risk premium for firms granting their 
CEOs a large number of stock options than for firms providing high managerial 
ownership. This leads to my fifth hypothesis: 
 
 H5: Stock options held by CEOs increase the cost of debt more than ownership. 
 
2.3.6. Restricted shares  
The last compensation component I consider is restricted shares. In the UK, most CEOs 
in publicly traded firms must meet certain prescribed performance targets (e.g. total 
shareholders return, TSR) before vesting restricted shares (PWC, 2008).  Hence, CEOs 
are expected to be motivated to increase the stock return in order to guarantee the 
vesting of restricted shares. The anticipation of subsequent alignment of interests of 
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shareholders and top managers will lead rational debt-holders to require a 
corresponding higher risk premium. Therefore, my hypothesis is:  
 
 H6: Firms providing more restricted shares to their CEOs face a higher cost of 
                  debt. 
 
2.4. Methodology 
 
I consider both annual compensation and cumulative compensation of CEOs. CEOs 
receive their compensation in a variety of forms. Each pay component received by the 
CEO during a particular year will be taken into account. I construct pay variables as a 
proportion of total CEO compensation, which is the sum of annual salary, bonuses, the 
estimated values of stock options and restricted shares, and the pension increment. In 
addition, as a robustness check, I also employ an alternative proxy for annual 
compensation, which is the value of each pay component scaled by the firm‟s total 
sales. Previous studies on CEO compensation did not consider pension element of pay 
because that information was not easily available in the early period. However, the 
disclosure of pension data is now mandatory following the introduction of the 
Directors‟ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002), which allows us to collect full 
compensation data to accurately estimate each pay component and analyse the impact 
of pensions. I focus on the defined benefit (DB) pension, as only DB pensions are a 
potential liability for a firm and therefore represent inside debts. I hand collect the 
actuarial value of the defined benefit pensions as reported in firm annual reports. Since 
defined benefit pension value is reported as cumulative number, I estimate the amount 
of new pension awarded in a particular year as a year-to-year change in accumulated 
pension. 
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In addition to the annual monetary amounts of compensation, I look at the total amount 
of equity-like (stock options and shares) and debt-like pay (pension) accumulated by a 
CEO during his or her tenures. This has potentially even stronger implications for firm 
policies, since CEOs are much more likely to be motivated by changes in their total 
wealth rather than changes in the value of their annual compensation. For stocks and 
options, I conduct this analysis by using the number of shares grants because monetary 
values can vary based on valuation assumptions. I therefore define new compensation 
variables by considering the number of stock options, unrestricted shares (ownership) 
and restricted shares held by a CEO as a proportion of total number of shares 
outstanding. These new definitions are also useful to check the robustness of my 
findings. 
 
The yield spread of a corporate bond is used to measure the cost of debt. Following 
prior literature (e.g. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008), it is 
estimated as the difference in yield to maturity between a firm‟s bond and a UK 
government bond with a comparable maturity. The spread is expressed in basis points.
4
 
When a firm has multiple bonds outstanding in a year, I use the market value weighted 
average yield spread. This procedure allows me to use a single representative bond 
yield per firm year. 
 
I perform ordinary least square (OLS) regression to measure the effect of CEO 
compensation on the cost of debt. The yield spread of corporate bonds is used as the 
dependent variable, and the CEO compensation components are used as the explanatory 
variables. Following prior studies examining yield spread (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006; 
                                                 
4
 For a few corporate bonds with a maturity longer the longest maturity of government bonds, the yield 
spread is compared with the longest available maturity of the latter. 
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Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; Devos, Prevost and Rao, 2008), the estimated regression 
model is written as follows: 
 
Spread i,t  = α0 + β Compensation i,t-1 + ∑ λ Bond Characteristics i,t  
                    +∑ δ Firm Characteristics i,t + ∑ ζ Industry dummies i,t  
                   + ∑ υ Year dummies i,t  +εi,t.                                                                       (1) 
 
The regression specification considers a lagged relationship because bondholders adjust 
the bond price once information on compensation becomes publicly available. All 
bond-specific information is therefore collected three months after the end of a fiscal 
year.
5
 We can see how bondholders react to the latest CEO compensation information.  
 
Although OLS regression is popular and widely used, it is not short of limitations. OLS 
is sensitive to outlier. OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent if multicollinearity and 
individual effects exist among independent variables (e.g. Greene, 2007). In this study, 
the possible individual effects are that different firms may apply unique remuneration 
packages for their CEOs. Hence the variation among CEO compensations may be 
contaminated by unmeasured individual firm characteristics (unobserved firm 
heterogeneity).  To address such a concern, I also use fixed effect regression, focusing 
on within variation of CEO compensation for individual firms.  
 
Prior literature suggests several bond and firm characteristics that can also influence the 
yield spread of bonds (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008). These 
factors are included as control variables in regression. The bond characteristics are bond 
                                                 
5
 UK Publicly traded firms are required to publish their annual reports within four months after the end of 
the fiscal year. I also randomly check the date of annual report release in Thomson Banker. 
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rating, duration and bond size. For the bond rating variable, I convert each rating 
category into a numerical scale. Following Klock, Mansi and Maxwell (2005), I assign 
the lowest Moody‟s rating D a value of 1, and then, as the bond rating increases, the 
numerical rating changes by an increment of 1, up to a value of 22 for the highest 
Moody‟s rating, Aaa. I further convert this rating into a rating residual to control for all 
information other than compensation that can affect bond rating (spread) and that is not 
captured by other control variables used in the regression. The residual is estimated 
from the regression, where the dependent variable is bond rating and the independent 
variables are the various compensation components. The duration of the bond is used to 
control for differences in bond maturity and coupon rate. The bond size is used to 
control the impact of liquidity on yield spread. A large bond size suggests higher 
liquidity and therefore a lower cost of debt. Similar to Ortiz-Molina (2007), I use the 
relative bond size (as the fraction of a firm‟s total assets) instead of the absolute bond 
size. The firm characteristics that can affect yield spread include firm size, debt ratio, 
profitability, market-to-book ratio and firm risk. These firm characteristics are found to 
be informative in explaining the cost of debt (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Ertugrul and 
Hegde, 2008). The exact definitions of all these variables are presented in Table 2.1. 
The regression model also incorporates industry and time factors. 
 
2.5. Data 
 
The sample is selected from non-financial and non-utility UK firms  in FTSE All Share 
Index. To be included in the sample, a firm must have a straight bond outstanding. 
Since the benchmark for calculating corporate bond yield spread is the corresponding 
UK government bond yield, I exclude firms with bond issued in currencies other than 
pound sterling.   
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Information on yield spread, bond and firm characteristics is collected from 
DataStream. CEO compensation data is mainly collected from BoardEx. It is a database 
which is specialized for analysing profile and relationship of organization leaders in 
Europe and North America.  It captures extensive personal information about 380,000 
leaders (all directors in UK publicly traded firms are covered), including date of birth, 
nationality, education background, working experiences, board and non-board 
positions, and compensation. As far as the data of compensation is concerned, BoardEx 
provides detailed information on the actual monetary value of cash compensation and 
number of shares for stock options and restricted shares. The estimated monetary values 
of equity incentives are also reported. In addition, stock options are classified into 
traditional stock options (TSOs) and performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) in 
BoardEx. The exercise (vesting) dates for stock options (restricted shares) are also 
available. 
6
 Firm annual reports are used to collect data on CEO defined benefit 
pensions. The sample period of the study is 2003-2006. It starts with 2003 because this 
is the year when firms were first required to publish detailed information about CEO 
pensions in their annual reports, according to the Directors‟ Remuneration Report 
Regulations (2002). It stops in 2006 to eliminate the potential influence of later 
financial crisis.   
 
The total number of firm-year observations in my sample is 150.
7
 The distribution of 
the sample over years and different industries is presented in Table 2.2. Firm-years 
steadily increase from 31 in 2003 to 44 in 2006. Sample firms are distributed over five 
main industries, as classified by the UK SIC (2003) code.   
                                                 
6
 To address the concern of the accuracy of data in BoardEx, I also randomly checked 15 firms in my 
sample. The data from BoardEx is identical as documented in corresponding annual reports. BoardEx is 
also used as a reliable data source in other published compensation studies (e.g. Kuang and Qin 2009). 
7
 The relatively small sample size is mostly caused by the fact that few firms have publicly traded bonds 
issued in pound sterling. 
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Table 2.1  Variables definitions 
 
Panel A: Bond characteristics  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Spread Bond yield spread expressed in basis points over UK government securities (DS8: SP). For 
multiple bonds, market value-weighted average is used. 
  
Rating  Bond rating of Moody‟s (DS: MRT) converted to a numerical scale, in which the lowest 
rating (D) is 1 and the highest (Aaa) is 22. 
 
Low Rating Dummy variable equals 1 if Rating is no more than 14 (Moody‟s Rating Baa2), the 
benchmark for “investment grade bond”, otherwise 0.  
 
Rating Residual Residual from the regression where the dependent variable is Rating and the independent 
variables are the relevant compensation components. 
  
Bond Size Relative size of bonds calculated as the market value of bonds (DS: MV) scaled by book 
value of total assets (WC 02999). 
  
Duration  Duration of bonds (DS: DM). For multiple bonds, market value-weighted average is used. 
  
 
 
Panel B: Firm characteristics  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of book value of total assets (WC9 02999). 
  
Debt Ratio Book value of long-term debt (WC 03251) scaled by book value of total assets (WC 
02999). 
  
Profitability Operating income (WC 01250) before depreciation (WC 01151) scaled by book value of 
total assets (WC 02999). 
  
Market-to-Book ratio Market-to-book value ratio calculated as the book value of total debt (WC 03255) plus the 
market value of equity (DS: MV), scaled by the book value of total assets (WC 02999). 
  
Risk  Standard deviation of Profitability calculated using data of year t-6 to t-1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 DS is the abbreviation for DataStream.  
9
 WC is the abbreviation for WorldScope. 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Panel C: CEO compensation  
 
Variable Name Definition 
Total Compensation 
 
 
Total  compensation to Sales 
 
Salary 
 
Salary to Sales 
 
The Sum of salary, bonuses, the estimated values of stock options and restricted shares 
grants10, and the pension increment in a particular year. 
 
Total compensation scaled by total sales (WC 01001). 
 
Annual salary scaled by total compensation. 
 
Annual salary scaled by total sales (WC 01001). 
Bonus Cash bonus scaled by total compensation. 
 
Bonus to Sales Cash bonus scaled by total sales (WC 01001). 
 
Incremental Pension Year-to-year change in the actuarial value of defined benefit pension scaled by total 
compensation. 
 
Incremental Pension to Sales  Year-to-year change in the actuarial value of defined benefit pension scaled by total 
sales (WC 01001). 
 
Pension to Equity The total transfer value of defined benefit pension scaled by the estimated value of 
equity holdings (including ownership, restricted shares and options). 
 
TSO Grants  The estimated value of traditional stock option grants scaled by total compensation. 
 
TSO Grants to Sales  The estimated value of traditional stock option grants  scaled by total sales  
(WC 01001). 
 
PVSO Grants 
 
 
PVSO Grants to Sales 
 
The estimated value of performance-vested stock option grants scaled by total 
compensation. 
 
The estimated value of performance-vested stock option grants scaled by total sales 
(WC 01001).  
 
Option Grants  
 
Option Grants to Sales 
 
The sum of TSO grants and PVSO grants. 
 
The sum of TSO grants to sales and PVSO grants to sales.  
Share Grants  
 
Share Grants to Sales 
The estimated value for restricted share grants scaled by total compensation. 
 
The estimated value for restricted share grants scaled by total sales 
(WC 01001). 
  
TSO Holding The number of traditional stock options scaled by total number of shares outstanding 
(DS: NOSH). 
  
PVSO Holding The number of performance-vested stock options scaled by total number of shares 
outstanding (DS: NOSH). 
 
Option Holding The sum of TSO holding and PVSO holding. 
 
Restricted Shareholding The number of restricted shares held by the CEO scaled by total number of shares 
outstanding (DS: NOSH). 
 
Ownership                                  The number of shares owned by the CEO scaled by total number of shares 
                                                    outstanding (DS: NOSH). 
                                                 
10
  Please see the Appendix for the estimated value of stock options and restricted shares.   
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Table 2.2  Sample selection and distribution 
 
 Number of firms Number of observations 
Panel A: Sample selection 
FTSE ALL firms  616 2464 
Less: 
    Financials & Utilities 
 
259 
 
1036 
    Observations without straight bond issued 284 1136 
    Observations without straight bond issued in  £ 29 142 
Final sample 44 150 
   
Panel B: Year distribution 
2003 31 31 
2004 35 35 
2005 40 40 
2006 44 44 
Total 44 150 
   
Panel C: Industry distribution   
Mining and Quarrying   3 12 
Manufacturing 18 59 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 8 31 
Hotel & Restaurant  2 8 
Transport & Communication 5 20 
Others  8 20 
Total                                                                                                              44                                         150 
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Table 2.3 presents descriptive statistics of major variables used in my empirical 
analysis. All data is winsorized at 5% level to limit the impact of extreme values. Panel 
A provides information on bond characteristics. The average (median) spread for traded 
bonds is 148.37 (109.56) basis points with a standard deviation of 134.65 basis points. 
This means that the corporate bond yield has a premium of 1.48% compared with the 
benchmark government bonds yield on average. Debt-holders require a higher return for 
holding a corporate bond compared with a government bond. The mean (median) bond 
rating is 13.82 (14), which means about half of the bonds in my sample belongs to the 
investment grade category (above Moody‟s rating Baa2). On average, the market value 
of bonds is only 1.35% of a firm‟s total asset in our sample. Compared with Oriz-
Molina (2006), the relative size of bonds in my study is much smaller than US sample. 
The average bond in my sample has a duration of about 6.15 years.  
 
Descriptive statistics on annual compensation are provided in Panel B of Table 2.3. 
Each type of compensation is expressed as a fraction of total CEO compensation and 
total sales. The mean (median) of total compensation is about £3.29 million (£2.45 
million). On average, the total amount of annual pay received by a CEO is about 0.13% 
of a firm‟s total annual sales. The CEO of the median firm receives 25.43% of total 
compensation (about £623,000) as salary and 13.44% (about £329,000) as cash 
bonuses. I observe that performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) dominate option 
compensation compared with traditional stock options (TSOs). Share grants also 
constitute a significant fraction of CEO compensation, accounting for 28.02% of annual 
compensation on average. Finally, an interesting new finding is the amount of defined 
benefit pension received by CEOs. The annual pension increment is on average 12.43% 
of total compensation, which equals to about £397,000. 
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Panel C of Table 2.3 provides information on CEO accumulated compensation. On 
average, CEOs hold traditional stock options (TSOs), performance-vested stock options 
(PVSOs) and restricted shares of about 0.02%, 0.08% and 0.06% of total shares 
outstanding, respectively. This suggests that PVSOs holdings dominate the accumulated 
equity compensation. The median value for TSOs holdings is zero, which means more 
than half of CEOs in our sample without any traditional stock options. The ratio of CEO 
pensions to equity compensation is on average 0.37, which is slightly higher than the 
figure of 0.25 reported by Wei and Yermack (2011) for US firms. This also indicates 
the relatively low equity incentives for UK top managers compared with the 
counterparts in the US. CEOs‟ share ownership information is shown in Panel D of 
Table 2.3. I find that on average CEOs in my sample hold just 0.58% of their firms‟ 
total common shares outstanding. The median value for CEO ownership even drops to 
0.03%.  
 
Panel E of Table 2.3 provides information on sample firm characteristics. The average 
(median) firm in the sample has total assets of £10 (£4) billion. The long-term debt 
amounts to about 27% of total assets on average. I find that sample firms have a mean 
(median) profitability of 15% (13%) and a market-to-book ratio of 1.35 (1.10). 
 
The correlation matrix between key variables is presented in Table 2.4. I observe that 
bond spread has a significantly positive correlation with PVSOs grants and holding, and 
with debt ratio. It is negatively related with rating, duration, firm size and market-to-
book ratio, which is consistent with my expectations as well as previous literature.  
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Table 2.3  Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 150 firm-year FTSE ALL observations from 2003-2006. Only straight bonds issued in pound sterling are 
included in the sample. All variables are winsorized at 5% and defined in Table 2.1.  
 
Variables  Mean Median St. Dev. Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Panel A. Bond characteristics     
Spread (Basis Points) 148.37 109.56 134.65 81.70 144.79 
Rating   13.82   14.00     2.41 13.00   15.50 
Low Rating     0.61     1.00     0.49   0.00     1.00 
Bond Size (%)     1.35     0.85     1.32   0.49     1.99 
Duration (Years)     6.15     5.84     2.68   4.09     7.75 
 
Panel B. Annual compensation     
Salary (%)   28.05    25.43   14.46  16.65   34.11 
Bonus (%)   15.09    13.44   11.40    7.10   20.40 
TSO Grants (%)     2.33      0.00    9.34    0.00     0.03 
PVSO Grants (%)   14.08      8.91  16.25    0.00   23.72 
Option Grants (%)   16.25    12.59  17.88    0.00   27.72 
Share Grants (%) 28.02 30.00 22.83 0.00 44.72 
Incremental Pension (%) 12.43 0.52 16.86 0.00 24.17 
Total Compensation (£m)  3.29 2.45 2.78 1.38 4.47 
Salary to Sales (%) 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Bonus to Sales (%) 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
TSO Grants to Sales (%)*102 0.12 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 
PVSO Grants to Sales (%)*102 1.21 0.45 1.84 1.84 1.71 
Option Grants to Sales (%)*102 1.30 0.55 1.87 0.00 1.88 
Share Grants to Sales (%) 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.05 
Incremental Pension to Sales (%) 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Total Compensation to Sales (%)   0.13 0.07 0.21 0.04 0.13 
 
Panel C. Accumulated compensation     
TSO Holding (%) 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 
PVSO Holding (%) 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.11 
Option Holding (%) 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.12 
Restricted Shareholding (%) 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.08 
Pension to Equity 0.37  0.03 0.55 0.00 0.65 
 
Panel D. Other equity incentives     
Ownership (%) 0.58 0.03 2.28 0.01 0.13 
 
Panel E. Firm characteristics     
Firm Size (£bn) 10.42 3.99 1.87 1.92 8.88 
Debt Ratio (%) 26.56 22.74 16.88 13.35 35.68 
Profitability (%) 15.41 13.00 8.39 9.06 19.03 
Market-to-Book ratio 1.35 1.10 0.95 0.75 1.58 
Risk (%) 2.84 1.76 2.98 0.99 3.55 
34 
 
Table 2.4  Correlation matrix 
 
Correlations between main variables for 150 observations. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by the total compensation. All 
variables are defined in Table 2.1. The correlations that are significant at 10% level are in bold. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1)Spread 1                     
(2)Rating -0.56 1                    
(3)Bond Size -0.01 -0.04 1                   
(4)Duration  -0.25 0.31 0.35 1                  
(5)Bonus -0.07 0.10 0.09 0.11 1                 
(6)Incremental Pension  -0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.30 1                
(7)Pension to Equity -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.02 -0.27 0.72 1               
(8)TSO Grants 0.10 -0.11 -0.12 -0.01 -0.21 -0.09 -0.03 1              
(9)PVSO Grants 0.17 -0.15 0.02 -0.15 -0.21 -0.13 -0.10 -0.05 1             
(10)Option Grants 0.19 -0.17 -0.04 -0.13 -0.29 -0.16 -0.11 0.43 0.88 1            
(11)Share Grants -0.17 0.23 -0.18 -0.06 -0.12 -0.34 -0.28 -0.08 -0.46 -0.45 1           
(12)Ownership 0.51 0.01 0.00 -0.17 0.07 -0.14 -0.15 -0.06 0.17 0.12 -0.18 1          
(13)TSO Holding 0.13 -0.02 0.24 0.09 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 0.19 0.20 0.26 -0.12 -0.05 1         
(14)PVSO Holding 0.56 -0.47 0.07 -0.37 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.06 0.48 0.44 -0.34 0.28 0.21 1        
(15)Option Holding 0.43 -0.30 0.22 -0.19 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.09 0.46 0.45 -0.31 0.18 0.72 0.80 1       
(16)Restricted Share Holding -0.03 -0.07 0.16 0.10 0.13 -0.08 -0.14 -0.17 -0.20 -0.26 0.29 -0.10 0.19 -0.05 0.08 1      
(17)Firm Size -0.32 0.36 -0.51 -0.07 -0.24 -0.09 -0.09 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.32 -0.18 -0.11 -0.29 -0.26 -0.25 1     
(18)Debt Ratio 0.27 -0.24 -0.23 0.11 0.16 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.09 0.23 0.11 0.21 -0.05 -0.18 1    
(19)Profitability -0.11 0.04 0.16 -0.13 0.18 0.03 -0.11 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 -0.24 0.06 1   
(20)Market-to-Book Ratio -0.31 0.25 0.06 0.03 0.29 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 0.12 -0.17 -0.09 -0.32 -0.28 -0.07 -0.01 0.16 0.64 1  
(21)Risk -0.07 0.09 0.10 -0.13 0.16 -0.12 -0.14 0.08 -0.11 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16 -0.09 -0.17 -0.04 0.48 0.45 1 
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2.6. Empirical results 
 
As discussed in Section 2.4, multivariate regressions are estimated to investigate the 
impact of CEO compensation on the yield spread of firms. Firstly, I estimate the full 
regression model with all pay components included (except for salary). Since each 
compensation component is scaled by the total compensation, and all the compensation 
components must add up to 1 by definition, I also investigate the robustness of my 
results by estimating a number of regressions, dropping out different compensation 
components sequentially. Finally, I estimate regressions for each individual pay 
component separately. OLS results using different components of CEO pay are 
presented in Panels A of Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7.  Fixed effects regression is also used 
and presented in Panels B of Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. Fixed effects regression is 
employed to control for the heterogeneity of unobserved firms. In each table, the 
column beside the variable names shows the predicted sign for each of the coefficient 
estimates. Table 2.5 presents results of my main regressions, estimating the relationship 
between annual compensation components (measured as a percentage of total 
compensation) and the cost of debt. Table 2.6 presents the same regressions, employing 
an alternative measure for the compensation variables (compensation as a fraction of 
total sales). Finally, I analyse the impact of the cumulative compensation (accumulated 
holdings of stock options, restricted shares and ownership) on the cost of debt in Table 
2.7. The results of these estimations, grouped by the compensation component, are 
discussed below. 
 
2.6.1. Cash bonus 
 
In Panel A of Table 2.5 (columns 1 to 4), bonus is measured as a fraction of annual 
compensation. I find that the coefficients of bonus remain negative in all of these 
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pooled regressions. When I include all CEO pay components in a regression (column 
1), the coefficient for bonus is -1.96 at the significance level of 10%. Sequentially 
dropping option grants and share grants variables from the regression (columns 2 and 3) 
does not affect this result, with coefficients for bonus becoming -1.48 and -1.63 
respectively and remaining statistically significant. When I test the cash bonus 
component separately (column 4), the coefficient is still negative, at -1.23, with the t-
statistic of -1.55. When I use fixed effects regression in Panel B of Table 2.5, the 
coefficients of bonus are -3.42 and -2.04 in columns 1 and 2, respectively. The 
significance level even reaches 1%. The test for the cross-effect is also found 
significant, with a cross-section Chi-square of 357 at 1% significance level. The cross-
section effect (firms specific) does exist. In Table 2.6, I employ the fraction of bonus in 
total sales as an alternative proxy. The regression coefficients for cash bonus (columns 
1, 2 and 4 in Panel A) are still negative, -751.08,   -461.06 and -498.13, respectively, 
although none of them are now statistically significant. The similar results can be found 
in Panel B of Table 2.6 (Columns 1 and 2) when I employ fixed effects regression. This 
difference could be caused by the fact that scaling some pay components (such as 
bonus) by sales does not explicitly takes into account their relative importance for CEO 
total pay, and therefore provides a weaker proxy for my analysis.  
 
Overall, this analysis provides some evidence for my first hypothesis (H1), that more 
cash bonus will lower the cost of debt. With more bonus compensation, risk-taking 
incentive for CEOs is reduced to a certain extent. As bondholders price the risk-
avoiding incentives, I find a negative relationship between bonus and yield spread. 
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Regarding the control variables, I observe that most of the variables are related to yield 
spread in the expected direction in both Tables 2.5 and 2.6. The regression coefficients 
of rating residual and firm size in all four regressions are negative and statistically 
significant at 1% level, which means that higher-rated bonds are traded at lower credit 
spreads. Also as expected, bond size is negatively related to spread, indicating a 
possible liquidity effect. Larger firms and companies with lower debt ratio have a lower 
cost of debt. Finally, duration, profitability, market-to-book ratio and risk (as measured 
by the standard deviation of profitability) have little impact on the credit spread. 
 
2.6.2. Pension 
 
The results of regressions analysis of the effects of annual increases to CEO pension 
benefit on the cost of debt are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. In Table 2.5, pension is 
measured as a fraction of total compensation. The coefficients for pension pay range 
from -1.52 (column 2) to -1.90 (column 1) in Panel A when OLS regression is 
employed, all highly statistically significant. In column 5 of Panel A, I examine 
pensions exclusively. The coefficient is -1.38 at 1% significance level. In another word, 
if CEO defined benefit pension increases by 1% as a percentage of annual pay, it would 
lead to a decrease in the cost of debt by 1.38 basis points. In Panel B, I use fixed effects 
regression instead of OLS model. The coefficient of pension increment (column 1) 
remains significantly negative. The coefficient of pension increment (column 3) is 
however positive, but fails to reach the significance level.  
 
In Table 2.6, I scale pension increment by total sales instead of total compensation.  
OLS model and fixed effects model are employed in Panels A and B individually.  
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Table 2.5  Annual compensation and the cost of debt 
Panel A  OLS regression 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO 
Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by the total compensation. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  509.03*** 500.04*** 500.07*** 389.08*** 384.18*** 365.28*** 358.30*** 369.21*** 
  (5.19) (5.14) (5.16) (4.45) (4.79) (4.33) (4.47) (4.40) 
Bonus (-) -1.96* -1.48* -1.63* -1.23     
  (-1.79) (-1.67) (-1.98) (-1.55)     
Incremental Pension (-) -1.90** -1.52*** -1.60***  -1.38***    
  (-2.49) (-2.70) (-3.01)  (-2.74)    
Option Grants (+) -0.13 0.29    1.12**   
  (-0.15) (0.48)    (2.04)   
Share Grants (+) -0.51      0.21  
  (-0.74)      (0.46)  
TSO Grants (+)        1.34 
         (1.34) 
PVSO Grants (+)        1.12* 
         (1.91) 
Rating Residual (-) -17.55*** -16.47*** -16.41*** -22.30*** -24.72*** -21.59*** -24.02*** -21.35*** 
  (-3.32) (-3.24) (-3.25) (-4.75) (-5.49) (-4.59) (-5.29) (-4.52) 
Bond Size (-) -16.07* -16.03* -15.76* -19.48** -19.12** -20.04** -18.45** -20.04** 
  (-1.94) (-1.94) (-1.92) (-2.40) (-2.42) (-2.46) (-2.29) (-2.45) 
Duration (-) -5.08 -5.36 -5.63      
  (-1.30) (-1.38) (-1.47)      
Firm Size (-) -38.62*** -41.48*** -41.00*** -36.44*** -37.51*** -36.89*** -38.50*** -37.37*** 
  (-3.91) (-4.56) (-4.55) (-4.14) (-4.49) (-4.18) (-4.37) (-4.14) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.81*** 1.89*** 1.90*** 1.76*** 1.48*** 1.70*** 1.73*** 1.69*** 
  (3.06) (3.25) (3.27) (3.05) (2.63) (2.97) (3.04) (2.93) 
Profitability (-) 0.09 -0.04 0.13      
  (0.06) (-0.02) (0.09)      
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -17.53 -18.34 -18.81      
  (-1.27) (-1.34) (-1.38)      
Risk (+) -0.03 -0.06 -0.26      
  (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.07)      
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.47 
 
0.47 
 
0.48 
 
0.43 
 
0.46 
 
0.43 
 
0.44 
 
0.42 
 
Wald Tests 
 
                                                  H0: βBonus=βIncremental Pension 
 
H0: βTSO Grants=βPVSO Grants 
Chi Square (p-value)                  0.00 (0.97)          0.04 (0.84) 
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Table 2.5  (Continued) 
Panel B Fixed effects regression 
Results of fixed effects regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Fixed effects apply to cross-section (44 firms) effect. Year dummies is 
included but not reported. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants are scaled by the total compensation. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Intercept  1120.64*** 1191.10*** 1117.74*** 980.17*** 964.19*** 1081.95***   
  (3.36) (3.69) (3.35) (2.98) (2.89) (3.19)   
Bonus (-) -3.42*** -2.04***       
  (-4.89) (-4.02)       
Incremental Pension (-) -1.01**  0.46      
  (-2.21)  (1.05)      
Option Grants (+) 1.08   0.49     
  (1.28)   (1.33)     
Share Grants (+) 1.81    -0.58    
  (0.87)    (-1.46)    
TSO Grants (+)      -0.40   
       (-0.56)   
PVSO Grants (+)      0.69*   
       (1.68)   
Rating Residual (-) -47.97*** -48.51*** -45.83*** -44.48*** -43.15*** -47.68***   
  (-5.65) (-5.78) (-5.21) (-5.30) (-5.03) (-5.39)   
Bond Size (-) -18.17 -22.69 -22.68 -16.66 -13.73 -20.72   
  (-1.12) (-1.44) (-1.39) (-1.03) (-0.83) (-1.25)   
Duration (-) 10.81 8.51 8.22 9.80 8.97 9.59   
  (1.52) (1.20) (1.12) (1.35) (1.23) (1.32)   
Firm Size (-) -99.14*** -114.71*** -111.22*** -98.84*** -93.12*** -109.84***   
  (-2.87) (-3.39) (-3.15) (-2.85) (-2.68) (-3.06)   
Debt Ratio (+) 0.79 0.65 0.89 1.11* 0.86 1.14**   
  (1.39) (1.15) (1.56) (1.93) (1.51) (2.00)   
Profitability (-) -3.85** -4.56*** -4.10** -3.95** -3.98** -4.10**   
  (-2.35) (-2.82) (-2.47) (-2.33) (-2.41) (-2.40)   
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -14.82 -18.73 -19.84 -17.35 -18.52 -18.85   
  (-0.77) (-0.97) (-0.99) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-0.95)   
Risk (+) 0.29 1.06 0.82 0.52 1.23 0.44   
  (0.14) (0.52) (0.39) (0.25) (0.59) (0.22)   
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.92 
 
0.92 
 
0.91 
 
0.92 
 
0.91 
 
0.92 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-section Test  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wald Test  H0: βTSO Grants=βPVSO Grants 
 
Chi-square (p-value) 
  
357***(0.00) 
 
359***(0.00) 
 
347***(0.00) 
 
350***(0.00) 
 
351***(0.00) 
 
Chi-square (p-value)          1.79(0.18)                    
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Table 2.6  Annual compensation and the cost of debt: alternative measure 
Panel A  OLS regression 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants 
are scaled by total sales. All variables are defined in Table2.1. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept  486.18*** 504.77*** 460.00*** 410.07*** 411.50*** 339.60*** 321.87*** 338.80*** 
  (4.27) (4.43) (4.07) (3.93) (4.72) (4.21) (3.70) (4.16) 
Bonus to Sales (-) -751.08 -461.06  -498.13     
  (-1.20) (-0.77)  (-0.88)     
Incremental Pension to Sales (-) -625.76* -663.66* -687.25**  -634.64*    
  (-1.81) (-1.92) (-2.00)  (-1.86)    
Option Grants to Sales (+) 1208.33** 1128.43** 1104.47**   1229.42**   
  (2.43) (2.27) (2.23)   (2.60)   
Share Grants to Sales (+) 306.33      201.82  
  (1.51)      (1.09)  
TSO Grants to Sales (+)        1272.93 
         (0.64) 
PVSO Grants to Sales (+)        1243.06** 
         (2.52) 
Rating Residual (-) -16.83*** -16.58*** -17.20*** -22.22*** -22.77*** -23.35*** -23.92*** -23.16*** 
  (-3.13) (-3.07) (-3.22) (-4.55) (-4.87) (-5.07) (-5.06) (-5.02) 
Bond Size (-) -22.88** -19.24** -18.53** -18.84** -20.33** -19.61** -21.19** -19.39** 
  (-2.61) (-2.27) (-2.20) (-2.30) (-2.49) (-2.44) (-2.49) (-2.42) 
Duration (-) -3.38 -2.83 -3.79      
  (-0.80) (-0.27) (-0.94)      
Firm Size (-) -44.16*** -43.49*** -39.47*** -40.45*** -41.46*** -34.20*** -34.64*** -34.08*** 
  (-4.15) (-4.07) (-4.23) (-4.03) (-4.61) (-4.08) (-4.04) (-4.01) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.93*** 1.85*** 1.83*** 1.80*** 1.73*** 1.53*** 1.89*** 1.50*** 
  (3.28) (3.13) (3.09) (3.15) (3.05) (2.70) (3.27) (2.62) 
Profitability (-) -0.25 -0.50 -0.38      
  (-0.16) (-0.33) (-0.25)      
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -20.65 -23.28* -22.02      
  (-1.50) (-1.69) (-1.61)      
Risk (+) 0.56 1.57 0.85      
  (0.15) (0.42) (0.23)      
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.47 
 
0.46 
 
0.47 
 
0.42 
 
0.43 
 
0.45 
 
0.42 
 
0.45 
 
Wald Tests 
 
                                        H0: βOption Grants= - βIncremental Pension 
 
                                                            H0: βTSO grants=βPVSO grants 
Chi Square (p-value)    0.55 (0.46)                            0.00 (0.99) 
 
41 
 
Table 2.6  (Continued) 
Panel B Fixed effects regression 
Results of fixed effects regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Fixed effects apply to cross-section (44 firms) effect. Year dummies is 
included but not reported. Bonus, Incremental Pension, Option Grants, Share Grants, TSO Grants and PVSO Grants are scaled by total sales. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   
Intercept  716.77** 968.06*** 1032.69*** 874.05*** 853.10** 819.68**   
  (2.01) (2.84) (3.12) (2.66) (2.62) (2.51)   
Bonus to Sales (-) -603.84 -605.37       
  (-1.51) (-1.61)       
Incremental Pension to Sales (-) -181.66  -70.41      
  (-0.66)  (-0.27)      
Option Grants to Sales (+) -135.51   94.01     
  (-0.40)   (0.28)     
Share Grants to Sales (+) -42.99    -183.19    
  (-0.24)    (-1.15)    
TSO Grants to Sales (+)      -184.59   
       (-0.15)   
PVSO Grants to Sales (+)      -5439.81   
       (-0.62)   
Rating Residual (-) -25.95*** -35.48*** -41.39*** -39.27*** -36.04*** -37.22***   
  (-3.74) (-4.38) (-4.91) (-5.21) (-5.11) (-4.71)   
Bond Size (-) -3.66 -17.21 -19.72 -13.63 -10.77 -10.33   
  (-0.20) (-1.02) (-1.21) (-0.81) (-0.64) (-0.62)   
Duration (-) 12.22 9.82 8.13 11.44 9.93 12.53*   
  (1.58) (1.30) (1.10) (1.58) (1.35) (1.71)   
Firm Size (-) -71.46** -95.60*** -101.21*** -88.78** -84.12** -84.28**   
  (-1.91) (-3.39) (-2.90) (-2.56) (-2.44) (-2.43)   
Debt Ratio (+) 1.51** 1.25** 0.95 1.31** 1.07* 1.42**   
  (2.54) (2.17) (1.65) (2.34) (1.90) (2.49)   
Profitability (-) -2.71 -3.41** -4.04** -3.15* -3.56** -2.88*   
  (-1.59) (-2.01) (-2.43) (-1.97) (-2.18) (-1.79)   
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -20.42 -19.45 -18.70 -20.07 -17.27 -18.75   
  (-0.94) (-0.94) (-0.93) (-1.00) (-0.84) (-0.93)   
Risk (+) 0.58 0.49 0.99 0.13 1.26 0.17   
  (0.26) (0.23) (0.47) (0.06) (0.60) (0.08)   
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.90 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
 
 
 
 
Cross-section Test  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wald Test  H0: βTSO Grants=βPVSO Grants 
 
Chi-square (p-value) 
  
330***(0.00) 
 
337***(0.00) 
 
344***(0.00) 
 
353***(0.00) 
 
349***(0.00) 
 
Chi-square (p-value)          0.34(0.55)                    
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Similar to the results in Table 2.5, the coefficients for pension in Panel A (from column 
1 to 3) remain negative and significant in all regressions. In a separate test (column 5), 
the coefficient is -634.64 at 10% significance level. This indicates that if CEO defined 
benefit pension increment as a percentage of total sales increases by 1%, the bond yield 
will decrease by 634.64 basis points. However, the coefficients of pension fail to reach 
the significance level in Panel B when fixed effects model is employed (columns 1 and 
3). The possible explanation is that the fixed effects model focuses on within variation. 
The variation of pension increment is very limited for a particular CEO over period.  
 
In summary, the evidence provided above supports my second hypothesis (H2) in 
general. That is deferred CEO compensation in the form of company defined benefit 
pension is effective in aligning interests of CEOs and debt-holders. Debt-holders 
appreciate the unique risk-avoiding incentives provided by CEO pensions. Hence debt-
holders do take into account CEO pensions when pricing the debt. Debt-holders will 
require a lower risk premium if CEOs have more pensions.  
 
2.6.3. Stock options  
 
Both annual option grants (Table 2.5 and 2.6) and total CEO option holdings (Table 
2.7) are considered in my study. In Table 2.5, I measure option grants as a percentage of 
total compensation. In panel A of Table 2.5, the OLS regression model is employed. 
When other compensation components are present in the same regression, coefficients 
for option grants are not significantly different from zero (columns 1 and 2). However, 
when I exclude all other pay components and conduct a separate test including option 
grants only (column 6), the coefficient estimate increases to 1.12, significant at 5% 
level. This suggests that when option grants as a percentage of total pay increase by 1%, 
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the bond yield will increase by 1.12 basis points. In Panel B of Table 2.5, I use fixed 
effects regression instead of OLS model. The coefficients of option grants (columns 1 
and 4) remain positive, while fail to reach significance level.  
 
My results from Table 2.5 are further corroborated by these estimates presented in 
Table 2.6, where I employ an alternative proxy for option grants. The option grants here 
are measured as a fraction of total sales, and are therefore less likely to be affected by 
other compensation components. In all pooled regressions (from column 1 to 3) of 
Panel A, the coefficients for option grants remain positive and highly significant. In a 
separate test (column 6), I further confirm that more option grants lead to a higher cost 
of debt. The coefficient is 1,229.42 at 5% significance level. This suggests that if option 
grants as a percentage of total sales increase by 1%, bond yield goes up by 1,229.42 
basis points. When fixed effects regression is employed in Panel B of Table 2.6 
(columns 1 and 4), the coefficients of option grants fail to reach any significance level.  
 
In Table 2.7, I use cumulative equity-based compensation as the proxy. The coefficients 
of option holding are all positive and highly significant in pooled regression when OLS 
model is employed (columns1, 2 and 4 of Panel A). In a separate test (column 4), the 
coefficient of option holding is 346.28 at 1% significance level. This indicates that if 
CEO option holding as a percentage of a firm‟s total shares outstanding increases by 
1%, the bond yield spread will soar by 346.28 basis points. In Panel B, I use fixed 
effects regression as the alternative model. The coefficient of option holding (column 4) 
is 107, at 5% significance level. Such a result also indicates the positive relationship 
between CEO option holding and the cost of debt.  
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In short, the above mentioned results provide strong evidence to support my third 
hypothesis (H3), that stock options will lead to a higher cost of debt. Such results will 
not be affected by different measurements of stock options and regression models 
employed.  
 
2.6.4 .Comparison between PVSOs and TSOs 
 
As described in Section 2.3.4, I am interested to see whether debt-holders are aware of 
the distinctive features of performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) and traditional 
stock options (TSOs). I argue that PVSOs will increase the cost of borrowing more than 
TSOs. One reason for this is that the performance-vested conditions provide incentives 
for CEOs to manipulate performance targets (e.g. earnings management), which will 
lower the quality of earnings and make it more difficult for bondholders to assess a 
firm‟s default risks. Hence, I expect that bondholders may react differently to PVSOs 
and TSOs. 
 
In column 8 of Panel A of Table 2.5, I test the difference between PVSO grants and 
TSO grants by using OLS model. The coefficients of both PVSO and TSO grants are 
positive and similar in magnitude, while only that of PVSO grants reaches the 
statistically significant level. However, the Wald test fails to support the hypothesis that 
the difference between these coefficients is statistically significant. I conduct the same 
test by using an alternative definition of PVSO and TSO grants in Panel A of Table 2.6 
(column 8). I also consider fixed effects regression in Panels B of Table 2.5 and 2.6 
(column 6). The results are very similar.  
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In Table 2.7, once again, I disaggregate options holdings into PVSO holdings and TSO 
holdings. In panel A, OLS regression is employed. Similar to the results in columns 8 of 
Panel A of Table 2.5 and Table2.6, the coefficients of PVSO and TSO holdings 
(column 6) are positive, but only that of PVSO holdings is statistically significant. The 
Wald test confirms that the difference is meaningful. The p-value for the Wald test is 
0.08. This suggests that the difference between the coefficients of PVSOs holdings 
(460.57) and that for TSOs holding (153.20) is reliable. When fixed effects regression is 
adopted in Panel B of Table 2.7, the coefficients of PVSO and TSO holdings are 130.01 
and 103.50, respectively (Column 6). However, the following Wald test fails to confirm 
that the difference between PVSO and TSO holding is significant. Overall, I find weak 
evidence that debt-holders are more sensitive to CEO holdings of performance vested 
stock options (PVSOs) than traditional stock options (TSOs), and thereby require a 
higher rate of return if a firm uses more PVSOs to compensate its CEOs. These results 
support my fourth hypothesis (H4): PVSOs outweigh TSOs in terms of increasing the 
cost of borrowing.  
 
2.6.5. Comparison between stock options and ownership 
 
As described in Section 2.3.5, I would like to see whether debt-holders will consider 
CEO stock options and ownership differently. Because of the different pay-off 
structures between stock options and ownership, the downside risk of share price is 
relatively low for stock options compared with ownership. Hence I predict that stock 
options will create a stronger incentive for risk-taking compared with ownership. And 
creditors may consequently charge a higher price for stock options than ownership.  
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The results are shown in Table 2.7. As expected, and in line with previous research (e.g. 
Ortiz-Molina, 2006), the coefficients for option holdings and ownership are both 
positive and highly statistically significant in pooled regressions (columns 1 and 2 of 
Panel A) and separate regressions (columns 3 and 4 of Panel A). This further confirms 
that both option holdings and ownership lead to a higher cost of debt, likely by aligning 
interests of shareholders and CEOs. In column 2, I examine whether the increase in the 
cost of debt is similar between option holdings and ownership. The coefficient of option 
holdings is 293.65, while that of ownership is only 25.97. The Wald test confirms that 
the difference between these coefficients is statistically significant (p value is less than 
0.00). In Panel B of Table 2.7, fixed effects regression is employed as the alternative 
model. In column 2, the coefficients of ownership and option holding are 5.13 and 
35.47, respectively. However, the Wald test fails to confirm such a difference is 
statistically reliable. In short, the results mentioned above provide some supports for my 
fifth hypothesis (H5): although both ownership and option holdings have the same 
qualitative effects of increasing the cost of debt, higher CEO option holdings are seen 
by the market as a much stronger signal that a CEO will act in the interests of 
shareholders, to the detriment of debt-holders.   
 
2.6.6. Restricted shares  
 
The last pay component I analyse is restricted shares. The results are presented in 
Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. In hypothesis (H6), I argue that restricted shares may increase 
borrowing costs. However, the relationship between restricted shares and the cost of 
debt is not confirmed by my results. In all the regressions for equity-like compensation, 
including forms of annual and accumulated compensation, restricted share grants or 
holdings seem to have no effect on bond yield spread. This result is consistent across 
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different measures of compensation (Tables 2.5 and 2.6) and is supported by the 
estimates for restricted share holdings in Table 2.7.  It seems that debt-holders are 
indifferent with restricted shares. The incentives for risk-seeking or risk-avoiding from 
restricted shares are still unclear. 
 
2.6.7. Pension and credit quality  
 
One of the main findings of my study so far is that, while equity-based compensation 
can lead to a higher cost of debt by exacerbating the conflict between shareholders and 
debt-holders, pension appears to have the opposite effect in mitigating this conflict.  
I further investigate the relationship between CEO pensions and the cost of debt by 
taking into account the riskiness of corporate bond. An incentive to reduce the riskiness 
of the debt, provided to a CEO, is most likely to be effective when this risk is sizable 
enough. For firms that already have very low credit risk, the additional incentives 
provided by CEO compensation are likely to be less important than for companies that 
pay a substantial premium to debt-holders to compensate for their credit risk. Therefore, 
if the negative relationship that I observe in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 between the amounts of 
debt-like CEO compensation (pension) and the yield spread is indeed driven by the 
incentive effects of CEO pensions, I should expect that this relationship will be stronger 
for poor-rated bonds. 
 
I test this hypothesis in Table 2.8. In columns 1 and 2, I consider the effects of total 
accumulated pension by employing the pension-to-equity ratio, similar to the 
measurement used by Wei and Yermack (2011). As expected, both coefficients are 
negative and statistically significant. The more debt-like wealth (pension) a CEO has 
relative to his or her equity holding, the more his or her interests are aligned with those 
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of debt-holders, and the lower the costs of debt financing will be. From columns 3 to 8, 
I focus on the effectiveness of pension as a risk-avoiding incentive among lower and 
higher rated bonds. If pension provides a CEO with risk-avoiding incentives, such 
incentives will be stronger when the default risk is high (low bond rating in this case). I 
find that the coefficients for interaction variables of incremental pension and low bond 
rating (columns 3 and 4) and pension-to-equity ratio and low bond rating (columns 5 
and 6) are negative and highly significant. This suggests that the incentive effect of 
pension, found in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, are mostly concentrated among lower-rated, 
riskier bonds. To confirm this, I conduct an analysis on the subsample of 91 
observations whose bond ratings are below investment grade. The results are reported 
in columns 7 and 8 of Table 2.8. I find that both pension increment and pension-to-
equity ratio have a significant negative impact on the costs of debt among lower rated 
bonds. 
 
Overall, this analysis strongly supports my second hypothesis (H2), that higher levels of 
defined benefit pension lead to a lower cost of debt. This result is likely to be driven by 
the fact that pension aligns the interests of outside debt-holders (e.g. bondholders) and 
inside debt-holders (CEOs with pension). 
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Table 2.7  Accumulated equity incentives, ownership and the cost of debt 
Panel A  OLS regression 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on accumulated equity incentives and ownership for 150 observations. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. Coefficients for industry and year 
dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
        
Intercept  123.66 125.97 270.10*** 377.65*** 472.11*** 339.15*** 
  (1.37) (1.47) (3.51) (4.78) (5.33) (4.22) 
Ownership (+) 25.99*** 25.97*** 26.18***    
  (6.96) (7.00) (6.86)    
Option Holding (+) 293.17*** 293.65***  346.28***   
  (4.23) (4.67)  (4.77)   
Restricted Share Holding (+) 10.47    -40.49  
  (0.09)    (-0.28)  
TSO Holding (+)      153.20 
       (1.24) 
PVSO Holding (+)      460.57*** 
       (4.57) 
Rating Residual (-) -24.05*** -24.04*** -20.80*** -15.86*** -13.09** -11.05** 
  (-5.02) (-5.04) (-4.27) (-3.10) (-2.38) (-2.20) 
Bond Size (-) -15.60** -15.57** -13.74* -23.51*** -21.28** -20.04** 
  (-2.18) (-2.18) (-1.89) (-3.05) (-2.54) (-2.60) 
Duration (-) 0.04 0.07     
  (0.01) (0.02)     
Firm Size (-) -9.21 -9.29 -21.94*** -32.26*** -40.93*** -28.89*** 
  (-1.14) (-1.16) (-2.79) (-3.98) (-4.76) (-3.55) 
Debt Ratio (+) 2.09*** 2.09*** 2.38*** 1.75*** 2.21*** 1.89*** 
  (4.12) (4.21) (4.56) (3.08) (3.60) (3.41) 
Profitability (-) 1.43 1.44     
  (1.09) (1.11)     
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -30.82*** -30.99*** -26.51*** -19.13* -32.12*** -16.36 
  (-2.63) (-2.70) (-2.94) (-1.92) (-3.99) (-1.63) 
Risk (+) 4.95 4.91     
  (1.57) (1.58)     
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.62 
 
0.63 
 
0.55 
 
0.48 
 
0.39 
 
0.50 
 
Wald Tests                                                                  
                                                                  
H0: βownership=βOption Holding 
                                                               
H0: βTSO Holding=βPVSO Holding 
Chi Square (p-value)         15.02***(0.00)  3.08*(0.08) 
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Table 2.7  (Continued) 
Panel B Fixed effects regression 
Results of fixed effects regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components for 150 observations. Fixed effects apply to cross-section (44 firms) effect. Year dummies is 
included but not reported. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
        
Intercept  798.61** 816.46** 1092.78*** 1115.09*** 1107.49*** 1093.17*** 
  (2.23) (2.29) (3.26) (3.35) (3.33) (3.28) 
Ownership (+) 3.01 5.13 4.87    
  (0.31) (0.55) (0.58)    
Option Holding (+) 33.38 35.47  107.00**   
  (0.61) (0.66)  (2.01)   
Restricted Share Holding (+) 183.65    138.75  
  (1.17)    (1.00)  
TSO Holding (+)      103.50 
       (1.43) 
PVSO Holding (+)      130.01 
       (1.28) 
Rating Residual (-) -19.32*** -17.61*** -45.30*** -42.89*** -45.51*** -44.17*** 
  (-3.36) (-3.16) (-5.15) (-3.10) (-5.33) (--5.10) 
Bond Size (-) -22.08 -25.31 -22.26 -25.53 -21.34 -22.29 
  (-1.19) (-1.38) (-1.37) (-1.54) (-1.29) (-1.33) 
Duration (-) 16.35** 16.83** 8.17 9.70 8.06 8.81 
  (2.10) (2.16) (1.12) (1.32) (1.10) (1.17) 
Firm Size (-) -84.85** -85.58** -107.78*** -112.87*** -110.42*** -109.82*** 
  (-2.23) (-2.25) (-3.05) (-3.21) (-3.16) (-3.11) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.48** 1.48** 0.97* 0.94 0.93 0.88 
  (2.43) (4.42) (1.69) (1.66) (1.63) (1.52) 
Profitability (-) -2.19 -2.38 -4.45** -3.65** -4.09** -3.99** 
  (-1.22) (-1.33) (-2.61) (-2.22) (-2.46) (-2.35) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -26.86 -24.04 -18.77 -21.61 -20.67 -19/85 
  (-1.22) (-1.10) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-0.97) 
Risk (+) 1.37 1.63 1.29 0.61 0.75 0.75 
  (0.56) (0.67) (0.58) (0.29) (0.36) (0.36) 
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.90 
 
0.90 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
0.91 
 
Wald Tests                                                                  
                                                                  
H0: βownership=βOption Holding 
                                                               
H0: βTSO Holding=βPVSO Holding 
Chi Square (p-value)         0.32(0.57)  0.04(0.84) 
Cross-section Tests        
Chi Square (p-Value)  261***(0.00) 282***(0.00) 283***(0.00) 340***(0.00) 350***(0.00) 301***(0.00) 
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Table 2.8  Pensions, credit quality and the cost of debt 
 
Results of ordinary least squares regression of the bond yield spread on annual compensation components. All variables are defined in Table 2.1. The last two columns are estimated only for observations with low bond 
ratings. Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
Variables Exp. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Intercept  453.58*** 425.00*** 495.63*** 440.59*** 457.18*** 346.18*** 947.41*** 955.89*** 
  (4.80) (5.15) (5.49) (6.00) (4.94) (5.02) (5.85) (5.73) 
Incremental Pension (-)   1.92* 2.06**   -1.67***  
    (1.93) (2.10)   (-2.77)  
Pension to Equity (-) -34.99** -37.93*   33.06 46.46  -46.64** 
  (-2.13) (-2.34)   (1.05) (1.50)  (-2.32) 
Low Rating* Incremental  Pension (-)   -4.00*** -4.12***     
    (-3.66) (-3.82)     
Low Rating* Pension to Equity (-)     -88.61** -106.6***   
      (-2.52) (-3.10)   
Rating Residual (-) -17.62*** -21.43*** -20.24*** -20.86*** -20.22*** -25.84*** -25.90*** -26.72*** 
  (-3.13) (-4.37) (-3.79) (-3.96) (-3.60) (-5.38) (-3.52) (-3.51) 
Bond Size (-) -16.12* -20.00** -12.55  -12.72  -15.13 -14.82** 
  (-1.94) (-2.53) (-1.59)  (-1.54)  (-1.25) (-1.19) 
Duration (-) -6.07  -1.67* -8.24** -5.19  -22.41*** -22.67*** 
  (-1.52)  (-1.70) (-2.32) (-1.32)  (-3.91) (-3.86) 
Firm Size (-) -36.39*** -37.07*** -43.16*** -36.95*** -39.56*** -32.32*** -85.62*** -86.40*** 
  (-4.09) (-4.43) (-5.01) (-5.17) (-4.49) (-4.42) (-5.49) (-5.37) 
Debt Ratio (+) 1.83*** 1.69*** 2.06*** 2.03*** 2.01*** 1.83*** 3.40*** 3.45*** 
  (3.05) (2.87) (3.64) (3.64) (3.39) (3.12) (4.30) (4.21) 
Profitability (-) -0.33  0.41  -0.04  -5.85** -6.51** 
  (-0.22)  (0.28)  (-0.02)  (-2.35) (-2.53) 
Market-to-Book Ratio (-) -22.70* -21.25** -27.29** -27.25*** -23.89* -22.52** -16.99 -14.93 
  (-1.64) (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.71) (-1.76) (-2.20) (-0.72) (-0.61) 
Risk (+) 0.62  -0.86  -0.01  -1.85 -1.40 
  (0.17)  (-0.25)  (-0.02)  (-0.33) (-0.25) 
 
No. of obs. 
  
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
150 
 
91 
 
91 
 
Adjusted R2  
  
0.45 
 
0.46 
 
0.51 
 
0.51 
 
0.48 
 
0.47 
 
0.60 
 
0.58 
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2.7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I examine whether and how different CEO pay components affect firms‟ 
borrowing costs. I expect to observe a negative relationship between pay components 
that generate risk-avoiding incentives and the cost of debt, and a positive relationship 
between the borrowing cost and pay components that motivate CEOs to seek more 
risks. I consider all four common pay components: bonus, pension, stock options and 
restricted shares. I take the advantage of the extensive compensation disclosure 
requirements in the UK by using UK data for the period of 2003-2006. My findings are 
in general consistent with my expectations. 
 
First of all, I document that debt-like compensation (defined benefit pension) and cash 
bonuses reduce borrowing costs. The existence of defined benefit pensions makes 
CEOs potential debt-holders of firms. It naturally aligns interests of CEOs and other 
debt-holders. Therefore, borrowing costs are lower for firms that provide more defined 
benefit pension to CEOs. In addition, most of this effect is concentrated among lower-
rated bonds, where the default risk is high and the risk-reducing incentives are more 
desirable. In the case of cash bonuses, their main goal is to motivate CEOs to focus on 
short-term profitability (such as annual earnings). Consequently, it may discourage 
CEOs from seeking long-term risky investment projects. Hence, cash bonuses provide 
certain levels of risk-avoiding incentives, which I show to be favorably priced by debt-
holders. My result is consistent with Duru, Manshaw and Reeb (2005). The main 
difference is the proxy for bonus. They adopt the log of cash bonus (the absolute value), 
while I use the percentage of cash bonus as total compensation (the relative value). My 
result may provide further implication from the view of pay structure.  
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Secondly, I find that firms with a high level of stock options granted to their CEOs are 
severely punished by the debt market. Theoretically, stock options and restricted shares 
are expected to link CEO wealth with that of shareholders. This may motivate CEOs to 
take excessive risks at the expense of debt-holders. As a result, a higher level of stock 
options and restricted shares grants are expected to lead to a higher cost of debt. I find a 
strong positive relationship between bond yield spread and the level of CEO stock 
option holdings and grants. Moreover, the effect of stock options on bond yields is 
found to be much stronger than that of CEO ownership. These results are consistent 
with US studies (e.g. Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Brockman, Martin and Unlu, 2010). As far as 
restricted shares are concerned, I do not find evidence that the cost of debt is positively 
related to restricted shares of CEOs 
 
Finally, I split stock options into two categories: performance-vested stock options 
(PVSOs) and traditional stock options (TSOs). I argue that the performance-vested 
targets on stock options may further motivate CEOs to take excessive risks to meet 
these targets, which will further jeopardize bondholders‟ interests. Hence, PVSOs 
should outweigh TSOs in terms of increasing the cost of debt. I show that debt-holders 
do react differently to performance-vested stock options and traditional stock options. 
CEOs with relatively more performance-vested stock options holdings face a higher 
cost of borrowing, which confirms my hypothesis. 
 
Overall, my study shows that the capital market rationally considers the impact of 
various CEO pay components on managerial risk-taking when pricing publicly traded 
debts. Consequently, optimally adjusting CEO compensation structure can be a useful 
tool in reducing a firm‟s borrowing cost. 
54 
 
Chapter 3   CEO Compensation and Expectations Management 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
A recent survey by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) indicates that top managers 
are truly concerned with meeting or beating financial analysts‟ earnings expectations. 
This  primarily comes from the importance that top managers place on share price 
changes after news of reported earnings meeting or beating analysts‟ forecasts, or 
failing to do so. CEOs can meet or beat analysts‟ expectations either by inflating 
earnings numbers (e.g. Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999) or dampening analysts‟ 
earnings forecasts (e.g. Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). The former type of activity is 
popularly known as earnings management and has been extensively investigated in a 
variety of contexts. On the other hand, there is a growing research interest in the second 
type of activity, commonly known as expectations management. It follows from the 
remarkable discovery that analysts‟ forecasts exhibit an optimistic-pessimistic (also 
called walk-down) pattern: beginning-of-period forecasts are predominantly optimistic, 
while end-of-period forecasts are mostly pessimistic (e.g. Bernhardt and Campello, 
2007). 
 
Little enough is known about the causes of this phenomenon. Studies by Matsumoto 
(2002) and Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki (2006) show that managers guide analysts‟ 
forecasts downwards in order to avoid missing market expectations for earnings. 
Researchers are now examining what circumstances may encourage managers to 
engage in such an opportunistic activity. Kross, Ro and Suk (2010) find that managers 
are more likely to issue “bad news” managerial forecasts if their firms have a record of 
meeting or achieving market expectations consistently. Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 
(2004) document that  end-of-period forecast pessimism is more likely to occur towards 
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new equity issues and insider sales subsequent to a firm‟s earnings announcements. My 
purpose is to explore this optimistic-pessimistic forecast pattern further by examining 
CEO compensation. Specifically, I investigate whether a higher compensation creates a 
stronger incentive for CEOs to engage in expectations management.  
 
Although CEO compensation may be an interesting context in which to evaluate 
whether the pattern of initial optimism and final pessimism has anything to do with 
expectations management, studies rarely focus on this issue. Aboody and Kasznick 
(2000) were among the first to investigate whether CEOs manage market expectations 
by influencing the timing of voluntary disclosures around stock options grants. They 
find that CEOs who receive their stock options before earnings announcements are 
more likely to issue “bad news” forecasts and less likely to issue “good news” forecasts. 
In another study, Cheng and Warfield (2005) document that shares and stock options 
grants are positively related to the incidence of meeting or just beating financial 
analysts‟ forecasts. 
 
In this study, I focus on expectations management in the UK. An analysis of UK firms 
offers an attractive avenue to undertake such research for a variety of reasons. First of 
all, Brown and Higgins (2005) observe that expectations management is more prevalent 
in countries where a strong investor protection environment puts heavy emphasis on 
share prices and limits managers‟ ability to inflate earnings numbers. In their study, UK 
is on the top league of the prevalence of expectations management among industrialised 
courtesies. Athanakasakou, Strong and Walker (2009) also document that UK firms are 
more likely to adopt expectations management rather than earnings management in 
order to meet or beat analysts‟ forecasts. The underlying reasons behind the prevalence 
56 
 
of expectations management in the UK remain largely unknown. Secondly, most of 
equity-based compensation in the UK is conditionally vested. A survey by KPMG 
(2007) finds that UK directors‟ restricted shares and stock options are often related to 
the accounting profitability (e.g. EPS growth) as well as stock return (e.g. total 
shareholders return). Such features may provide strong incentives for UK directors to 
avoid missing financial analysts‟ earnings forecasts. Because the literature documents a 
strong negative stock price reaction to firms which fail to achieve the market 
expectations (e.g. Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis, 2009). If expectations 
management is able to help CEOs to achieve market expectations, UK CEOs may have 
incentives to do so.  
 
I perform robust cross-sectional regression analysis to investigate whether CEO 
compensation encourages expectations management. The literature documents that 
CEO bonuses will suffer greatly if firms fail to achieve market expectations (e.g. 
Matsunaga and Park, 2001). Stock options exercises and insider sales are also found to 
be positively related to the use of expectations management to meet or beat financial 
analysts‟ earnings forecast (e.g. Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004). Therefore, I 
focus on three variable pay components that are most likely to prop up expectations 
management: bonuses, stock options and restricted shares. As for expectations 
management, I use a wide variety of measures commonly used in the literature. 
 
The results of my analysis show that CEOs are more likely to engage in expectations 
management when they have a relatively high proportion of equity-based compensation 
(stock options and restricted shares that are to be vested soon after earnings 
announcements). The relationship is stronger when CEOs already possess a high level 
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of ownership. On the other hand, I document a negative relationship between bonuses 
and the incidence of expectations management. A possible explanation is that bonuses 
are mainly accounting performance based. CEOs may intend to employ alternative 
methods (e.g. earnings management) rather than expectations management, in order to 
achieve market expectations. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I review the prior 
literature. The hypotheses are developed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the 
methodology of this study. In Section 3.5, I describe the data. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 3.6. I conclude this chapter in Section 3.7.  
 
3.2. Literature review 
3.2.1. CEO compensation 
 
It is widely acknowledged that appropriate compensation may help to reduce the 
principal-agent problem by aligning interests of shareholders and managers (e.g. 
Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). Equity-based compensation (stock options and shares) 
is intended to take a leading role in this alignment. 
 
In the UK, most equity-based compensation is conditionally vested. A survey by 
KPMG (2007) documents that CEOs‟ restricted shares and stock options are often 
related with a vesting condition which is based on prescribed total shareholder return 
(TSR). The literature also suggests that both of accounting and stock based performance 
targets should be considered in executive compensation package (e.g. Lambert, 1993 
and Murphy, 1999). Stock price is forward-looking and a good indicator for 
shareholders‟ wealth. Hence by linking CEO compensation with stock price is able to 
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encourage top managers to create values for shareholders. However, stock price is 
noised and not only affected by managerial contributions and behaviour (e.g. internet 
bubble in 1990s‟ and the financial crisis since 2007). To reduce the noise in stock price, 
accounting performance is an alternative benchmark to make managerial actions 
accountable. Another important feature of UK CEO pay is the relatively long vesting 
period: most restricted shares and stock options can only be vested three years after the 
initial grant (KPMG, 2007). These strict vesting conditions and the long vesting period 
upon equity-based compensation are expected to strengthen the pay-for-performance 
relationship.  
 
3.2.2. Expectations management 
 
Expectations management refers to the practice of managers purposefully dampening 
analysts‟ earnings forecasts to produce a positive earnings surprise or avoid a negative 
earnings surprise upon the release of earnings announcements (Bartov, Givoly and 
Hayn, 2002). From an interview with US CFOs, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) 
report that several firms use earnings guidance to ease the analyst‟s job in computing 
earnings forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) finds that the last consensus earnings forecasts 
prior to earnings announcements tend to be pessimistically biased. This suggests that 
expectations management may guide the final consensus earnings forecast downward, 
making it “beatable”. Bernhardt and Campello (2007) trace the path of analysts‟ 
forecast revisions and find that forecasts become “pessimistic” step by step, from the 
beginning to the end of the period. They describe such a revision path as a revolution 
that is possibly caused by expectations management.  
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CEOs can use various channels to disclose information for possible expectations 
management. The public channels CEOs can use include managerial forecasts, press 
conferences, profit warnings and so on. Cotter, Tuna and Wysocki (2006) find that 
analysts react to managerial forecasts quickly and are more likely to issue a final 
“beatable” forecast afterwards. CEOs can also use private channels of information 
disclosure to affect analyst forecasts. Based on a case study of UK firms, Holland 
(2005) observes that CEOs can organize certain private or semi-private meetings with 
analysts to explain firm policies, discuss public issues and so on. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 
(2004) find that the value of analyst forecast revision comes more from financial 
analysts‟ different channels for collecting private information rather than a better ability 
to interpret the public information. 
 
CEOs may find it particularly advantageous to resort to disclosures that can influence 
analysts‟ forecasts. Firstly, expectations management is relatively under-regulated 
compared with earnings management. It is not against any implicit financial reporting 
rules and bears relatively lower costs. Secondly, analysts have their own incentives to 
promptly incorporate information from insiders into their forecast revisions. For 
example, Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000) find that forecast accuracy is positively 
related to the likelihood of analysts‟ promotion. Therefore, analysts are motivated to 
quickly incorporate insiders‟ disclosures into their forecast revisions. Thirdly, Langberg 
and Sivaramakrishan (2008) argue that analysts are less suspicious of insiders‟ “bad 
news” disclosures than those of “good news”. Considering that expectations 
management aims to dampen analysts‟ forecasts via “bad news” disclosures, analysts 
are more likely to adjust their forecasts in such circumstances.  
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3.2.3. CEO compensation and expectations management 
 
The nature of expectations management is to opportunistically use information 
disclosure to dampen market expectations. To establish such a link, two conditions are 
vital: (1) CEO compensation provides incentives for certain types of disclosure; and (2) 
CEOs have the opportunity to control the disclosure.  
 
CEOs naturally lack the incentive to disclose information to outsiders, because such 
information may be used to monitor and discipline CEOs themselves (e.g. Bushman and 
Smith, 2001). CEOs may also prefer to release “good news” rather than “bad news” 
because of the natural market reactions to news with different content (e.g. Kasznik and 
Lev, 1995). However, recent studies suggest that managerial voluntary disclosure can 
be dramatically affected by CEOs‟ equity-based compensation. Nagar, Nanda and 
Wysocki (2003) investigate the relationship between managers‟ disclosure activities 
and their stock price-based incentives. Using 1,109 US firm observations from 1995 to 
1997, they find that both managerial forecast frequency and analysts‟ subjective ratings 
of disclosure practice are positively related to CEOs‟ equity incentives. Hence they 
argue that stock-based incentives encourage the voluntary disclosures of “good news” 
but not hold the “bad news” release. The reason is that, as they explain, equity-based 
compensation ties CEOs‟ wealth to stock price. The market reacts negatively to the 
“silence” of “bad news”, penalizing share price as well as top managers‟ equity-based 
compensation. That is why equity-based compensation may encourage not withholding 
the release of “bad news”. Therefore, equity incentives align interests of shareholders 
and CEOs on the issue of voluntary disclosure. However, Baik, Kang and Morton 
(2010) provide evidence that managerial ownership actually provides an incentive to 
create information opacity. Based on 26,000 US firm-years from 1988-2002, they 
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document that managerial ownership is negatively related to the accuracy of analysts‟ 
consensus forecasts and coverage. They argue that managerial entrenchment leads to a 
less transparent disclosure environment, jeopardizing shareholders‟ interests.  
 
CEOs may also have opportunities to manipulate disclosures for their own interests. 
They control the time, content and target audience of voluntary disclosure. Considering 
that expectations management uses disclosure to dampen analysts‟ earnings forecasts, 
CEOs are capable of controlling expectations management for opportunistic objectives. 
I now discuss the specific link between CEO compensation and expectations 
management, and develop hypotheses.  
 
3.3. Hypotheses development  
 
The ideas linking CEO compensation with expectations management are graphically 
presented in Figure 3.1. It is safe to assume that a CEO knows the bonus plan and the 
vesting schedule of stock options and restricted shares, because all such information is 
documented in the remuneration contract in advance. Hence, at the beginning of a year, 
a CEO is able to plan his or her effort and activities so as to receive bonuses, exercise 
stock options or sell shares after  current year‟s earnings announcement. CEOs have 
incentives to receive the maximum bonuses and exercise stock options or sell owned 
shares at a good price. If expectations management is able to help CEOs to achieve their 
interests, they have a strong incentive to employ it. I hypothesize that link 1 exists and 
expectations management will actually help CEOs to maximize their wealth. Secondly, 
successful expectations management will lower market expectations, making the 
reported earnings more likely to meet or beat market expectations (see link 2). Thirdly, 
the market tends to interpret meeting or beating market expectations (MBE) as “good 
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news”, and react positively (e.g. Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis, 2009). Such a 
positive reaction will justify a CEO‟s bonus, as well as boost the share price, which 
makes CEO stock options exercise and shares sale more profitable (see link 3). 
Therefore, expectations management is assumed to be an effective way to benefit a 
CEO‟s personal wealth. In other words, CEOs may employ expectations management 
for personal interests. This justifies the existence of link1. 
 
3.3.1. Cash bonus 
 
Annual cash bonus may provide incentives for expectations management. Matsunaga 
and Park (2001) investigate the effects of missing analysts‟ consensus forecast on 
CEOs‟ annual bonus. Analysing US data from 1993-1997, they find that the change in a 
CEO‟s bonus is lower when a firm misses the quarterly earnings forecast. This suggests 
that CEOs‟ bonuses may suffer from an incremental penalty if a firm fails to achieve 
market expectations. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First 
of all, the compensation committee may view missing market expectations as a signal 
of poor managerial efforts, and penalize CEOs in response. Graham, Harvey and 
Rajgopal (2005)‟s survey indicates that the capital market interprets missing market 
expectations as CEOs having little control over their firm performance. Hence the 
subsequent penalties on bonuses may be justified. On the other hand, achieving market 
expectations is viewed as a good sign of CEOs‟ credibility and efforts. It helps the 
compensation committee to justify their high bonus payment to top managers, 
overcoming the political constraints on CEO compensation (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). Thirdly, the compensation committee may tie the penalty on bonuses to missing 
market expectations. By doing so, CEOs are encouraged to voluntarily disclosure more 
accurate and detailed information to shareholders, limiting information asymmetry. 
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Figure 3.1 Theoretical links between CEO compensation and expectations management 
 
CEO 
Compensation 
 
1. Bonus. 
 
2. Un-exercisable 
stock options that will 
soon become 
exercisable. 
 
3. Restricted shares 
that will soon become 
vested.  
Link 
1 
Expectations 
Management  
 
 
 
Guiding analysts‟ 
expectations to a 
beatable level via 
managerial 
information 
disclosure.  
Link 
2 
Link 
3 
MBE 
 
 
Reported earnings 
meeting or 
beating the 
analysts‟ 
expectations.  
Compensation 
Vesting 
 
1. Receiving bonus.  
 
2. Exercising stock 
options.  
 
3. Selling shares.  
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The potential penalty on bonus if a firm fails to achieve market expectations may also 
motivate CEOs to “truthfully” communicate with analysts in order to generate more 
accurate earnings forecasts. Therefore, I expect that bonuses received by a CEO provide 
a strong incentive to avoid missing the market expectations. My hypothesis is: 
 
H7: CEOs with more cash bonus are more likely to meet or beat  
        market expectations.  
 
Expectations management may lower market expectations through managerial 
information disclosure. These empirical studies also find that expectations 
management  helps CEOs to meet or beat market expectations (e.g. Baik and 
Jiang, 2006). Therefore, I also expect a positive relationship between CEO bonus 
and the incidence of expectations management. My next hypothesis is developed 
as follows: 
 
H8: CEOs with more cash bonus are more likely to conduct 
        expectations management. 
 
3.3.2. Stock options and restricted shares   
 
Stock options and restricted shares may be also related with the likelihood of 
expectations management. First of all, CEOs have the incentive to exercise stock 
options or selling shares shortly after earnings announcements. Since an important 
condition for exercising stock options and vesting restricted shares is based on 
accounting performance, CEOs may have a large amount of exercisable stock options 
and increasing ownership from restricted shares vesting shortly after earnings 
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announcements. These increasing equity incentives make CEOs‟ wealth more 
concentrated on a single asset: namely their firms‟ stock. It increases CEOs‟ risk 
exposure to the stock market. To diversify such a risk, CEOs have incentive to engage 
in insider sales, lowering their equity incentives. Based on a large US sample from 1993 
to 2000, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that un-exercisable stock options and 
ownership are positively related with insider sales within six months after earnings 
announcements. Hence, stock options and restricted shares are sensitive to stock price 
movement shortly after earnings announcements.  
 
Secondly, CEOs actively create “good news” prior to insider sales. Bartov and 
Mohanram (2004) show that CEOs have private information that can be used to predict 
future stock price. Using 17,970 CEO stock option exercise observations from 1992-
2001, they document that CEOs manipulate earnings before large stock options 
exercise, so as to increase the cash payout of stock options exercises. Hillier and 
Marshall (2002) focus on UK data from 1992 to 1996 and find that CEOs sell 
abnormally more after “good earnings news”. They interpret that CEOs have private 
information about the infomativeness of earnings and exploit the stock market in the 
following insider trading.  
 
Thirdly, expectations management helps to increase the probability of earnings to 
achieve market expectations, which is interpreted as “good news” by the market. Baik 
and Jiang (2006) examine the role of expectations management on achieving market 
expectations. Based on their 5,703 observations in US from 1995 to 2002, they show 
that 53.3% of observations meet or exceed market expectations following managerial 
forecast. In contrast, the sub-sample without managerial forecast shows only 33.5% of 
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observations were able to beat market expectations. Hence they argue that expectations 
management is an effective way to meet or beat financial analysts‟ earnings forecasts. 
 
In short, CEOs‟ stock options exercise and insider sales after earnings announcements 
may motivate expectations management (e.g. Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004). 
Such insider sales are more likely to link with two particular equity-based compensation 
components: the un-exercisable stock options and restricted shares which will be vested 
in the following fiscal year (after  current fiscal year‟s earnings announcement). In other 
words, these two components may provide strong incentives for expectations 
management. I formulate hypotheses as follows: 
 
H9: CEOs with more equity compensation (stock options and restricted 
       shares) which will be vested in the following year are more likely to 
       meet or beat market expectations.  
 
H10: CEOs with more equity compensation (stock options and restricted 
        shares) which will be vested in the following year are more likely to 
        conduct expectations management.  
 
3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Measurement of CEO compensation  
 
In this study I focus on three CEO pay components: bonuses, stock options and 
restricted shares. Bonus is measured as a fraction of cash bonus in CEO total 
compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonuses, and the estimated value of stock 
options and shares received during a fiscal year. Such a measurement is to address the 
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relative importance of cash bonus in total annual compensation. A bigger weight of 
cash bonus in CEO annual compensation indicates a stronger incentive for top 
managers to maximize his or her cash bonus. As far as stock options and restricted 
shares are concerned, I use the number of shares of each equity incentives scaled by a 
firm‟s total shares outstanding. In addition, dummy variables for bonuses, stock options 
and restricted shares are also introduced. All compensation variables are defined in 
panel A of Table 3.1  
 
3.4.2. Measurement of expectations management  
 
A. Bartov‟s method  
Since managerial voluntary disclosures are not always publicly available, and surely not 
ones with the intention to influence market expectations, it is common practice in the 
literature to consider analysts‟ forecast revisions to be the main indicator of 
expectations management. Following Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Brown and 
Higgins (2005), I calculate the following method to capture the possible expectations 
management. CEOs are more likely to dampen analysts‟ expectations if they observe 
“optimism” among analysts. The magnitude of this optimism can be captured by 
analysing forecast errors. A dummy variable (Optimism) is calculated as follows: 
 
Optimism i,t   = 1 if FE i,t ＜0; Otherwise = 0.        (2) 
 
Where FE is the forecast error defined as the difference between the reported earnings 
per share (EPS i,t) and the consensus forecast that prevailed at the beginning of the year 
(AFE i,t), deflated by the firm‟s share price 12 months prior to earnings announcement 
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(Price i,t-1). The deflator is used to control any potential spurious relationship resulting 
from cross-sectional scale differences in earnings per share. 
 
Managerial disclosure activities to dampen analysts‟ expectations will typically result in 
a downward forecast revision from the beginning to the end of the year. A dummy 
variable (DOWN) is calculated to capture such downward forecast revisions as follows: 
 
Down i,t = 1 if REV i,t  ＜0; Otherwise = 0.         (3) 
 
Where REV i,t is forecast revision defined as the difference between the latest consensus 
forecast prior to the earnings announcement (AFL i,t) and the consensus forecast at the 
beginning of the year (AFE i,t), deflated by the share price 12 months prior to earnings 
announcement (Price i,t-1). 
 
Successful expectations management increases the likelihood of reported earnings 
meeting or beating analysts‟ expectations. In other words, the final reported earnings 
will exceed the last consensus earnings forecast prior to the earnings announcement. 
Therefore, a dummy variable (MBE) is calculated as follows to measure whether the 
reported earnings meet or beat the market expectations:  
 
MBE i,t  = 1 if ES i,t  ≥0; Otherwise =0.         (4) 
 
Where ES is the amount of earnings surprise defined as the difference between the 
reported earnings per share (EPS i,t) and the latest consensus forecast prior to the 
earnings announcement (AFL i,t), deflated by the share price 12 months prior to earnings 
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announcement (Price i,t-1). I also construct a stringent proxy of expectations 
management that is a combination of these above mentioned individual constructs: 
Optimism, Down and MBE. A dummy variable (EM_Bartov) is defined as follows: 
 
         EM_Bartov i,t = 1 if Optimism i,t , Down i,t and  MBE i,t  = 1 ; Otherwise = 0.  (5) 
 
This new proxy variable suggests that CEOs are highly likely to conduct expectations 
management when those following conditions are met: (1) there is analysts‟ optimism at 
the beginning of a year (reported earnings are less than the first consensus forecast); (2) 
there is a downward forecast revision from the beginning of the year to just before the 
earnings announcement (the last consensus forecast is less than the first consensus 
forecast); and (3) analysts‟ expectations are met or beaten when earnings are announced 
(reported earnings are greater than or equal to the last consensus forecast). 
 
The advantage of the above mentioned proxy of expectations management is that it 
considers both the incentive (early analysts‟ optimism) and the successful consequence 
(meeting or beating market expectations when earnings are announced). However, these 
measures can still disregard a group of firms that use expectations management, yet 
ultimately fail to meet or beat analysts‟ expectations. Moreover, one can argue that the 
identified downward forecast revision may actually be driven by “depressed news” 
from the wider market and firm-specific circumstances instead of managerial 
opportunistic disclosures. Therefore, I also conduct another proxy to capture the 
possible expectations management.   
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B. Matsumoto‟s method 
An alternative measurement for expectations management is developed by Matsumoto 
(2002) and recently adopted by Athanasakou, Strong and Walker (2009) for UK data. 
According to this approach, the earnings surprise component is calculated as the 
difference between the last consensus forecast and the expected portion of forecast that 
takes into account overall firm-specific and market-wide developments. I model the 
change in current earnings (∆EPSt) scaled by lagged price (Pt-1) as a function of two 
variables: prior years‟ change in earnings (∆EPSt-1) scaled by lagged price (Pt-2), and the 
cumulative excess return (CRETt) over the current year until the latest forecast is made. 
The change in prior years‟ earnings captures the trends of earnings growth, while the 
cumulative excess return obtains firm-specific news over the period. 
 
∆EPS i,t /P i,t-1 = α1 + α2 * (∆EPS i,t-1 / P i,t-2) + α3 * CRET i,t+ e                 (6) 
 
The above equation is employed within each industry-year. To estimate the expected 
change in earnings E(∆EPSt), I adopt parameters estimated from equation (6) and 
employ them in each industry-year. It is assumed that analysts can not know current 
year‟s parameters (α in equation 5). They use prior years‟ parameters (β) instead.  
 
          E(∆EPS i,t) = [β1 + β2 * (∆EPS i,t-1 / P i,t-2) + β3 * CRET i,t ] * pt-1                          (7) 
 
In the next step, I estimate the expected earnings forecast (EF) by using the actual prior 
year‟s earnings (EPS t-1) and the expected change in earnings E(∆EPSt).  
 
EF i,t = EPS i,t-1 + E(∆EPS i,t).                      (8) 
71 
 
Finally, I compute the unexpected earnings forecast (UEF) as the difference between 
the last consensus‟s forecast (AFL) and the expected earnings forecast (EF). If the UEF 
is negative, it suggests that analysts‟ forecasts are lower than what we expected (or 
pessimistically biased). In such a case, I suspect that expectations management may 
occur. Dummy variable (EM_Matsumoto) is introduced as follows. 
 
UEF i,t = AFL i,t  - EF i,t                                 (9) 
EM_Matsumoto i,t = 1 UEF <0 ; Otherwise = 0                 (10) 
 
3.4.3. Testing models  
Prior to establishing the direct link between CEO compensation and expectations 
management, I should prove that CEOs do care about market expectations, because 
expectations management is only one of several means available for CEOs to reach 
market expectations. The following basic regression model is adopted: 
 
            MBE i,t = α0 + β Compensation i,t + ∑ λ Controls i,t + ∑ ζ Industry dummies  
                       + ∑ υ Year dummies   +ε                                                                       (11) 
 
Next, I test the relationship between compensation and expectations management in the 
following model:  
 
            EM_Bartov i,t / EM_ Matsumoto i,t = b0 + δ Compensation i,t + ∑ ρ Controls i,t  
                                                + ∑ Ѕ Industry dummies + ∑ κ Year dummies + ν       (12)                       
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Following prior studies, several control variables are included in each regression model. 
Earlier studies (e.g. Skinner and Sloan, 2002) find that large firms with high growth 
opportunity are more likely to avoid missing market expectations. Richardson, Teoh, 
Wysocki (2004) show that firms that report loss and have negative earnings growth 
have stronger incentives to reach market expectations. Matsumoto (2002) argues that 
several industries (such biotechnology, computers, electronics and retail) may 
demonstrate higher concern for market expectations because of the concern of potential 
litigation risk. I consider those factors. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
3.5. Data 
 
The data for CEO compensation is collected from BoardEx. It contains detailed 
information on the dates when stock options become exercisable and restricted shares 
are to be vested. By comparing the dates of stock option (restricted share) vesting with 
fiscal year end and earnings announcement dates, I can compute how many shares of 
stock options and restricted shares are to be vested in the following year. Analysts‟ 
forecast data is collected from International Broker‟s Estimate System (I/B/E/S). It 
reports the consensus median forecasts throughout the time horizon as well as actually 
earnings per share when earnings are announced. The actual date of the earnings 
announcement and dates for each consensus forecast are also available. Other data for 
control variables is collected from FAME or DataStream. The sample consists of non-
financial and non-utility FTSE 350 firms from the period 2002-2006. After I match 
CEO compensation data from BoardEx and the consensus analysts‟ forecasts data from 
I/B/E/S files, the final sample comprises of 719 firm-year observations, representing 
194 large UK publicly traded firms. The sample selection and distribution are reported 
in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.1  Variables definitions 
 
Panel A: CEO Compensation  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Total Compensation 
 
 
Bonus 
 
Bonus_Dummy 
 
OptionNY 
 
The sum of salary, bonuses, the estimated values of stock options and restricted shares 
grants11 in a particular year. 
 
Cash bonus scaled by total compensation. 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if Bonus>0, otherwise zero. 
 
The number of shares of stock options which will be vested in the next fiscal year 
(after this year‟s earnings announcement), scaled by total number of shares outstanding 
(DS: NOSH). 
 
OptionNY_Dummy 
 
ShareNY 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if OptionNY>0, otherwise zero. 
 
The number of shares of restricted shares which will be vested in the next fiscal year 
(after this year‟s earnings announcement), scaled by total number of shares outstanding 
(DS: NOSH). 
 
ShareNY_Dummy 
 
EquityNY 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if ShareNY>0, otherwise zero. 
 
The sum of OptionNY and ShareNY. 
 
EquityNY_Dummy 
 
Ownership 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if EquityNY>0, otherwise zero. 
 
The number of shares owned by the CEO scaled by total number of shares 
 outstanding (DS:NOSH). 
 
 
Panel B: Control Variables  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
MV 
 
Growth 
 
Profitable  
 
Chearn                                                                        
 
The natural log of market capitalization (DS: MV). 
 
The market capitalization (DS: MV) scaled by the book value of  equity (DS :307 ). 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if EPS ≥ 0, otherwise 0. 
 
Dummy variables equals 1 ∆EPS >0, otherwise 0. 
Lit 
 
 
                                                                     
 
Indicator variables equals 1 if a firm belongs to a high risk industry (Datastream level 6 
BIOTC, CMPSV, INTNT, SOFTW, ELETR, DSCST, ERETL, HARDL, MULTI, 
SOFTG) including biotechnology, computers, electronics and retails (See Matsumoto 
2002). Otherwise Lit equals 0.  
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  Please see the Appendix for the estimated value of stock options and restricted shares   
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Expectations management  
 
 
Variable Name Definition 
ES 
 
 
 
FE 
 
 
 
REV  
Earnings surprise is the difference between I/B/E/S/ reported EPS and the last 
consensus forecast, scaled by the lag price (12 months prior to earnings 
announcement). 
 
Forecast error is the difference between I/B/E/S/ reported EPS and the first consensus 
forecast after the last year‟s earning announcement, scaled by  the lag price(12 months 
prior to earnings announcement). 
 
Forecast revision is the difference between the last consensus forecast (AFL) and the  
first consensus forecast after the last year‟s earning announcement(AFE), scaled by  
the lag price (12 months prior to earnings announcement). 
 
CRET 
 
 
 
The cumulative excess monthly return following the last year‟s earnings announcement 
to the month before this year‟s earnings announcement. Excess return is firm return 
less market return (FTSE All Shares Index).  
 
UEF 
 
 
 
Optimism 
The un-expected earnings forecasts are the difference between the last consensus 
forecast and the “expected” forecast. The “expected forecast” is calculated by 
employing the regression model of change in earnings and CRET. 
 
Dummy variable of market optimism equals 1 if FE<0, otherwise 0.   
 
Down 
 
MBE 
Dummy variable of expectations down equals 1 if REV< 0, otherwise 0.   
 
Dummy variable of meeting or beating the market expectations equals 1 if ES ≥0, 
otherwise 0.   
 
EM_Bartov 
 
 
EM_ Matsumoto 
Dummy variable of expectations management (using Bartov‟s method) equals 1 if 
Optimism=1, Down=1 and MBE=1; otherwise 0. 
 
Indicator variable of expectations management (using Matsumoto‟s method) equals 1 
if UEF<0; otherwise 0.  
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Table 3.2  Sample selection and distribution 
 
 Number of firms Number of observations 
Panel A: Sample selection 
FTSE 350 firms  350 1750 
Less: 
    Financials & Utilities 
 
99 
 
495 
    Observations with incomplete information  52 400 
    Observations have less than 3  analysts following 5 131 
Final sample 194 719 
   
Panel B: Year distribution 
2002 98 98 
2003 131 131 
2004 142 142 
2005 170 170 
2006 178 178 
   
Panel C: Industry distribution   
Mining and Quarrying   15 58 
Manufacturing 71 255 
Construction 14 55 
Wholesale & Retail Trade 26 97 
Hotel & Restaurant  8 30 
Transport & Communication 16 66 
Real Estate  12 45 
Others  32 113 
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Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of earnings surprises in the sample. Consistent with 
prior literature (e.g. Athanasakou, Strong and Walker, 2009), most UK publicly traded 
firms are able to meet or beat market expectations. Many more observations can be 
found in the positive earnings surprise area. More importantly, most of observations are 
concentrated in a small positive earnings surprise area (1or 2 penny). It is consistent 
with prior studies that CEOs have strong incentives to meet or just beat market 
expectations (e.g. Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Frequency distribution of Earnings Surprise 
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The sample consists of 719 observations during the period of 2002-2006 for 194 FTSE 350 non-financial and non-
utility firms. ES is the difference between actual reported earnings and the latest analysts‟ forecast from I/B/E/S in 
the unit of pence. The size of each bin is 1 penny.   
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Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics for major variables. In Panel A, I can see that 
the average (median) total annual compensation is £2.14 (£1.14) million. Bonuses 
account for 19% of total annual compensation, with an average (median) package of 
£343,000 (£225,000). As far as stock options and restricted shares grants are concerned, 
restricted shares are more popular than stock options. The median value for the former 
is £278,000, while that for the latter is only £75,000.  
 
Panel B shows great variation among CEO ownership. The mean and median value for 
CEO ownership is 1.02% and 0.05%, respectively. The mean (median) value for 
variable EquityNY is 0.07(0.02). This means that CEOs have 0.07% equity incentives 
(stock options and restricted shares which will be vested in the following year) out of a 
firm‟s total share outstanding on average.   
 
Both Panel C and Panel D in Table 3.3 report the descriptive statistics of variables to 
capture expectations management. Similar to prior research, it is found that most UK 
publicly traded firms can meet market expectations. The median figure for earnings 
surprise (ES) is positive, and the proportion of firms meeting or beating market 
expectations (MBE) is around 71.07%. Finally, the proportion of observations 
documented as expectations management based on Bartov‟s method (EM_Bartov) is 
17.25%. Such result is similar to those reported in Brown and Higgins (2005). The 
number of observations showing the sign of expectations management based on 
Matsumoto‟s method (EM_Matsumoto) is much higher, accounting for 65.79% of total 
observations. This suggests that Bartov‟s method employs more strict conditions and 
generates fewer suspicious observations.  
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Table 3.3  Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 719 firm-year FTSE350 observations from 2002-2006. All variables are winsorized at 2% level and defined 
in Table 3.1 
 
Variables  Mean Median St. Dev. Quartile 1 Quartile 3 
Panel A. CEO annual compensation     
Salary  (£ 000s’) 494.85 430.00 237.05 330.00 636.00 
Bonus (£ 000s’) 342.98 225.00 402.40    0.00 441.00 
Options Grants (£ 000s’) 392.69 75.00 900.98     0.00 389.00 
Restricted Shares Grants (£ 000s’) 906.69 278.00 3672.36     0.00 787.00 
Total Compensation (£ 000s’) 2137.20 1143.00 4200.87 706.00 2183.00 
Bonus (%) 19.04 18.73 12.87 10.27 26.25 
 
Panel B. CEO equity incentives     
Ownership (%) 1.02 0.05 4.35 0.01 0.22 
OptionNY (%) 0.04 0.00 0.10    0.00 0.05 
SahreNY (%) 0.03 0.00 0.10     0.00 0.01 
EquityNY (%) 0.07 0.02 0.16     0.00 0.08 
 
Panel C. Expectations management (discrete variables)     
ES 0.0101 0.0017 0.1114 -0.0003 0.0065 
FE 0.0075 0.0025 0.1039    -0.0038 0.0134 
REV -0.0026 0.0003 0.0686     0.0048 0.0059 
UEF(Penny) -7.52 -3.27 59.61     -12.24 2.63 
 
Panel D. Expectations management (dummy variables) 
 
Variables                                                No. of Variables  =1    N  Frequency (%) 
Optimism  270  719  37.55 
Down 330  719     45.90 
MBE 511  719      71.07 
EM_Bartov 124  719      17.25 
EM_Matsumoto  473  719  65.79 
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The correlation matrix between key variables is reported in Table 3.4. The variable of 
bonus demonstrates significantly positive correlations with earnings surprise (ES) and 
meeting or beating market expectations (MBE). However, it is negatively related with 
one proxy of expectations management, EM_Bartov, which is unexpected. In terms of 
equity incentives which will be vested in the following year (EquityNY), it is positively 
related to meeting or beating market expectations (MBE) as well as another proxy to 
capture expectations management, EM_Matsumoto. This is consistent with my 
expectations.  
 
3.6. Empirical results  
3.6.1. Cash bonus 
 
First of all, I examine CEO annual cash bonus. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, I have 
two hypotheses. The first is (H7): CEOs with more cash bonuses are more likely to 
meet or beat market expectations. The second is (H8): Bonus is positively related with 
the probability of expectations management.  
 
The results of hypothesis (H7) are reported in the columns1and 2 of Table 3.5.  As 
expected, both coefficients for variables of Bonus and Bonus_Dummy are positive, 
while only that for Bonus_Dummy remains statistically significant. The coefficient of 
Bonus_Dummy is 0.75. This indicates that the odds ratio of meeting or beating the 
market expectation for a CEO receives cash bonus, over that odds ratio for a CEO 
without cash bonus is, 2.12 (e
0.75 
). For example, If I assume the odds ratio of meeting 
or beating market expectation for a CEO without cash bonus is 2.45 (0.71/1-0.71), 
based on the mean value of MBE in our sample. The corresponding odds ratio for a 
CEO receiving cash bonus will be 5.19(2.12* 2.45). In another word, the probability of 
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meeting or beating the market expectations for a CEO receiving cash bonus is 0.84 
(5.19/ (5.19+1). Compared with CEOs without cash bonus, the probability of meeting 
or beating the market expectations increases about 13% (0.84-0.71), on the condition 
that CEOs receive cash bonus. I also consider the extent of reported earnings meeting or 
beating market expectations. Such results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.6. 
I find that only the variable of Bonus is positively related with earnings surprise at 5% 
significance level. This suggests that when CEOs receive more bonuses, the reported 
earnings will exceed market expectations by a greater magnitude. Therefore, I find 
some evidence to support my hypothesis (H7): CEOs who receives bonuses are more 
likely to meet or beat market expectations. Furthermore, a high level of cash bonus will 
lead to a greater magnitude to exceed market expectations.  
 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.7, I test my hypothesis (H8): CEOs who receive more 
bonuses are more likely to engage in expectations management. As mentioned in 
Section 3.4, I use two proxies to capture possible expectations management. Hence I 
split Table 3.7 in two panels: Panel A for Bartov‟s method; while panel B for 
Matsumoto‟s method. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table 3.7, I find that these 
coefficients for Bonus and Bonus_Dummy are both negative and for Bonus at 1% 
significance level. This suggests that if CEOs receive more cash bonuses, they are less 
likely to engage in expectations management (based on Bartove‟s method), which is 
inconsistent with my hypothesis (H8). Similar results can also be found in columns 1 
and 2 of Panel B in Table 3.7, when I use Matsumoto‟s method to define expectations 
management. In short, I document that cash bonus is negatively related with the 
probability of expectations management.  
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Table 3.4  Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlations among main variables. Correlations that are significant at 10% level or below are in bold. All variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)  (11) (12) (13)  (14) (15)  (16) (17)  (18) (19)  
(1 )Bonus  1                   
(2) EquityNY 0.11 1                  
(3) OptionNY 0.08 0.78 1                 
(4) ShareNY 0.09 0.76 0.19 1                
(5) ES 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1               
(6) FE 0.12 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.80 1              
(7) REV 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.41 0.22 1             
(8) OPTIMISM  -0.22 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.10 -0.24 -0.20 1            
(9) DOWN  -0.20 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.05 -0.13 -0.28 0.62 1           
(10) MBE  0.10 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.15 -0.02 -0.43 -0.08 1          
(11) EM_BARTOV  -0.14 0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.12 -0.18 0.59 0.50 0.29 1         
(12) CRET 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 1        
(13) UEF  -0.02 0.13 0.21 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.09 1       
(14) EM_MATSUMOTO  -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.13 0.20 0.24 -0.12 0.11 -0.05 -0.30 1      
(15) MV  0.01 -0.07 -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 1     
(16) GROWTH  -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 1    
(17) PROFITABLE  0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.12 -0.08 0.01 -0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 1   
(18) CHEARN  0.16 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.13 -0.39 -0.27 0.24 -0.21 0.06 0.09 -0.22 0.07 -0.03 0.09 1  
(19) LIT 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 0.03 1 
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Table 3.5  CEO compensation and meeting or beating the market expectations 
Logit regression of Meeting or beating market expectations (MBE) on testing CEO compensation components. The data set is a pooled sample of 719 firm-years from FTSE 350 non-financial 
and non-utility firms for the period of 2002-2006. P value is reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Industry and year dummies are 
included but not reported. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Probability (MBE i,t=1) = Logit ( α0+ α1* Testing Compensation i,t+ α2* MV i,t + α3*Growth i,t + α4* Profitable i,t + α5* Chearn i,t + α6* Lit i,t + α7∑ INDUS+ α8∑ Years + ε ) 
 
Variable                            Exp. sign                                     (1)                             (2)                                   (3)                        (4)                             (5)                                   (6)                                (7)                             (8)  
Intercept ? 0.54 0.36 0.36 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.60 
  (0.45) (0.62) (0.62) (0.53) (0.49) (0.46) (0.48) (0.40) 
Bonus + 0.01        
  (0.20)        
Bonus_Dummy +  0.75***       
   (0.00)       
EquityNY +   1.72**      
    (0.03)      
EquityNY_Dummy +    0.44**     
     (0.02)     
OptionNY +     0.14    
      (0.21)    
OpionNY_Dummy +      0.27   
       (0.13)   
ShareNY +       2.82**  
        (0.03)  
ShareNY_Dummy +        0.43** 
         (0.03) 
MV + -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11* 
  (0.16) (0.12) (0.23) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.08) 
Growth + 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.58) (0.59) (0.65) (0.72) (0.61) (0.63) (0.64) (0.58) 
Profitable + -0.32 -0.48 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.23 -0.25 -0.24 
  (0.53) (0.35) (0.65) (0.63) (0.62) (0.64) (0.61) (0.63) 
Chearn + 1.08*** 1.02*** 1.13*** 1.10*** 1.12*** 1.10*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lit + -1.01* -0.92 -0.85 -0.81 -0.92 -0.89 -0.90 -0.83 
 
 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) 
McFadden R2   0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
          
LR Statistics   88.48 94.67 93.38 92.38 88.47 89.02 93.83 91.50 
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Table 3.6  CEO compensation and earnings surprise 
OLS regression of earnings surprise (ES) on testing CEO compensation components. The data set is a pooled sample of 719 firm-years from FTSE 350 non-financial and non-utility firms for the 
period of 2002-2006. P value is reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Industry and year dummies are included but not reported. All 
variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
ES i,t = β0+ β 1* Testing Compensation i,t + β 2* MV i,t + β 3*Growth i,t + β 4* Profitable i,t + β 5* Chearn i,t + β 6* Lit i,t + β 7∑ INDUS+ β 8∑ Years + ε  
 
 Variable                                Exp. sign                                   (1)                             (2)                                (3)                             (4)                                (5)                              (6)                                (7)                             (8)  
Intercept ? 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  (0.80) (0.80) (0.67) (0.71) (0.61) (0.71) (0.67) (0.63) 
Bonus + 0.0007**        
  (0.04)        
Bonus_Dummy +  0.02       
   (0.16)       
EquityNY +   0.01      
    (0.62)      
EquityNY_Dummy +    0.01     
     (0.23)     
OptionNY +     -0.004    
      (0.93)    
OptionNY_Dummy +      -0.01   
       (0.13)   
ShareNY +       0.04  
        (0.38)  
ShareNY_Dummy +        0.01 
         (0.29) 
MV + -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0001 
  (0.81) (0.76) (0.84) (0.72) (0.81) (0.74) (0.81) (0.68) 
Growth + -0.00003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00002 
  (0.87) (0.86) (0.84) (0.79) (0.86) (0.82) (0.84) (0.80) 
Profitable + -0.022 -0.023 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
  (0.35) (0.32) (0.42) (0.43) (0.41) (0.45) (0.41) (0.42) 
Chearn + -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.76) (0.78) (0.99) (0.94) (0.99) (0.91) (0.99) (0.99) 
Lit + -0.055* -0.051* -0.052* -0.049 -0.053* -0.050 -0.052* -0.050 
  (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.50) 
          
Adjusted R2   0.009 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.005 
          
F Statistics   1.39 1.27 1.16 1.24 1.15 1.29 1.20 1.22 
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Combining all these results mentioned above, I find that cash bonuses generate strong 
incentives for CEOs to meet or beat market expectations. However, cash bonuses will 
lead to a lower probability of expectations management. In other words, cash bonuses 
may generate incentives for CEOs to use alternative methods of expectations 
management (such as earnings management) to achieve market expectations (e.g. 
Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995).  
 
3.6.2. Stock options and restricted shares  
 
The second type of CEO compensation I am interested is equity incentives (stock 
options and restricted shares) which will be vested in the following year. My hypothesis 
(H9) is that CEOs with more equity incentives which will be vested in the following 
year are more likely to meet or beat market expectations. The results for this hypothesis 
are reported in columns 3 to 8 in Table 3.5. As expected, the coefficients for the 
variables of equity compensation, EquityNY and EquityNY _Dummy (columns 3 and 
4), are both positive at 5% significance level. When I split equity incentives into stock 
options (columns 5 and 6) and restricted shares (columns 7 and 8), the results remain 
similar, while only those for restricted shares are statistically significant. For instance, 
the variable of ShareNY (column 7) has a coefficient of 2.82, which is significant at 5% 
level. These findings support my hypothesis (H9) that CEOs with more equity 
incentives which will be vested in the following year are more likely to achieve market 
expectations. And such an effect is mainly from restricted shares rather than stock 
options. I also do an additional test on hypothesis (H9) in Table 3.6.  Here I look at how 
CEO equity incentives will affect the extent of achieving market expectations. The 
results are reported in the columns 3 to 8 of Table 3.6. However, I fail to establish a 
meaningful interpretation.  
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Table 3.7  CEO compensation and expectations management 
Panel A.  Expectations management (Bartov’s method)  
Logit regression of expectations management (EM_Bartov) on testing CEO compensation components. The data set is a pooled sample of 719 firm-years from FTSE 350 non-financial and non-
utility firms for the period of 2002-2006. P value is reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Industry and year dummies are included but 
not reported. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Probability (EM_Bartov i,t=1) = Logit ( κ0+ κ 1* Testing Compensation i,t + κ 2* MV i,t + κ 3*Growth i,t + κ 4* Profitiable i,t + κ 5* Chearn i,t + κ 6* Lit i,t + κ 7∑ INDUS+ κ 8∑ Years + ε ) 
 
       Variable                           Exp. sign                                 (1)                             (2)                                   (3)                        (4)                             (5)                                   (6)                                (7)                              (8)  
Intercept ? 0.67 0.62 0.40 0.32 0.51 0.53 0.38 0.46 
  (0.47) (0.44) (0.61) (0.69) (0.52) (0.46) (0.63) (0.57) 
Bonus +                -0.02***        
  (0.00)        
Bonus_Dummy +  -0.43       
   (0.15)       
EquityNY +   0.31      
    (0.60)      
EquityNY_Dummy +    0.46**     
     (0.04)     
OptionNY +     -0.40    
      (0.71)    
OptionNY_Dummy +      0.27   
       (0.13)   
ShareNY +       1.07  
        (0.24)  
ShareNY_Dummy +        0.57** 
         (0.01) 
MV ? 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
  (0.99) (0.98) (0.95) (0.73) (0.89) (0.99) (0.92) (0.56) 
Growth ? -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.23) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.24) (0.19) 
Profitable ? -0.76 -0.78 -0.86* -0.85* -0.88* -0.76 -0.87* -0.85* 
  (0.13) (0.12) (0.08) (0.85) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) 
Chearn ? -1.07*** -1.10*** -1.16*** -1.20*** -1.16*** -1.07*** -1.16*** -1.07*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lit ? -1.08 -1.18 -1.10 -0.94 -1.14 -1.08 -1.08 -0.92 
  (0.32) (0.28) (0.31) (0.38) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.40) 
 
 
         
McFadden R2  0.09 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 
          
LR Statistics  59.80 54.33 52.61 56.43 52.49 59.80 53.71 58.87 
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Table 3.7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B.  Expectations management (Matsumoto’s method)  
Logit regression of expectations management (EM_Matsumoto) on testing CEO compensation components. The data set is a pooled sample of 719 firm-years from FTSE 350 non-financial and 
non-utility firms for the period of 2002-2006. P value is reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Industry and year dummies are included 
but not reported. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Probability (EM_Matsumoto i,t =1) = Logit ( ν0+ ν 1* Testing Compensation i,t + ν 2* MV i,t + ν 3*Growth i,t + ν 4* Profitable i,t + ν 5* Chearn + i,t ν 6* Lit i,t + ν 7∑ INDUS+ ν 8∑ Years + ε ) 
 
       Variable                             Exp. sign                                (1)                             (2)                                (3)                             (4)                             (5)                                   (6)                                (7)                          (8)  
Intercept ? 3.33*** 3.56*** 3.01***            3.06*** 3.03*** 3.10*** 3.16*** 3.20*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bonus +                -0.01        
  (0.27)        
Bonus_Dummy +  -0.64**       
   (0.04)       
EquityNY +   1.17      
    (0.12)      
EquityNY_Dummy +    0.39**     
     (0.04)     
OptionNY +     1.57    
      (0.12)    
OptionNY_Dummy +      0.32*   
       (0.07)   
ShareNY +       0.87  
        (0.40)  
ShareNY_Dummy +        0.07 
         (0.73) 
MV ? -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
  (0.49) (0.57) (0.56) (0.34) (0.62) (0.40) (0.47) (0.45) 
Growth ? -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.40) (0.41) (0.39) (0.34) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) 
Profitable ? -0.81 -0.72 -0.78 -0.78 -0.78 -0.76 -0.82 -0.81 
  (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) 
Chearn ? -1.33*** -1.29*** -1.35*** -1.38*** -1.36*** -1.38*** -1.35*** -1.35*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Lit ? -0.77 -0.86 -0.71 -0.64 -0.72 -0.70 -0.76 -0.77 
  (0.21) (0.16) (0.25) (0.30) (0.24) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) 
 
McFadden R2  
  
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
          
LR Statistics   121.30 124.57 123.04 124.50 122.82 123.32 120.90 120.21 
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As far as hypothesis (H10) is concerned, I intend to see whether CEO equity incentives 
which will be vested in the following year will lead to a higher probability of 
expectations management. These results are reported in columns 3 to 8 of Panel A 
(Bartov‟s method) and Panel B (Matsumoto‟s method) of Table 3.7. In Panel A, I find 
that the coefficients of variables EquityNY_Dummy and ShareNY_Dummy (columns 4 
and 8) are both positive at 5% significance level, as expected. For instance, the 
coefficient of EqutityNY_Dummy is 0.46. I can interpret such a coefficient as follows.  
That is the odds ratio to employ expectations management (according to Bartov‟s 
method) when CEOs have equity compensation to be vested in the following year, over 
that odds ratio for CEOs without equity compensation vesting in the following year is 
1.58 (e
0.46
). If I assume the odds ratio of using expectations management for a CEO 
without equity incentives vesting in the following year is 0.20 (0.17/1-0.17), based on 
the mean value of expectations management (according to Bartov‟s method) in our 
sample. The corresponding odds ratio for a CEO with equity incentives vesting in the 
following year will be 0.32 (1.58* 0.20). In another word, the probability of employing 
expectations management for a CEO with equity incentives vesting in the following 
year is 0.24(0.32/ (0.32+1). Compared with CEOs without vesting equity incentives, the 
probability of employing expectations management increases about 4% (0.24-0.20), if 
CEOs have equity incentives to be vested in the following year.  
 
Similar results can be found in columns 3 to 8 of Panel B in Table 3.7 when using 
Matsumoto‟s method to capture possible expectations management. The coefficients of 
variable EquityNY_Dummy (column 4) and OptionNY_Dummy (column 6) are both 
positive at 10% significance level. This suggests that expectations management is more 
likely to occur if CEOs have equity incentives (especially stock options) to be vested in 
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the following year. Overall, I find some evidences to support my hypothesis (H10): 
equity incentives which will be vested in the following year will lead to a higher 
probability of expectations management.  
 
Next, I will test whether the relationship between CEO equity compensation which will 
be vested in the following year and the probability of expectations management is 
conditional on the level of CEO ownership. Prior studies find that CEOs have stronger 
incentives to exercise stock options or engage in insider sales if they have a large 
amount of equity incentives (e.g. Cheng and Warfield, 2005). The reason for this is that 
CEOs would like to exercise stock options and sell shares in order to diversify the risk 
of wealth concentration in their own firms‟ shares.   
 
Therefore I expect that CEOs who have equity compensation which will be vested in 
the following year will have a stronger incentive to engage in expectations management 
if they have a relatively high level of ownership already. I divide my sample into two 
groups: those with high ownership and those with low ownership, based on the median 
value in the sample. The results are reported in Table 3.8. Consistent with my 
expectations, CEOs have equity compensation which will be vested in the following 
year are more likely to engage in expectations management, especially if they have 
relatively high level of ownership already. The coefficients of EquityNY_Dummy, 
ShareNY and ShareNY_Dummy are all positive at the significant level (at least 10%) in 
high ownership group (according to Bartov‟s method).  In contrast, only the coefficient 
of ShrNY_dummy is positive at 10% significance level in the low ownership group. 
Similar results can also be found on the right side of Table 3.8 when Matsumoto‟s 
method is employed.  
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Table 3.8  CEO compensation and expectations management under different levels of ownership 
Logit regression of expectations management (EM_Bartov and EM_Matsumoto) on testing CEO compensation components. The sample of 719 observations is grouped based on CEOs‟ 
ownership. The high ownership group consist of 360 observations of CEO ownership from 0.049%. The low ownership group has 359 observations with CEO ownership from 0 to 0.048%. P 
value is reported in parentheses.  *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Only testing compensation variables are reported. All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
 
Pro(EM_Bartov i,t =1/  EM_Matsumoto i,t =1) = Logit ( Ѕ0+ Ѕ 1* Testing Compensation i,t + Ѕ 2* MV i,t + Ѕ 3*Growth i,t + Ѕ 4* Profitable i,t + Ѕ 5* Chearn i,t + Ѕ 6* Lit i,t + Ѕ 7∑  INDUS+ Ѕ 8∑  Years + ε ) 
 
Variable                          Exp. sign                                   Model 1: Dependent variable= EM_Bartov                                                                  Model 2: Dependent variable= EM_Matsumoto                                                                                                                          
                                                                                             (1)                          (2)                               (3)                        (4)                             (5)                         (6)                                                  (1)                          (2)                               (3)                        (4)                             (5)                     (6)              
Panel A   High Ownership Group  N=360 
               
EquityNY +           1.41       1.36      
  (0.17)       (0.13)      
EquityNY_Dummy +  1.02**       0.43*     
   (0.01)       (0.10)     
OptionNY +   -0.49       1.67    
    (0.61)       (0.16)    
OptionNY +    0.40       0.33   
     (0.24)       (0.18)   
ShareNY +     3.05**       0.75  
      (0.02)       (0.54)  
ShareNY_Dummy +      0.70**       0.12 
       (0.04)       (0.66) 
McFadden R2   0.14 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15  0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 
LR Statistics   43.28 48.85 42.46 42.95 46.39 45.63  73.09 73.31 72.79 72.42 71.00 70.81 
 
Panel B   Low Ownership Group  N=359 
               
EquityNY + 0.20       3.82      
  (0.80)       (0.11)      
EquityNY_Dummy +  0.14       0.44     
   (0.65)       (0.11)     
OptionNY +   0.44       3.19    
    (0.77)       (0.20)    
OptionNY_Dummy +    0.26       0.35   
     (0.37)       (0.19)   
ShareNY +     0.26       8.29  
      (0.85)       (0.10)  
ShareNY_Dummy +      0.59*       0.28 
       (0.05)       (0.34) 
McFadden R2   0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09  0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
LR Statistics   30.22 30.37 30.24 30.96 30.19 33.85  70.67 69.07 68.90 68.25 70.61 67.43 
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In summary, I find some evidence to support my hypotheses (H9) and (H10) based on 
these results mentioned above. Equity incentives which will be vested in the following 
year will generate strong incentives to meet or beat market expectations. Further more, 
the probability of expectations management is documented to be positively related to 
equity incentives which will be vested soon. In other words, partly because of equity 
incentives, CEOs do care about the market expectations and have a strong incentive to 
employ expectations management to achieve such a goal. This phenomenon is more 
prevalent if CEOs have a high level of ownership already.  
 
3.6.3. Sensitivity analysis  
 
I also use alternative variables to measure CEO compensation in my analysis. 
Specifically, I use the absolute monetary amount of cash bonus (Log of bonus) to 
replace the variable of Bonus in the previous discussion.  I also adopt the estimated 
value of stock options and restricted shares which will be vested in the following year 
as the alternative proxy for the variables of OptionNY and ShareNY mentioned 
previously. Different levels of winsorization (1% or 5%) are also employed. These 
results are similar to those in Table 3.7(detailed results are not reported in this chapter).   
Hence my previous findings are not based on specific measurement methods for 
compensation or driven by outliers.  
 
3.7. Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, I examine whether and how CEO compensation is related with 
expectations management. Expectations management occurs when managers purposely 
dampen market expectations in order to generate a positive earnings surprise when 
earnings are announced. The literature suggests that CEO bonus, stock options exercise 
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and insider sales are positively related to the occurrence of meeting or beating market 
expectations (e.g. Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2004). 
Because achieving market expectations conveys positive signals to the stock market, 
thus the stock market tends to reward firms which meet or beat market expectations. 
Such a market reward will help the board to justify high bonus payments, and benefit 
the option exercise or insider sales as well. Therefore, bonuses, option exercise and 
insider sales (after earnings announcement) may motivate CEOs to achieve market 
expectations when earnings are announced. If successful expectations management will 
help to achieve market expectations, CEOs may have strong incentives to employ it.  
 
I link expectations management with three components of CEO pay: bonuses, stock 
options and restricted shares that will be vested in the following year, because these pay 
components can be more lucrative for CEOs if expectations management will lead to a 
higher probability of achieving market expectations. The well documented positive 
stock market reaction for firms which meet or beat financial analysts‟ earnings forecast 
(e.g. Bhojraj, Hribar, Picconi and McInnis, 2009) justify high bonus payments and 
benefit insider trading. I link the possible insider trading after earnings announcement 
with two particular CEO equity compensation components: stock options and restricted 
shares which will be vested in the following year. In short, I expect that CEO cash 
bonus and equity compensation (stock options and restricted shares) which will be 
vested in the following year will motivate CEOs to employ expectations management to 
reach market expectations. My main findings are listed below.  
 
First of all, I find that CEO bonus and equity compensation (stock options and restricted 
shares) which will be vested in the following year are positively related with the 
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incidence of achieving market expectations. Those compensation components do 
motivate CEOs to care about market expectations.  
 
Secondly, I document that if CEOs have equity compensation which will be vested in 
the following year, they are more likely to engage in expectations management. Such 
relationship is stronger when CEOs have a high level of ownership already. This is 
consistent with prior studies (e.g. Cheng and Warfield, 2005) showing that CEOs have 
strong incentives to diversify the risk in a single asset (own firms‟ shares). They 
actively create a favourable trading environment for stock options exercise and insider 
sales. Using expectations management to meet market expectations is one such case.  
 
Thirdly, CEO cash bonuses are documented  negatively related with the probability of 
expectations management. This suggests that although cash bonuses motivate CEOs to 
care about market expectations, they are less likely to conduct expectations 
management to achieve such an earnings benchmark. One possible explanation is that, 
cash bonuses are usually tied to an accounting performance. CEOs may be more 
interested in inflating the earnings number than dampening market expectations to 
avoid missing market expectations. 
 
In short, the study in this chapter provides some empirical evidence about the link 
between CEO compensation and expectations management. CEOs may choose an 
information disclosure strategy to favour his or her compensation pays. Such an 
information manipulation motivated by CEO compensation may benefit CEOs at the 
expenses of shareholders‟ interests.  
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Chapter 4   CEO Compensation, Career Horizon and Research and 
Development Spending 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
There is a debate in the literature about whether career horizon affects managers‟ 
investment decisions. As proposed by Smith and Watt (1992), the career horizon 
problem hypothesizes that managers with a short career horizon are likely to reject 
long-term investment projects, because these realized gains of such an investment may 
not benefit exiting managers. If different lengths of career horizon lead to different 
investment decisions that do not suit shareholders‟ interests, then the career horizon 
problem can be viewed as a type of agency cost (e.g. Davidson, Xie, Xu and Ning, 
2007). Previous literature also provides some evidence to support the idea that older 
CEOs are less likely to spend on research and development (R&D hereafter) expenses 
(e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a; Barker and Mueller, 2002; Lundstrum, 2002).  
However, some recent studies find that the so-called career horizon problem regarding 
risky investment disappears (e.g. Conyon and Florou, 2006; Cazier, 2011). They argue 
that recent developments in corporate governance may limit outgoing CEOs‟ short-
sighted behaviour. Hence it is difficult to observe obvious R&D spending cuts when 
CEOs approach retirement. It is interesting to examine whether the career horizon 
problem, which is well documented in the literature, still exists in the UK, where the 
corporate governance mechanism is well established.  
 
In addition, few studies examine the interactive relationship between CEO 
compensation and career horizon on investment decisions. One exceptional paper is 
Cheng (2004). He investigates whether compensation committees deliberately adjust 
stock options grants to prevent opportunistic reductions in R&D expenditure. His 
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findings indicate that retiring CEOs (aged above 63) who receive more stock option 
grants will not reduce R&D spending. In a recent paper, Cazier (2011) criticizes 
previous career horizon studies. He argues that CEOs near retirement may have 
incentives to curtail R&D spending for personal gains; however, such a view assumes 
that compensation committees neither recognize such an agency problem nor are able to 
provide optimal incentive contracts to overcome it. His study clearly suggests the 
possible explicit role of CEO compensation in the career horizon problem. If CEO 
compensation does affect top managers‟ investment decisions, it is also interesting to 
ask whether such effects will vary among different career horizon lengths. For instance, 
it is widely believed that equity incentives may align interests of shareholders and 
managers in terms of investment decisions. Are the incentives for risky investment from 
equity incentives the same for younger CEOs, whose career horizons are long enough to 
fully benefit from current investment decisions, as for older CEOs who are counting 
down their remaining days in office?  
 
This chapter seeks to answer these questions. First of all, I examine whether and how 
career horizon will affect R&D spending. Secondly, I seek to find out whether and how 
the interactive relationship between career horizon and CEO compensation will 
influence investment decisions.  
 
I intend to make three main contributions. First of all, I re-examine the so-called career 
horizon problem by using more recent UK data. Compared with the US, both CEO 
power and pay incentives in Britain are relatively weak. Such a background may limit 
CEOs‟ ability and incentives to manipulate investment decisions for their self-interested 
purposes. I may observe some different results compared with US studies. In addition, I 
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examine UK CEOs over a wide range of career horizon. Conyon and Florou (2006) 
focus on a sample of CEO departures (especially for retirement) in Britain. The 
assumption is that any cuts in R&D spending and capital expenditure are more likely to 
occur in the last few years of a CEO‟s career horizon. My study intends to explore this 
issue in a larger sample and over a longer career track.  
 
Secondly, I include CEO pension in this study. Pension (defined benefit) is overlooked 
in previous studies, partly because of poor data availability. Considering that the nature 
of a pension is deferred and debt-like, it may generate unique incentives for risk-taking, 
especially when CEOs approach retirement.  
 
Thirdly, there is no consensus about the role of equity incentives in investment 
decisions when CEOs have a short career horizon. There are two conflicting theories: 
agency theory and prospect theory. Based on agency theory, CEOs with a short career 
horizon may not curtail long-term value added R&D spending, if they have a large 
amount of equity incentives. Chen (2004) provides evidence (based on stock option 
grants) to support such a theory. On the other hand, prospect theory suggests that CEOs 
with short career horizons are more likely to preserve gains from equity holdings. In 
such a case, equity incentives may accentuate incentives for avoiding risks. Cutting 
R&D expenses is one of the possible options. Matta and Beamish (2008) provide 
evidence that CEOs with short career horizons are less likely to engage in international 
acquisitions, if they have more equity incentives.  
 
The key findings in this study are listed as follows. First of all, I do not observe the 
influence of career horizon problem on investment decisions. There is no evidence that 
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CEOs will curtail R&D spending when their career horizons become short. Secondly, I 
document that pension effectively discourages R&D spending among older CEOs. This 
suggests that a high level of pension makes CEOs more risk-averse when the date of 
retirement approaches. Thirdly, ownership will encourage R&D spending in general, 
but the opposite effect occurs when CEOs become older. This is consistent with the 
prospect theory for CEOs become risk-averse when their career horizon is short but 
have a large amount of wealth under stock market exposure. Fourthly, restricted shares 
seem to discourage R&D spending, while no such effects are found on stock options.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides the 
literature review and hypotheses development. The methodology is described in Section 
4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 provide detailed information about the data and empirical 
evidence, respectively. Conclusions are made in Section 4.6.    
 
4.2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
4.2.1. Career horizon  
 
The career horizon problem has drawn the attention of researchers for more than a 
decade (see early studies such as Dechow and Sloan, 1991). The main question is 
whether and how investment decisions vary among younger and older top managers 
(e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993; Conyon and Florou, 
2006; Cazier, 2011). As argued by Gibbons and Murphy (1992b), older managers have 
little or less career reputation concern compared with their younger counterparts. 
Younger managers have stronger incentives to boost their reputation via efforts 
involvement and improved performance. The labour market will update its belief on 
young managers‟ abilities and reward bright ones with better future employment 
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opportunities. However, such incentives for efforts involvement decline for older CEOs 
with well established reputations and shorter career horizons. In such circumstances, 
more pay incentives should be introduced for older CEOs (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 
1992b).  
 
R&D spending may be a typical investment decision which may not fully benefit CEOs 
with short career horizons. First of all, R&D spending has a long pay-back period. It 
will take away precious cash flows which may be consumed for top managers‟ 
immediate personal interests. The cash flows pay-back may occur in the long term, 
when older CEOs have left the firm already. Furthermore, R&D spending is required to 
be expensed in the current period, which will lead to lower reported earnings. The 
literature also provides some evidence that retiring CEOs will manipulate reported 
earnings for personal gains, such as bonuses and pensions (e.g. Davidson, Xie, Xu and 
Ning, 2007; Kalyta, 2009; Demers and Wang, 2010). Considering the direct 
relationship between R&D spending and current reported earnings, CEOs with short 
career horizons may have the incentive to sacrifice such investment for their own 
interests. Previous studies also generate some evidence that older top managers may 
curtail R&D spending (e.g. Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a; Barker and Mueller, 2002; 
Lundstrum, 2002).  
 
However, some studies provide quite different evidence about the career horizon 
problem. Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) document that the decline in R&D 
expenditure for outgoing CEOs is more likely to be explained by poor accounting 
performance rather than short career horizons. By investigating UK data in the1990s, 
Conyon and Florou (2006) document that retiring CEOs will not cut R&D expenditure 
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on the verge of retirement. They explain that the corporate governance mechanisms 
(e.g. equity incentives for outside board members and the power of other executive 
directors) may mitigate retiring CEOs‟ self-interested cut-backs on R&D spending. 
Their findings echo a more recent study by Cazier (2011). He provides US evidence 
that CEOs will not cut R&D spending in their final years in office. He argues that the 
improved corporate governance mechanism (incentive pay, for instance) can effectively 
mitigate short-sighted behaviour for outgoing CEOs. In short, there are mixed empirical 
results and no consensus has been reached on the career horizon problem.  
 
I intend to re-examine the career horizon problem in this chapter. Hence my hypothesis 
still follows a traditional view of the career horizon on investment decision making (e.g. 
Barker and Mueller, 2002). The specific hypothesis is listed as follows:  
 
                H11:  Older CEOs will spend less on R&D expenses. 
 
4.2.2. Pension  
 
Pension (defined benefit plan) is a type of deferred pay for CEOs. It can also be viewed 
as an inside debt, because firms are liable to pay a promised amount of pension after 
CEOs retire.
12
 As CEOs grow older, the impact of a pension may affect CEO 
investment decisions dramatically. First of all, CEOs with short career horizons are 
more likely to be concerned with the safety of their pension compared with younger 
CEOs. The cash out date for pensions is upon retirement. Hence older CEOs are closer 
to access their pensions. This may motivate older CEOs to take actions to maximize the 
probability of receiving their promised pension after retirement. If a certain type of 
                                                 
12
  Please see the detailed explanation of why DB pension is a type of inside debt in Section 2.3.2. 
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investment (R&D spending, for instance) will create a high level of risk and decrease 
the probability of pension payment, CEOs with a short career horizon may be reluctant 
to invest in such projects.  
 
Secondly, the accumulation of pension increases with CEO tenure. Firms may hold a 
large amount of pension liability (defined benefit) for older CEOs, due to their previous 
years‟ services. Therefore, older CEOs are more sensitive to the safety of their firms 
because a large amount of their personal wealth is held in the form of their firms‟ 
potential debt. Hence CEOs with more pensions are likely to manage their firms 
conservatively. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) document that firms who offer CEOs 
more pensions are less likely to become insolvent, which is measured as the expected 
distance for a firm to go burst. Their findings clearly suggest the role of pension 
provision on CEO risk preference. If R&D spending is risky and may generate long-
term uncertainty in a firm, CEOs may have stronger incentives to cut such expenditure 
when they hold a large amount of pension. Hence I expect that pension will accentuate 
CEOs‟ incentives to cut R&D spending when they approach retirement. I hypothesize 
as follows: 
 
               H12: Older CEOs with more pensions will spend less on R&D expenses  
 
4.2.3. Equity incentives 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.1, there is no consensus about the role of equity incentives 
on the career horizon problem. There are two conflicting theories which predict 
opposite relationships: agency theory and prospect theory. I discuss these theories and 
related predictions as follows.  
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A.  Agency theory and the “interest alignment” hypothesis 
CEOs with different career horizon lengths may have different career concerns.  
Gibbons and Murphy (1992b) argue that younger top managers have stronger incentives 
to take actions for firm growth. By observing firm performance, the labour market can 
update its belief about managers‟ abilities. Talented younger managers are more likely 
to be awarded better future employment opportunities. However, career and reputation 
concerns become less important as CEOs approach retirement, because older CEOs 
have less career mobility options as well as a shorter employment period. At such a 
point, additional incentives for risky but value-added investment are expected to be 
essential for older CEOs. Without sufficient pay incentives, retiring CEOs may further 
lack the motivation to make long-term and risky investments.  
 
The role of equity pay in encouraging risk-seeking activities is well-documented (e.g. 
Guay, 1999; Cole, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). By linking CEOs‟ personal wealth with 
firm value, equity incentives may motivate CEOs to make risky but value-added 
investments. For instance, the convex payoff structure of stock options largely sheds 
downward risks. In addition, CEOs have to take actions to increase stock price above 
the strike price of options, otherwise they can not materialize the wealth of stock 
options. Hence equity incentives may align interests of shareholders and CEOs in 
investment decisions. CEOs with more equity incentives are more likely to spend on 
risky but value-added investments (R&D spending in this case). My “interest 
alignment” hypothesis expects that equity incentive will still align interest of CEOs and 
shareholders on investment decisions, no matter the length of CEOs‟ career horizons. 
The specific hypothesis is listed below:  
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                H13a: Older CEOs with more equity incentives (ownership, stock options 
                           and restricted shares) will spend more on R&D expenses. 
 
B. Prospect theory and the “wealth preservation” hypothesis 
Prospect theory describes how people make decisions between choices which involve 
different levels of risk (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Thaler, 
1991). It develops the so-called certainty effects: people have a tendency to choose 
strategies that obtain gains with certainty. This helps to explain certain risk-avoiding 
behaviour (e.g. choices in gambling and insurance purchase). Based on this theory, 
people will outweigh sure gains and become risk-averse when they face uncertainty. It 
has been widely used in behavioural finance to explain personal finance decisions.  
 
Prospect theory also has possible implications for CEOs‟ investment decisions. CEOs 
with a short career horizon may have accumulated a large amount of equity incentives 
during their tenures. Such firm-specific wealth increases CEOs‟ risk exposure to the 
stock market. CEOs‟ wealth is extremely sensitive to their firms „share price, 
considering managerial equity incentives are less diversified than that of ordinary 
investors. Such sensitivity becomes more severe when CEOs approach retirement for 
two reasons. 
 
First of all, older CEOs have incentives to cash out equity incentives around retirement. 
Retiring CEOs intend to maintain their current living standard and the social circle after 
they leave office. By cashing out equity incentives, retiring CEOs can raise funds to 
supplement their pensions. Carpenter (2000) documents that retiring CEOs reduce their 
financial ties with their firms by cashing equity incentives in their final years in office. 
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Therefore, CEOs with a short career horizon are extremely sensitive to their firms‟ 
share price movement in their final years of employment. If risky investments will 
generate uncertain short-term returns, CEOs have incentives to cutback such spending.  
 
Secondly, some firm policies urge retiring CEOs to cash out equity incentives soon 
after turnover. Hall and Murphy (2003) suggest that stock options will be forfeited or 
subject to shorter vesting periods upon CEO turnover. For example, when Rod 
Eddington retired as CEO of British Airways in September 2005, the firm required him 
to exercise all stock options within six months after retirement. In a US study, Dahiya 
and Yermack (2008) look at firms‟ policies for the treatment of stock options for 
retiring CEOs. They document that there is a large discount for the estimated value for 
stock options award for CEOs aged above 60, because of the shorter exercise period of 
stock options allowed for retiring CEOs. Therefore these strict policies for older CEOs 
may strengthen their sensitivity to short-term stock performance. In such circumstances, 
older CEOs tend to preserve short-term realized gains by reducing investments which 
may create uncertainty in terms of share price. 
 
The above mentioned situation is consistent with prospect theory. When decision 
makers perceive a potential loss, they are more likely to preserve what they get instead 
of seeking additional gains. In other words, CEOs with a short career horizon intend to 
preserve current gains in their equity holding. Matta and Beamish (2008) find that 
CEOs are less likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions if they have short career 
horizons and a large amount of equity incentives. They explain that CEOs would prefer 
to reject risky mergers and acquisitions because such activities may create uncertainty 
for their current wealth in equity incentives. If R&D spending is risky and will create 
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uncertainty for top managers‟ gains in equity holdings, older CEOs may be less likely 
to invest. I conduct my “wealth preservation” hypothesis as that equity incentive will 
motivate older CEOs to preserve their gains in wealth, making them more risk-averse 
and less likely to spend on R&D expenditure. The specific hypothesis is demonstrated 
as follows: 
 
               H13b: Older CEOs with more equity incentives (ownership, stock options  
                          and restricted shares) will spend less on R&D expenses. 
 
4.3. Methodology  
4.3.1. Measurement of R&D spending  
 
I intend to adopt several variables to define R&D spending. The first variable I use is 
R&D intensity. Following the literature, I scale R&D expenditure by a firm‟s total sales 
(e.g. Lundstrum, 2002; Antia, Pantzalis and Park, 2010). It is reasonable to argue that 
R&D intensity will be heavily influenced by the industry factors. Hence I also use the 
variable Abnormal R&D. This is the difference between actual R&D expenditure and 
“expected” R&D expenditure which is estimated by a model (Cazier, 2011). The 
detailed procedures are listed below.   
 
R&D i,t = a0+a1 *R&Dindustry median,t +∑a2*Controls i,t                                                  (13) 
 
Where R&D is actual R&D expenditure for a particular year. As far as industry is 
concerned, I use broad industry classifications due to the relatively small sample size in 
my study. I use four industries in total: Chemical and allied products (UK SIC section 
D: 24), Electronic products (UK SIC section D: 30-33), Other manufacturing (UK SIC 
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section D:  15-36) and Miscellaneous. The detailed information is available in Table 
4.2. Control variables include: Firm Size, Leverage, Profitability, FCF (Free cash 
flows), Growth and Firm Age. The main purpose of this model is to estimate the 
parameter of a1, a2 and ∑a3. The residual of this regression is the difference between 
the actual R&D spending and “expected” R&D spending based on equation (13).  
 
Then, I develop the following two proxies for R&D spending: Abnormal_R&D and  
Abnormal_R&D_Cuts, as follows.  
  
Abnormal_R&D i,t = residual of equation (13)                                                            (14) 
Abnormal_R&D_Cuts i,t = 1 if Abnormal_R&D i,t <0, otherwise 0                             (15) 
 
4.3.2. Measurement of career horizon 
 
Following the literature, I use CEO age as the main proxy for career horizon (e.g. 
Barker and Muller, 2002; Lundstrum, 2002; Demers and Wang, 2010). Older CEOs 
indicate relatively short career horizons. I also adopt two dummy variables to highlight 
the short horizon effects. One is CEO Age above 60; the other is CEO Age above 62.  
Because the normal retirement age is 65 in the UK, these dummy variables indicate the 
last 5 and 3 remaining years in the office. 
 
4.3.3. Measurement of CEO compensation 
 
CEO annual compensation is the sum of salary, bonuses, pension increment and the 
estimated value of equity (restricted shares and options) grants. As far CEO pension is 
concerned, I measure pension increment as a fraction of annual compensation as well as 
the total pension outstanding. CEO equity incentives are the number of shares of stock 
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options and restricted shares, scaled by a firm‟s total number shares outstanding. All 
variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
 
4.3.4. Testing Models 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, I adopt three proxies to represent R&D spending. The 
first is R&D intensity, which is measured as R&D spending scaled by a firm‟s total 
sales. My main purpose is to estimate the interactive relationship between pay and 
career horizon, and their joint impacts on investment decisions. Hence, career horizon 
variables, CEO compensation variables and their interactive variables should be 
included. The estimation of the dependent variable R&D intensity is listed as follows.  
 
R&D i,t = b0+b1 * Career horizon i,t + b2 * Compensation i,t + b3 * Career horizon i,t * 
Compensation i,t + ∑ b4 controls i,t + ∑ b5 Industry+ ∑ b6Years +ε                            (16) 
 
As far as the second proxy for R&D spending, Abnormal_R&D, is concerned; I use a 
similar OLS model to equation (16) but without industry and years dummies. 
13
 
Because the variable of Abnormal_R&D already considers these effects of industry and 
year.   
 
The last proxy for R&D spending, Abnormal_R&D_Cuts, is a dummy variable. I use 
the following model to test its relationship between career horizon and compensation.  
 
Probability (Abnormal_R&D_Cuts i,t=1 ) = c0+c1 * Career horizon i,t + c2 * 
Compensation i,t + c3 * Career horizon i,t * Compensation i,t + ∑ c4 Controls i,t +ε     (17)       
                                                 
13
 Please see Page 25 (paragraph two) for the discussion of limitations of OLS regression. 
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 4.4. Data  
 
I use FTSE 350 non-financial and non-utilities firms in this study. The time period is 
between 2003 and 2007. It starts with 2003; because it is the first year UK publicly 
traded firms have to disclose the detailed information about their directors‟ pensions to 
the public after the introduction of the Director‟s remuneration report regulations 
(2002). Further sample restrictions include R&D data availability and R&D intensity. 
Previous literature suggests that only industries where R&D is intensive and crucial are 
meaningful in the test (e.g. Cheng, 2004). Firms which spend over a quarter of total 
sales on R&D expenses are also excluded, following Gibbons and Murphy (1992a). 
Because those outliers of R&D intensity are mainly due to firms‟ business models. 14 I 
also exclude the data if a CEO is in his or her first year in office, because it is difficult 
to judge whether R&D spending decisions in such cases were made by the new CEO or 
the previous one. The R&D expenditure and firm characteristics data is collected from 
DataStream and FAME. The data of CEO bonus, equity incentives and CEO age come 
from BoardEx, while pension data is hand-collected from firms‟ annual reports.   
 
Following the selection procedure described above, I have a sample of 310 
observations. About two thirds of the observations (198 in total) come from 
manufacturing industries, especially the chemicals and the allied products industry. 
R&D spending is also more intensive and crucial for those industries. Detailed 
information about the sample selection is available in Table 4.2.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
  Based on the annual reports from 15 observations whose R&D intensity (R&D/Sales) >0.25, their 
revenues are mainly from licensing their intellectual property or contracts. It is not comparable with most 
my samples which sell own products.  
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Table 4.1  Variable definitions 
 
Panel A: R&D Spending & Firm Characteristics  
 
Variable Name Definition 
R&D intensity  R&D spending (WC 01201)/Total sales (WC 01001). 
  
Abnormal_R&D Residual from the regression where the dependent variable is actual R&D and the 
independent variables are economic determinants of R&D spending over the 
industry for a particular year (please see equation 13). 
  
Abnormal_R&D_Cuts Dummy variables equals 1 if Abnormal_R&D<0, otherwise zero. 
  
Size The natural logarithm of the firm‟s total assets (WC 02999). 
 
Leverage Total debt (WC 03255)/Total assets (WC 02999). 
 
Profitability Net operating income (WC 01250) plus Depreciation (WC 04049) and R&D 
spending (WC 01201), scaled by Total assets (WC 02999). 
 
FCF Free cash flows is calculated as the Operating cash flows (WC 04860) plus R&D 
spending (WC 01201) minus Capital expenditure (WC 0460), scaled by Total 
sales (WC 01001). 
 
Growth  The market value of equity (DS: MV)/The book value of equity (WC 03501). 
 
Firm Age The natural logarithm of the number of years between year t and the first year the 
company is publicly listed (DS: BDATE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: CEO Career Horizon 
 
Variable Name Definition 
CEO Age CEO age in years. 
  
CEO Tenure  Years in the position as CEO. 
  
CEO Age Above 60 Dummy variable equals 1 if CEO age is above 60, otherwise 0. 
  
CEO Age Above 62 Dummy variable equals 1 if CEO age is above 62, otherwise 0.  
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Table 4.1. (Continued) 
 
Panel C: CEO Compensation 
 
Variable Name Definition 
Total Compensation The sum of salary, bonuses, the incremental value of pension, the estimated value 
of option and restricted shares grants15 for a particular year. 
  
Bonus The amount of bonus scaled by total compensation. 
  
Pension Increment 
 
The gap of total transfer value of defined benefit pension between year t and year 
t-1. 
 
Pension to Equity  The total transfer value of defined benefit pension scaled by the estimated value 
of equity incentives.  
 
Options Grants The estimated value of stock option grants scaled by total compensation. 
Shares Grants The estimated value of restricted shares grants scaled by total compensation. 
 
Ownership  The number of shares owned by the CEO scaled by total shares outstanding.  
Options  The number of option shares scaled by total shares outstanding.  
Shares The number of restricted shares scaled by total shares outstanding.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
  Please see the Appendix for the estimated valuation for stock options and restricted shares  
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Table 4.2  Sample selection and distributions 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
                                                                                Observations  
All data available for R&D spending, compensation and firm characteristics                            384 
 
R&D intensity (R&D/Sales) > 0.25 (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992a)                                           (15) 
 
CEO tenure (years) < 1 (R&D spending may be decided by former CEOs)                               (59)          
 
Total                                                                                                                                             310                                                                                                             
 
Industry     
      
1 Manufacturing    UK SIC (2003) section D:  15-36                                                                198     
 
           1.1 Chemicals and allied products   UK SIC (2003) section D: 24                                  56 
 
          1.2 Electronic products                    UK SIC (2003) section D: 30-33                              39 
 
          1.3 Other manufacturing                                                                                                  103 
 
2 Miscellaneous                                                                                                                         112                                                                                                         
                                                    
Total                                                                                                                                           310 
 
 
 
Year     
      
2003                                                                                                                                             56 
        
2004                                                                                                                                             60 
 
2005                                                                                                                                             62 
 
2006                                                                                                                                             70 
 
2007                                                                                                                                             62 
 
Total                                                                                                                                           310 
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The descriptive statistics are listed in the table 4.3. In Panel A, R&D spending and firm 
characteristics information is provided.  The average R&D spending in this sample is 
£144.77 million, while the median value is just over £14 million. On average, my 
sample firm spends about 4% of its annual sales on R&D expenses (R&D intensity). 
The median value of the variable Abnormal_R&D is negative, indicating that over half 
observations in the sample spend less than my model predicted. The general profile of 
sample firms is large, less geared, profitable and mature based on firm characteristics 
data. They also have good growth prospects and strong cash flows.  
 
Information about CEO career horizon is available in Panel B of Table 4.3. The average 
(median) CEO age in my sample is about 54.04 (54.59). Less than 25% of CEOs in my 
sample are over 58, indicating that the general profile of CEOs in my sample is far from 
retirement. CEOs in my sample have spent about 5.8 years in the top management 
position, on average. The relatively long tenure may suggest that CEOs may be 
powerful enough to influence their firms‟ R&D spending decisions.    
 
CEO compensation information is listed in Panel C of Table 4.3. The mean (median) 
value for annual compensation is £2.95 million (£1.61million). Within annual 
compensation, shares grants constitute the most significant pay component. On average, 
it comprises about 25% of total annual pay. The mean (median) value for pension 
increment is 11% (2%). This means that just over half the observations in my sample 
have defined benefit pension plans for CEOs. There is a large variation of equity 
incentives among CEOs. On average, CEOs have ownership, stock option and restricted 
shares of 1.25%, 0.24% and 0.09% of their firms‟ total shares outstanding, respectively. 
The ratio of accumulative pension value to equity incentive value is 0.44, on average. 
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Table 4.3  Descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of 310 firm-years FTSE 350 observations from 2003-2007.All variables are winsorized at 2% 
level. All variables are defined in Table 4.1 
 
Panel A.  R&D Spending and Firm Characteristics 
 
Variables Mean St.Dev Min. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Max 
 
R&D spending (£M) 144.77 459.01 0.2 4.83 14.17 57 2839 
R&D intensity  0.0402 0.0543 0.0001 0.0034 0.0165 0.0485 0.2135 
Abnormal R&D  -0.0006 0.0221 -0.0549 -0.0125 -0.0002 0.0089 0.0794 
Abnormal R&D Cuts 0.51 0.50 0 0 1 1 1 
Firm Size (£M) 8425.47 21772 49.37 326.05 1244 4913 132365 
Leverage  0.20 0.13 0 0.10 0.20 0.28 0.53 
Profitability  0.19 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.17 0.23 0.50 
FCF  0.12 0.10 -0.03 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.43 
Growth  4.34 4.29 0.90 2.31 3.12 5.08 34.76 
Firm Age (years) 27.09 0.83 0.26 12.78 34.88 40.59 43.63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B.  CEO Career Horizon  
 
Variables Mean St.Dev Min. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Max 
CEO Age (years) 54.04 5.58 40.46 50.14 54.59 58.02 66.27 
CEO Tenure (years)  5.80 4.35 1.20 2.80 4.80 7.40 28.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. CEO Compensation 
 
Variables Mean St.Dev Min. Quartile 1 Median Quartile 3 Max 
Total  Pay (£000s) 2954.18 3484.24 220 858 1608.50 3620 17507 
Bonus  0.18 0.11 0 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.57 
Pension Increment  0.11 0.16 0 0 0.02 0.19 0.56 
Options Grants  0.13 0.16 0 0 0.06 0.23 0.59 
Shares Grants  0.25 0.21 0 0 0.28 0.41 0.77 
Ownership (%) 1.25 5.54 0 0.01 0.04 0.20 36.48 
Options (%) 0.24 0.36 0 0.02 0.09 0.29 1.82 
Shares (%) 0.09 0.12 0 0 0.04 0.12 0.51 
Pension to Equity  0.44 0.81 0 0 0.04 0.49 3.95 
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The correlation matrix among major variables is listed in Table 4.4. I find that R&D 
intensity is positively related with CEO tenure and those dummy variables indicating a 
short career horizon (e.g. CEO age above 62). Ownership, firm profitability, cash flows 
and growth prospect are also positively related with R&D intensity, while restricted 
shares, firm size, leverage and firm age are negatively related with R&D intensity. 
Abnormal_R&D is also positively related with CEO tenure and ownership. As far as the 
third proxy for R&D spending, Abnormal_R&D_Cuts, is concerned; it is negatively 
related with CEO age, tenure and ownership. CEO age and tenure are positively related 
with ownership and pension value. This demonstrates that the equity incentives have 
been accumulated through a CEO‟s career path.  
 
4.5. Empirical results   
4.5.1. Career horizon  
 
The results of the effect of career horizon on R&D spending are described in Table 4.5. 
As mentioned before, I adopt various career horizon variables and R&D spending 
variables. In Panel A, the dependent variable is the observable R&D spending data, 
R&D intensity. The coefficients for variables of CEO Age, CEO Age above 60 and 
CEO Age above 62 are all positive in eight regressions, while only that for the dummy 
variable of CEO Age above 60 (columns 3 and 4) are at 5% significance level. I then 
replace R&D intensity with Abnormal R&D and Abnormal R&D Cuts as the dependent 
variables, and these results are reported in the Panels B and C, respectively. These 
results are similar to those in Panel A. I do not find that R&D spending declines when 
CEOs approach retirement. The coefficient for CEO Age in column 2 of Panel C is -
0.04 at 10% significance level. This indicates that CEOs are less likely to cut R&D 
spending as they grow older.  It is inconsistent with my hypothesis (H11).
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Table 4.4  Correlation Matrix 
Correlations among main variables. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. The correlations, which are significant at 10% level, are in bold. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)  (17) (18) 
(1)RD_INTENSITY  1 
           
      
(2)ABNORMAL_RD  0.53 1 
          
      
(3) ABNORMAL_RD_CUTS  -0.34 -0.72 1 
         
      
(4)CEO_AGE  -0.06 0.00 -0.10 1 
        
      
(5)CEO_AGE_ABOVE_60  0.14 0.09 -0.11 0.60 1 
       
      
(6)CEO_AGE_ABOVE_62  0.12 0.08 -0.08 0.49 0.69 1 
      
      
(7)CEO_TENURE  0.18 0.09 -0.13 0.32 0.39 0.41 1 
     
      
(8)PENSION_INCREMENT  -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.23 0.10 -0.03 0.06 1 
    
      
(9)PENSION_TO_EQUITY_RATIO  -0.05 -0.08 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.75 1 
   
      
(10)OWNERSHIP  0.22 0.15 -0.13 0.12 0.22 0.35 0.57 -0.13 -0.11 1 
  
      
(11)OPTIONS  -0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.14 -0.05 -0.14 -0.05 -0.12 1 
 
      
(12)SHARES  -0.12 -0.01 -0.09 -0.16 -0.03 -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 1       
(13)SIZE  -0.24 -0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.23 0.02 -0.03 -0.18 -0.23 -0.27 1      
(14)LEVERAGE  -0.41 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.26 0.00 0.02 -0.21 0.00 0.06 0.34 1     
(15)PROFITABILITY  0.40 0.00 -0.03 0.09 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.18 -0.04 0.01 -0.19 -0.38 1    
(16)FCF  0.72 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.17 -0.07 -0.04 0.11 -0.14 -0.16 0.03 -0.35 0.49 1   
(17)GROWTH  0.09 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.10 -0.12 0.08 0.34 0.18 1  
(18)FIRM_AGE  -0.28 -0.03 0.00 0.17 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.27 0.22 -0.19 -0.05 0.01 0.28 0.16 -0.20 -0.24 -0.17  1 
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Table 4.5  CEO career horizon and R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1 Coefficients for 
industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Variables Exp (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
Intercept  0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
  (4.24) (4.37) (6.06) (6.62) (5.85) (5.71) 
 
 
CEO Age (-) 0.0003 0.0002     
  (0.63) (0.39)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)   0.02** 0.01**   
    (2.40) (1.98)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)     0.01 0.01 
      (1.62) (1.45) 
 
 
CEO Tenure  (+) -0.0003  -0.001  -0.005  
  (-0.55)  (-1.15)  (-0.91)  
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.17) (-6.79) (-5.51) (-5.62) (-5.33) (-6.55) 
Profitability (+) -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  
  (-0.45)  (-0.82)  (-0.57)  
Leverage  (-) -0.03  -0.03* -0.03* -0.03  
  (-1.64)  (-1.67) (-1.87) (-1.65)  
FCF (+) 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
  (15.38) (19.09) (15.74) (17.10) (15.58) (18.81) 
Growth (+) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001  -0.001  
  (-1.65) (-2.30) (-1.47)  (-1.54)  
Firm Age (-) -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
  (-0.81)  (-0.70)  (-0.63)  
 
 
Adjusted R2  0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons. The sample 
consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
 
Intercept  0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.28) (-0.04)    (-1.30) (-0.69) (-1.24) (-0.46) 
 
 
CEO Age (-) -0.0001 0.0001     
  (-0.52) (0.03)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)   0.005 0.01   
    (1.05) (1.61)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)     0.005 0.01 
      (0.75) (1.36) 
 
CEO Tenure  (+) 0.001*  0.0004  0.0004  
  (1.74)  (1.12)  (1.21)  
 
 
 
Adjusted R2  0.003 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for CEO career horizons. The 
sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
.  
 
Variables Exp (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
Intercept  1.60 1.93* 0.37*      0.11 0.36* 0.07 
  (1.40) (1.71) (1.83) (0.92) (1.81) (0.60) 
 
 
CEO Age (+) -0.02 -0.04*     
  (-1.08) (-1.70)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)   -0.41 -0.64*   
       (-1.14) (-1.88)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)     -0.29 -0.63 
      (-0.58) (-1.37) 
 
CEO Tenure  (-) -0.05*  -0.05  -0.06*  
  (-1.75)  (-1.60)  (-1.81)  
 
 
 
Mc Fadden R2  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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As far as control variables are concerned, R&D intensity is high if a firm is less geared 
and has strong cash flows. Bigger firms will have a relatively lower R&D intensity. In 
short, the above mentioned results are inconsistent with my hypothesis (H11): older 
CEOs may spend less on R&D expenditures. It seems that older CEOs may spend even 
more on R&D expenditure compared with their younger counterparts. The coefficient 
of dummy variable of CEO age above 60 is positive and reaches 5% significance level 
in the Panel A. A possible explanation is that I omit corporate governance factors (e.g. 
incentive pay) in the above estimations. I will include those factors in following 
discussions.  
 
4.5.2. Pension  
 
The first pension variable I examine is pension increment, the fraction of pension value 
in annual compensation. The results are reported in Table 4.6. In the column 1 of panel 
A, I find that the coefficient for pension increment alone is not significant. Then I add 
different career horizon variables and interactive variables of career horizon and 
pension increment in columns 3, 5 and 7.  Interestingly, I observe that those interactive 
variables of pension increment * CEO Age above 60 and Pension increment * CEO 
Age above 62 are negative at lest 5% significance levels. This suggests that pension 
increment discourages R&D spending if a CEO is above 60. Pension increment seems 
has no effect on R&D intensity for other CEO age groups. I find similar results in 
Panels B and C when I employ Abnormal R&D and Abnormal R&D Cuts as the 
dependent variables. The coefficient for the interactive variable CEO Age above 60 * 
pension increment in the column 5 of panel C is 4.43 at 5% significance level. This 
indicates that a firm is more likely to cut R&D spending if its CEO is above 60 and has 
more defined benefit pensions as a fraction of his or her annual compensation.  
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Table 4.6  Pension Increment, CEO career horizon, and R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons and pension increment. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 
4.1 Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
  (6.17) (4.12) (3.37) (6.12) (6.18) (5.81) (5.87) 
         
Pension Increment (-) -0.003 -0.004 0.16 -0.004 0.01 -0.001 0.003 
  (-0.20) (-0.32) (1.01) (-0.33) (0.72) (-0.09) (0.24) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0003 0.001     
   (0.68) (1.07)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.02** 0.03***   
     (2.41) (3.38)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.01 0.02** 
       (1.61) (2.02) 
CEO Age  (-)   -0.003     
* Pension Increment    (-1.05)     
 
CEO Age Above 60  
 
(-) 
     
-0.07** 
  
* Pension Increment 
 
     (-2.37)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)       -0.06* 
* Pension Increment        (-1.70) 
         
CEO Tenure (+) -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.34) (-0.55) (-0.60) (-1.14) (-1.61) (-0.90) (-1.12) 
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.22) (-5.18) (-5.23) (-5.50) (-5.63) (-5.32) (-5.38) 
Profitability (+) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
  (-0.37) (-0.43) (-0.41) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.56) (-0.57) 
Leverage (-) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.04* -0.03 -0.03* 
  (-1.61) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.68) (-1.89) (-1.64) (-1.72) 
FCF (+) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
  (15.39) (15.33) (15.36) (15.67) (15.81) (15.51) (15.51) 
Growth (+) -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.62) (-1.69) (-1.71) (-1.48) (-1.38) (-1.54) (-1.52) 
Firm Age  (-) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
  (-0.74) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.59) (-0.49) 
         
Adjusted R2  0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 
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Table 4.6. (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons and pension 
increment. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.18) (0.25) (0.20) (-1.07) (-1.13) (-1.06) (-1.05) 
         
Pension Increment (-) -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.003 -0.002 0.001 
  (-0.31) (-0.20) (0.01) (-0.40) (0.35) (-0.27) (0.01) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0001 -0.0001     
   (0.46) (-0.40)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.005 0.01*   
     (1.07) (1.84)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.004 0.01 
       (0.73) (1.08) 
CEO Age  (-)   -0.001     
* Pension Increment 
 
   (-0.03)     
CEO Age Above 60  (-)     -0.004   
* Pension Increment 
 
     (-1.58)   
CEO AgE Above 62 (-)       -0.03 
* Pension Increment 
 
       (-0.86) 
CEO Tenure (+) 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
  (1.67) (1.73) (1.73) (1.12) (0.78) (1.22) (1.03) 
         
Adjusted R
2
  0.003 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.001 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for career horizons and pension 
increment. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.27 2.00* 2.13 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.26 
  (1.26) (1.70) (1.59) (1.14)   (1.25) (1.20) (1.20) 
         
Pension Increment (+) 1.21* 1.47* -0.30 1.30* 0.54 1.19 1.00 
  (1.65) (1.95) (-0.03) (1.76) (0.66) (1.63) (1.32) 
CEO Age (+)  -0.04 -0.04     
   (-1.51) (-1.43)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)    -0.48 -1.22**   
     (-1.29) (-2.30)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)      -0.26 -0.55 
       (-0.51) (-0.89) 
CEO Age  (+)   0.03     
* Pension Increment 
 
   (0.19)     
CEO Age Above 60 *  (+)     4.43**   
* Pension Increment 
 
     (2.05)   
CEO Age Above 62*  (+)       2.46 
* Pension Increment 
 
       (0.84) 
         
CEO Tenure (-) -0.07** -0.05* -0.06* -0.05* -0.04 -0.06* -0.06* 
  (-2.22) (-1.75) (-1.75) (-1.66) (-1.28) (-1.93) (-1.77) 
         
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 
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In Table 4.7, I consider another pension variable, pension to equity ratio, which is 
measured as the ratio of pension value to equity incentive value. These results are very 
similar to those in Table 4.6. For example, the coefficient for the interactive variable 
CEO Age above 60* Pension to equity in column 5 of Panel A is -0.01 at 10% 
significance level. This suggests that R&D intensity is falling if a CEO is over 60 and 
has more defined benefit pension value relative to the value of his or her equity 
incentives. In Panels B and C of Table 4.7, I use the alternative proxies of R&D 
spending: Abnormal R&D and Abnormal R&D Cuts. These coefficients of interactive 
variables between career horizon and pension to equity value are in the direction of 
what I expected (columns 5 and 7 of Panel B and C in Table 4.7), though fail to reach a 
significance level.  
 
In short, the above mentioned results in table 4.6 and 4.7 provide some evidence that 
pension (defined benefit) may discourage CEOs from getting involved in research and 
development expenditures as they approach retirement. This is consistent with my 
hypothesis (H12): Older CEOs with more pensions are less likely to spend in R&D 
expenditure.  
 
4.5.3. Ownership 
 
Ownership is the first type of equity incentive I consider. The results are reported in 
Table 4.8.  The coefficients for the variable of ownership are positive at least10% 
significance levels in all regression in Panel A, when I use R&D intensity as the 
dependent variable. This suggests that ownership encourages CEOs to spend more on 
R&D spending.  
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Table 4.7  Pension to Equity ratio, CEO career horizon, and R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons and pension to equity ratio. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in 
Table 4.1 Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
  (5.68) (3.94) (3.61) (6.06) (6.13) (5.82) (5.82) 
         
Pension to Equity  (-) -0.002 -0.003 0.01 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
  (-0.95) (-1.17) (0.17) (-1.30) (-0.50) (-1.03) (-0.81) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0004 0.0004     
   (0.93) (0.95)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.02** 0.03***   
     (2.55) (3.10)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.01* 0.02* 
       (1.67) (1.69) 
CEO Age  (-)   -0.0002     
* Pension to Equity    (-0.25)     
 
CEO Age Above 60  
 
(-) 
     
-0.01* 
  
* Pension to Equity 
 
     (-1.77)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)       -0.005 
* Pension to Equity 
 
       (-0.56) 
         
CEO Tenure (+) -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.25) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-1.08) (-1.47) (-0.83) (-0.93) 
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.28) (-5.30) (-5.29) (-5.61) (-5.63) (-5.40) (-5.38) 
Profitability (+) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.27) (-0.34) (-0.33) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.45) (-0.47) 
Leverage (-) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 
  (-1.52) (-1.55) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.82) (-1.56) (-1.60) 
FCF (+) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
  (15.43) (15.40) (15.38) (15.74) (15.79) (15.55) (15.53) 
Growth (+) -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.71) (-1.80) (-1.80) (-1.60) (-1.50) (-1.64) (-1.63) 
Firm Age  (-) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.58) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.39) (-0.31) (-0.39) (-0.35) 
         
         
Adjusted R2  0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 
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Table 4.7 (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons and pension to 
equity ratio. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (-0.96) (-0.03) (-0.01) (-0.82) (-0.75) (-0.80) (-0.79) 
         
Pension to Equity (-) -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003* -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-1.58) (-1.49) (-0.15) (-1.72) (-0.99) (-1.59) (-1.45) 
CEO Age (-)  -0.0001 -0.0001     
   (-0.14) (-0.14)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.01 0.01*   
     (1.25) (1.80)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.005 0.01 
       (0.79) (0.72) 
CEO Age  (-)   0.001     
* Pension to Equity 
 
   (0.05)     
CEO Age Above 60  (-)     -0.01   
* Pension to Equity 
 
     (-1.30)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)       -0.001 
* Pension to Equity 
 
       (-0.11) 
CEO Tenure (+) 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 
  (1.79) (1.74) (1.74) (1.17) (0.83) (1.31) (1.25) 
         
Adjusted R
2
  0.01 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for career horizons and pension to 
equity ratio. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.30 2.20* 2.34* 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.28 
  (1.44) (1.85) (1.82) (1.29)   (1.25) (1.20) (1.32) 
         
Pension to Equity (+) 0.28* 0.35** -0.33 0.31** 0.20 1.19 0.27* 
  (1.88) (2.22) (-0.14) (2.04) (1.20) (1.63) (1.71) 
CEO Age (+)  -0.04 -0.04     
   (-1.63) (-1.62)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)    -0.53 -1.07**   
     (-1.41) (-2.06)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)      -0.26 -0.42 
       (-0.51) (-0.69) 
CEO Age  (+)   0.01     
* Pension to Equity 
 
   (0.29)     
CEO Age Above 60  (+)     0.70   
* Pension to Equity 
 
     (1.58)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)       0.13 
* Pension to Equity 
 
       (0.26) 
         
CEO Tenure (-) -0.07** -0.06* -0.06* -0.05* -0.04 -0.06* -0.06* 
  (-2.28) (-1.79) (-1.78) (-1.68) (-1.33) (-1.93) (-1.86) 
 
         
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
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Table 4.8  Ownership, CEO career horizon R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons and ownership. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1 
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
.  
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
  (5.87) (4.20) (3.23) (6.27) (6.19) (5.97) (5.89) 
         
Ownership  (+) 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.71** 0.14*** 0.12* 0.12*** 0.11* 
  (2.84) (2.91) (2.14) (3.01) (1.87) (2.68) (1.69) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0004 0.001     
   (0.92) (1.32)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.02*** 0.02**   
     (2.60) (2.55)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.01 0.01 
       (1.33) (1.22) 
CEO Age  ?   -0.01*     
* Ownership 
 
   (-1.75)     
CEO Age Above 60  ?     0.03   
* Ownership 
 
     (0.37)   
CEO Age Above 62 ?       0.03 
* Ownership        (0.31) 
         
CEO Tenure (+) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
  (-1.85) (-2.06) (-1.68) (-2.07) (-2.58) (-2.13) (-2.12) 
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.50) (-5.52) (-5.42) (-5.83) (-5.83) (-5.57) (-5.57) 
Profitability (+) -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
  (-0.60) (-0.70) (-0.58) (-1.07) (-1.06) (-0.74) (-0.73) 
Leverage (-) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.46) (-1.53) (-1.52) (-1.51) (-1.50) 
FCF (+) 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
  (15.81) (15.77) (15.62) (16.14) (16.12) (15.89) (15.85) 
Growth (+) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.47) (-1.53) (-1.51) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-1.42) (-1.42) 
Firm Age  (-)   0.001   0.001   0.001   0.001  0.003  0.004  0.001 
   (0.03)  (0.04) ( 0.36)  (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.07) 
         
         
Adjusted R2  0.59 0.59 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.59 
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Table 4.8 (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons and ownership. 
The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -0.001 0.004 -0.01 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
  (-0.52) (0.26) (-0.74) (-0.44) (-0.73) (-0.47) (-0.74) 
         
Ownership (+) 0.07** 0.07** 0.64*** 0.07** 0.09** 0.07** 0.09** 
  (2.19) (2.15) (2.80) (2.18) (2.14) (2.08) (2.06) 
CEO Age (-)  -0.0001 0.0001     
   (-0.37) (0.52)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.01 0.01   
     (1.04) (1.15)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.002 0.004 
       (0.40) (0.59) 
CEO Age   ?   -0.01**     
* Ownership 
 
   (-2.53)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     -0.05   
* Ownership 
 
     (-0.82)   
CEO Age Above 62  ?       -0.05 
* Ownership 
 
       (-0.78) 
CEO Tenure (+) 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.14) (0.25) (0.80) (-0.21) (0.11) (0.03) (0.31) 
         
Adjusted R
2
  0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for career horizons and ownership. 
The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables  Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.30 1.74 1.95 0.29 0.24 0.20 0.24 
  (1.42) (1.49) (1.55) (1.35)   (1.06) (1.39) (1.09) 
         
Ownership (-) -4.32 -4.97 -14.69 -4.46 -2.64 -4.21 -2.29 
  (-1.31) (-1.39) (-0.66) (-1.32) (-0.71) (-1.27) (-0.63) 
CEO Age (+)  -0.03 -0.03     
   (-1.26) (-1.33)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)    -0.42 -0.37   
     (-1.17) (-1.02)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)      -0.21 -0.05 
       (-0.43) (-0.08) 
CEO Age  ?   0.17     
* Ownership 
 
   (0.44)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     -12.43   
* Ownership 
 
     (-0.46)   
CEO Age Above 62  ?        -36.09 
* Ownership 
 
       (-0.21) 
         
CEO Tenure (-) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
  (-1.20) (-0.80) (-0.83) (-0.80) (-0.56) (-1.08) (-0.83) 
         
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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I then add the career horizon variables and the interactive variables of both career 
horizon and ownership in regressions (columns 3, 5 and 7 in Panel A of Table 4.8).  
I find that the interactive variable of CEO age and ownership (column 3) becomes 
negative at 10% significance level. Such a coefficient suggests that although ownership 
is a good setting to encourage R&D spending, older CEOs with more ownership dislike 
risky investments dramatically. I find the similar result in column 3 of panel B in Table 
4.8, when I replace R&D intensity with Abnormal R&D as the dependent variable. The 
coefficient for the interactive variable CEO Age * Ownership is -0.01, at 5% 
significance level. In short, these results in Table 4.8 provide some evidence to support 
the prospect theory in my hypothesis (H13b): Older CEOs with more ownership will 
spend less on R&D expenditure. A possible explanation is that CEOs who have a large 
amount of equity incentives and a relatively short career horizon are more likely to 
preserve gains in equity incentives. Hence they become more risk-averse in such a 
situation.  
 
4.5.4. Stock options 
 
Stock options constitute the second type of equity incentives I examine. Table 4.9 
demonstrates the related results. In Panel A, I did not find a positive relationship 
between stock options holding and R&D intensity as expected. The coefficients for the 
variable of options are not statistically significant in all regressions. The interactive 
effects of stock options on different career horizons are examined in columns 3, 5 and 7 
of Panel A in Table 4.9. Those coefficients for interactive variables also fail to reach 
any statistically significant level. Similar results are found when Abnormal R&D and 
Abnormal R&D Cuts are introduced as dependent variables in the Panels B and C.  
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Table 4.9  Stock Options, CEO career horizon and R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons and stock options. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1 
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 
  (5.57) (4.26) (3.95) (5.99) (6.00) (5.77) (5.75) 
         
Options  (+) -0.18 -0.29 0.27 -0.38 -0.16 -0.35 -0.16 
  (-0.30) (-0.46) (0.04) (-0.63) (-0.24) (-0.56) (-0.24) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0003 0.003     
   (0.72) (0.66)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.02** 0.02**   
     (2.46) (2.46)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.02* 0.02* 
       (1.69) (1.77) 
CEO Age  ?   -0.01     
* Options 
 
   (-0.08)     
CEO Age Above 60  ?     -0.90   
* Options 
 
     (-0.68)   
CEO Age Above 62 ?       -0.97 
* Options        (-0.65) 
         
CEO Tenure (+) -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.39) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-1.24) (-1.28) (-0.99) (-1.09) 
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.18) (-5.12) (-5.08) (-5.52) (-5.52) (-5.33) (-5.28) 
Profitability (+) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
  (-0.38) (-0.47) (-0.46) (-0.83) (-0.83) (-0.58) (-0.52) 
Leverage (-) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.03* -0.03 -0.03 
  (-1.59) (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-1.64) 
FCF (+) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
  (15.33) (15.29) (15.27) (15.62) (15.60) (15.45) (15.43) 
Growth (+) -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.60) (-1.65) (-1.65) (-1.46) (-1.44) (-1.52) (-1.50) 
Firm Age  (-)   -0.002   -0.002   -0.002   -0.001   -0.002  -0.001   -0.002 
   (-0.79)  (-0.80) ( -0.79)  (-0.69)  (-0.80)  (-0.61)  (-0.71) 
         
         
Adjusted R2  0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
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Table 4.9 (Continued)  
 
Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons and stock 
options. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.70) (0.14) (0.15) (-0.53) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.44) 
         
Options (+) -0.55 -0.54 -0.77 -0.62 -0.72 -0.63 -0.66 
  (-0.40) (-1.32) (-0.16) (-1.56) (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.46) 
CEO Age (-)  -0.0001 -0.0001     
   (-0.27) (-0.27)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.01 0.01   
     (1.25) (0.84)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.01 0.01 
       (1.02) (0.75) 
CEO Age   ?   0.004     
* Options 
 
   (0.05)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     0.35   
* Options 
 
     (0.38)   
CEO Age Above 62 ?       0.13 
* Options 
 
       (0.13) 
CEO Tenure (+) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.003 0.003 
  (1.59) (1.59) (1.58) (0.96) (0.11) (1.02) (1.02) 
         
No. of Obs.  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Adjusted R
2
  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for career horizons and stock 
options. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.25 1.82 1.82 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.21 
  (1.16) (1.57) (1.36) (0.99)   (0.81) (0.96) (0.97) 
         
Options (-) 50.75 59.37 58.13 57.62 74.10 56.43 53.92 
  (1.52) (1.55) (0.15) (1.60) (1.61) (1.56) (1.43) 
CEO Age (+)  -0.03 -0.03     
   (-1.38) (-1.22)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)    -0.51 -0.32   
     (-1.37) (-0.72)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)      -0.45 -0.51 
       (-0.88) (-0.79) 
CEO Age   ?   0.02     
* Options 
 
   (0.01)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     -59.20   
* Options 
 
     (-0.77)   
CEO Age Above 62  ?        13.20 
* Options        (0.15) 
         
CEO Tenure (-) -0.06** -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
  (-2.07) (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.44) (-1.46) (-1.62) (-1.60) 
         
No. of Obs.  310 310 310 310 310 310 310 
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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In short, I do not observe a positive relationship between CEO stock options holding 
and R&D spending. There is also no evidence to support  that stock option will 
encourage or discourage R&D spending among CEOs with short career horizons.  
 
4.5.5. Restricted shares 
 
The last type of equity incentives I consider is restricted shares. The related results are 
shown in Table 4.10. In Panel A, there is some evidence suggesting that restricted 
shares may discourage R&D spending. The coefficients remain negative for the variable 
of shares in all regressions, and most of them reach 10% significance levels. For 
instance, the coefficient for the variable of shares in column 1 of Panel A in Table 4.10 
is -3.48 at 10% significance level. This suggests that if a CEO has 1% more restricted 
shares out of a firm‟s total shares outstanding, the firm will reduce 3.48% R&D 
spending in terms of R&D intensity. A Possible explanation for the negative effect of 
restricted shares on R&D spending relies on vesting conditions of restricted shares. 
Total shareholder return (TSR) is the most common vesting condition for restricted 
shares (KPMG, 2007). If risky investments (e.g. R&D spending) create uncertainty of 
stock return, it may lower the possibility of vesting restricted shares. Hence restricted 
shares may discourage CEOs from getting involved in R&D spending. Ryan and 
Wiggins (2002) report similar results for the relationship between R&D spending and 
restricted shares grants by analysing US data. They document a negative relationship 
between R&D spending and restricted shares grant. As far as the interactive effect of 
restricted shares and the career horizon is concerned, I find no evidence in columns 3, 5 
and 7 of Panel A. Similar results hold when I use alternative R&D spending variables in 
Panels B and C.  
 
128 
 
Table 4.10  Restricted Shares, CEO career horizon and R&D spending 
 
Panel A: R&D intensity  
The panel presents OLS regression results of R&D spending intensity (R&D/Sales) on various variables for CEO career 
horizons and restricted shares. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1 
Coefficients for industry and year dummies are included but not reported. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (6.01) (4.61) (4.52) (6.32) (6.34) (6.10) (6.09) 
         
Shares (+) -3.48* -3.37* -21.33 -3.31* -2.81 -3.25* -3.14 
  (-1.84) (-1.76) (-1.20) (-1.77) (-1.31) (-1.72) (-1.60) 
CEO Age (-)  0.0001 -0.0002     
   (0.32) (-0.36)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.02** 0.02**   
     (2.33) (2.27)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.01 0.01 
       (1.48) (1.37) 
CEO Age  ?   0.34     
* Shares 
 
   (1.02)     
CEO Age Above 60  ?     -2.99   
* Shares 
 
     (-0.62)   
CEO Age Above 62 ?       -1.31 
* Shares        (-0.19) 
         
CEO Tenure (+) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.15) (-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.94) (-0.98) (-0.68) (-0.69) 
Size (+) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  (-5.56) (-5.48) (-5.34) (-5.81) (-5.83) (-5.62) (-5.61) 
Profitability (+) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-0.28) (-0.32) (-0.16) (-0.71) (-0.79) (-0.46) (-0.48) 
Leverage (-) -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
  (-1.39) (-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.45) (-1.35) (-1.42) (-1.41) 
FCF (+) 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
  (15.15) (14.98) (14.77) (15.42) (15.39) (15.25) (15.18) 
Growth (+) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.58) (-1.60) (-1.53) (-1.44) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-1.52) 
Firm Age  (-)   -0.001   -0.002   -0.002   -0.001   -0.002  -0.001   -0.002 
   (-0.67)  (-0.68) ( -0.72)  (-0.58)  (-0.63)  (-0.52)  (-0.51) 
         
         
Adjusted R2  0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
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Table 4.10 (Continued)  
 
. Panel B: Abnormal R&D   
The panel presents OLS regression results of Abnormal R&D on various variables for CEO career horizons and restricted 
shares. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  -0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (-1.19) (0.38) (0.54) (-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.09) (-1.08) 
         
Shares (+) -0.38 -0.53 -5.04 -0.29 0.01 -0.30 -0.31 
  (-0.32) (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.24) (0.01) (-0.24) (-0.24) 
CEO Age (-)  -0.0001 -0.0002     
   (-0.60) (-0.71)     
CEO Age Above 60 (-)    0.01 0.01   
     (1.02) (1.17)   
CEO Age Above 62 (-)      0.004 0.004 
       (0.72) (0.61) 
CEO Age   ?   0.08     
* Shares 
 
   (0.38)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     -1.92   
* Shares 
 
     (-0.58)   
CEO Age Above 62 ?       0.11 
* Shares 
 
       (0.12) 
CEO Tenure (+) 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.0004 0.0004 0.004 0.004 
  (1.68) (1.78) (1.80) (1.13) (0.10) (1.23) (1.22) 
         
Adjusted R
2
  0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
 
Panel C: Abnormal R&D Cuts  
The panel presents logit regression results of Abnormal_R&_Cuts on various variables for career horizons and restricted 
shares. The sample consists of 310 observations in 2003-2007.All variables are defined in Table 4.1.The Z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Exp. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept  0.46** 2.08* 2.24 0.46** 0.49** 0.45** 0.46** 
  (2.23) (1.74) (1.51) (2.17)   (2.27) (2.13) (2.17) 
         
Shares (-) -124.75 -154.56 -329.08 -134.32 -171.61 -131.34 -149.03 
  (-1.27) (-1.52) (-0.33) (-1.35) (-1.60) (-1.42) (-1.45) 
CEO Age (+)  -0.03 -0.03     
   (-1.37) (-1.22)     
CEO Age Above 60 (+)    -0.45 -0.66   
     (-1.23) (-1.53)   
CEO Age Above 62 (+)      -0.35 -0.54 
       (-0.70) (-0.94) 
CEO Age   ?   3.28     
* Shares 
 
   (0.18)     
CEO Age Above 60   ?     252.91   
* Shares 
 
     (0.94)   
CEO Age Above 62  ?        257.06 
* Shares        (0.68) 
         
CEO Tenure (-) -0.06** -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
  (-2.01) (-1.57) (-1.46) (-1.42) (-1.38) (-1.60) (-1.55) 
         
Mc Fadden R
2
  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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To summarize, I find some evidence to suggest that restricted shares may discourage 
R&D spending, in general. However, I do not find the role of restricted shares on R&D 
spending when the factors of CEO career horizon are added.  
 
4.6. Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, I intend to examine two questions: (1) whether career horizon will affect 
R&D investment decisions, and (2) whether and how the interaction of career horizon 
and CEO compensation may change the pattern of R&D spending. Based on previous 
literature, I expect to observe a positive relationship between CEO career horizon 
lengths and R&D spending, because the uncertainty of return and long pay-back period 
of R&D spending may not fully benefit CEOs with short career horizon.  
 
As far as CEO compensation is concerned, I expect that pension will discourage risky 
investments as CEOs approach retirement, because pension will make CEOs potential 
debt-holders of the firm, and a short career horizon means that the access day to pension 
cash out is approaching. I have two opposite hypotheses for equity compensation: the 
“interest alignment” hypothesis and the “wealth preservation “hypothesis. The former 
suggests that equity incentives are able to align interests of shareholders and CEOs, no 
matter how short the career horizon a CEO has. Hence, equity incentives may 
encourage R&D spending even as CEOs approach retirement. The latter theory 
indicates that a CEO whose career horizon is short is less likely to spend on risky 
investments if they have a high level of equity incentives. The reason is that outgoing 
CEOs may intend to preserve wealth gains in their equity holdings. If R&D spending 
may jeopardize the certainty of their “realized gains”, they will curtail such 
investments.  
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By using UK FTSE 350 data from 2003-2007, I document some empirical results for 
the above mentioned questions. First of all, I do not find that CEOs will spend less on 
R&D when their career horizons become shorter. After control for equity incentives, I 
even find that older CEOs (aged above 62) spend more on R&D expenses. Such result 
is not consistent with my hypothesis (H11), but similar to some recent empirical 
evidence (e.g. Conyon and Florou, 2006; Cazier, 2011). A possible explanation is that 
the recent corporate governance system realizes the incentives for R&D cuts when 
CEOs approach retirement. The enhanced corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. 
increasing monitoring roles of outside directors) may limit CEOs‟ short-sighted 
behaviour.  
 
Secondly, I document that pension will discourage R&D spending among older CEOs.  
This is consistent with my hypothesis (H12) that the debt-like compensation (defined 
benefit pension) makes CEOs more risk-averse when the day to access such assets 
approaches (retirement). The unique role of pension in risk aversion is highlighted in 
the condition of a short career horizon.  
 
Thirdly, I observe that ownership will encourage R&D spending in general. However, 
older CEOs with more ownership become dramatically risk-averse, which is consistent 
with my “wealth preservation” hypothesis (H13b). A high level of ownership combined 
with a short career horizon makes CEOs more sensitive to share price and generate the 
intention to preserve gains when they are still in office. Hence they are less likely to 
spend on R&D expenditures in such circumstances.  
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Fourthly, restricted shares demonstrate some negative effects on risky investments. The 
vesting conditions of restricted shares and the linear pay-off structure may explain parts 
of the “un-expected” risk-averse incentives. Those results are consistent with US 
studies (e.g. Ryan and Wiggins, 2002) suggesting that the roles of restricted shares, 
stock options and ownership on risky investments are complicated.   
 
Overall, the study in this chapter shows some evidence to support the interactive 
relationship between career horizon, CEO compensation and risky investment 
decisions. The remuneration committees should consider the combined “side-effects” of 
certain pay components and career horizons on value-added investment decisions. 
Appropriate adjustment for CEO compensation structure is required as CEOs approach 
the end of their career life. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
 
In this thesis, I examine the role of CEO compensation in the cost of debt, expectations 
management and the investment policy. This study provides some interesting evidence 
explaining managerial behavior and debt-holders‟ reaction from the viewpoint of CEO 
compensation. It also echoes and extends a growing number of studies that demonstrate 
the link between CEO compensation and managerial opportunistic behavior (e.g. Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Kalyta, 2009).  
 
Chapter 2 examines the link between CEO compensation and the cost of debt. I expect 
that rational debt-holders will consider the impact of CEO compensation on risk-
seeking or risk-avoiding incentives, and incorporate such information when pricing 
debts. I argue that CEO pay components that may provide risk-avoiding incentives will 
be favoured by debt-holders, while pay components which generate risk-seeking 
incentives will lead to a higher cost of borrowing. Consistent with my expectations, I 
find that cash bonus and pension reduce the cost of debt, because of their unique roles 
in risk-aversion incentive generation. On the other hand, equity- based compensation 
results in a soaring cost of borrowing, which is consistent with previous literature (e.g. 
Brockman, Martin and Unlu, 2010). Among equity incentives, stock options outweigh 
ownership in terms of increasing the cost of debt. In addition, debt-holders are more 
sensitive to performance-vested stock options (PVSOs) compared with traditional stock 
options (TSOs), due to the different features of these stock options. In short, I provide 
some evidence that bondholders do take various types of CEO compensation into 
account when pricing publicly traded debt.  
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In Chapter 3, I investigate the possible link between CEO compensation and 
expectations management. By dampening the market expectations, expectations 
management will help CEOs to achieve financial analysts‟ earnings forecasts, 
benefiting subsequent CEO bonuses and insider trading. Hence I expect that the 
possibility of expectations management is positively related to bonus and equity-based 
compensation which will be vested in the following year. My results confirm part of my 
hypotheses. I find that although bonus and equity-based compensation may motivate 
CEOs to care about achieving market expectations, only equity incentives lead to a 
higher probability of expectations management. This suggests that the wide spread 
expectations management in the UK (e.g. Athanasakou, Strong, and Walker, 2009) can 
be partly explained by CEO compensation. CEOs are motivated to manipulate 
information disclosure for personal gains.  
 
The issue of the career horizon problem is examined in Chapter 4. The career horizon 
problem hypothesizes that CEOs with a short career horizon are likely to reject long-
term investment projects. The long pay-back period and the uncertainty of the outcome 
from that investment may not fully benefit exiting managers. However, there is no 
conclusive view on the career horizon problem (e.g. Conyon and Florou, 2006). My re-
examination provides some additional material in this debate. In addition, I argue that 
the role of CEO compensation on investment may be varied in different lengths of CEO 
career horizon. Pension may make CEOs more risk-averse, especially as top managers 
approach retirement. Equity incentives may also discourage risky investments, because 
older CEOs are likely to preserve sure gains from equity incentives based on prospect 
theory. In this empirical study, I find no evidence to support the career horizon problem 
in the UK, which is similar with Conyon and Florou (2006). Older CEOs do not spend 
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less on research and development expenditures. Furthermore, I document that pensions 
effectively discourage research and development spending among older CEOs only.  
CEOs with more ownership and a shorter career horizon are also less likely to invest in 
research and development expenditure. Overall, these findings suggest that a firm‟s 
investment decision will be affected by the joint effects of CEO career horizon and his 
or her pay package. CEOs are motivated to adopt an investment strategy that will fit 
their own interests. 
 
This thesis contains both merits and limitations in sample and methodology. First of all, 
panel data is used in this thesis. The advantages of using panel data compared with 
cross section and time series data are significant. Panel data contains a larger sample 
size and more sample variability. It helps to control the impact of omitted bias and firm 
heterogeneity. For instance, different firms may have different compensation package 
design for their CEOs. Panel data allows me to use fixed effect analysis to control such 
firm heterogeneity, focusing on the within variation of CEO compensation in individual 
firms. Secondly, there are possible limitations of sample selection. In Chapter 2, the 
sample selection condition is firms which issue straight bond in pound sterling. It 
reduces the sample size from more than 600 firms in FTSE ALL to 44 firms finally. 
Such a relatively small sample may not represent the underlying population very well.  
More importantly, sample firms may have some particular characteristics (e.g less 
popular in New York and Frankfurt), so that they choose to issue straight bonds in 
British pound. If that is the case, the sample is not randomly selected. Thirdly, OLS 
analysis is used throughout this thesis. OLS analysis can help to ascertain relationship 
but not guarantee the underlying casual relationship. For instance, I study the casual 
relationship between CEO compensation and the cost of debt in Chapter 2. My 
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explanation is that different CEO compensation structure will lead to high or low costs 
of debt. The alternative explanation may be that different costs of debt may force 
remuneration committee to adjust CEO compensation structure. Fourthly, there is 
possible endogeneity problem in this study.  For instance, I investigate the relationship 
between R&D spending, CEO compensation and career horizon in Chapter 4. Both 
variables of CEO compensation and career horizon are treated as right-hand-side 
variables. A sensible question is whether CEO compensation is also decided by CEO 
career horizon. If that is the case, the variable of CEO compensation is endogenous as 
an independent variable in the analysis. The two-stage instrumental variables procedure 
is a possible solution to overcome the suspicious endogeneity problem. In the first step, 
variable of CEO compensation is treated as dependent variable, and then regressed on 
selected instrumental variables along with CEO career horizon. The appropriate 
instrumental variables include corporate governance variables (board size and 
independence), CEO education level, lagged value of CEO compensation, stock return 
volatility and the number of directorship for CEOs (e.g. Palia, 2001; Ertugrul and 
Hegde, 2008). In the second step, the variable of R&D spending is treated as dependent 
variables, and regressed on career horizon, control variables and the predicted value of 
CEO compensation from the first regression. Therefore, by employing the two-stage 
instrumental variables procedure, the suspicious endogenous variable of CEO 
compensation becomes exogenous.  
 
This thesis also has several limitations in other aspects with room to grow in future 
studies. For the study of the cost of debt in Chapter 2, the data covers the time period 
from 2003 to 2006 only. It may be interesting to extend the data after the financial crisis 
in 2007. If debt-holders are rational and informed, how will the financial crisis change 
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their attitude to CEO compensation when pricing a firm‟s debt? Will debt-holders 
reward firms that provide more risk-avoiding incentives pay to their CEOs, and require 
a higher risk premium from firms that grant more risk-seeking incentives pay in the 
post-financial crisis period? For the study of expectations management in Chapter 3, I 
use methods developed by the literature to capture so-called expectations management 
(e.g. Bartov, Givoly and Hayn, 2002; Matsumoto, 2002). Examining observable 
managerial information disclosure activities (e.g. earnings warning and managerial 
earnings forecasts) may provide additional support for my results. For the study of 
career horizon and investment decision in Chapter 4, I focus on one type of investment 
activity (R&D spending) only. Other investment decisions (e.g. firm restructuring, 
mergers and acquisitions and capital expenditure) may be additional appropriate 
proxies. Will the joint effect of CEO career horizon and compensation on R&D 
spending remains the same for other types of investment? In addition, some corporate 
governance variables (e.g. board structure and outside directors‟ incentives) are omitted 
in this study. Those corporate governance variables may provide a better explanation 
for the non-existence of the career horizon problem in the UK.   
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Appendix  
Valuation of stock options and restricted shares from BoardEx 
1.    Black Scholes calculation and assumptions for Stock option  
C = SN(d1) – Xe-rtN(d2) 
Where d1 = (ln(S/X) + (r + σ2/2)T) /σ(sqrt(T)) 
Where d2 = (ln(S/X) + (r - σ2/2)T) /σ(sqrt(T)) 
Black-Scholes requires a series of data items which are defined below: 
•     No. of Options = to that entered 
•     Share Price = to that of the company at the Annual Report date selected 
•     Time to expiry = Expiry date – annual report date 
•     Dividend Yield = 0 
•     Volatility = a 100-day historic moving average 
•     Risk Free Interest Rate:  UK = 6 months Libor rate 
•     Exercise Price = to that entered or a calculated exercise price (a calculated price 
       is derived as follows:  from information disclosed an Intrinsic Value, the No. Of  
            Options and the Date of valuation the exercise price 
            = Share Price - (Intrinsic Value/No. of Options).   
 
    2.  Calculation and assumptions for Share granted and ownership 
• The estimated value of restricted shares = number of restricted shares (Max.)  
                                                                     * Share price (end of year) 
• The estimated value of ownership = number of shares owned by executives  
                                                            * Share price (end of year) 
 
